austin-murphy-the-triumph-of-evil
austin-murphy-the-triumph-of-evil
austin-murphy-the-triumph-of-evil
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
64 THE TRIUMPH OF EVIL<br />
1966). East Germany had <strong>the</strong> most restrictive travel policies because<br />
West Germany tried to entice its skilled workers to emigrate not only<br />
through much better-paying jobs (easily obtainable because <strong>of</strong> similar<br />
culture and language and, more importantly, because <strong>of</strong>West Germany's<br />
<strong>of</strong>fer <strong>of</strong> immediate and automatic citizenship to East German immi<br />
grants) but also with sizable cash payments and many o<strong>the</strong>r benefits<br />
(Der Tagesspiege/, 1990f).5 West Germany could afford to be so "gen<br />
erous" to East German immigrants because it had impoverished East<br />
Germany after World War II by forcing it alone to pay <strong>the</strong> entire amount<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> enormous reparations to <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union that was contracted for<br />
Germany as a whole by <strong>the</strong> USA at Potsdam in 1945 (Apel, 1966).<br />
O<strong>the</strong>r forms <strong>of</strong> economic warfare and extortion (where <strong>the</strong> far greater<br />
wealth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> capitalist countries gave <strong>the</strong>m powerful advantages)<br />
also played a part in communist Eastern Europe moving toward capitalist<br />
systems. In particular, lucrative trade, loans, and aid were <strong>of</strong>ten<br />
<strong>of</strong>fered to communist countries if <strong>the</strong>y conducted capitalistic economic<br />
"reforms", while "non-reforming" communist countries were typically<br />
confronted with trade barriers. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> threat <strong>of</strong> an escalation <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> arms race, which was especially counterproductive to <strong>the</strong> poorer<br />
communist countries that had to expend a larger percent <strong>of</strong> national<br />
income to defense as a result, also produced motivation to appease<br />
Western demands for capitalist reforms (Marcy, 1990).<br />
In addition, ethnic, cultural, and religious differences were a factor<br />
in <strong>the</strong> break-up <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Eastern European communist bloc. In particular,<br />
many people in Eastern European countries and in <strong>the</strong> former Soviet<br />
Union had resented being dominated by Russians since <strong>the</strong> pre-communist<br />
days <strong>of</strong> czarist Russia (Matlock, 1995), especially after Russia<br />
killed or exiled millions from <strong>the</strong> Caucasus in <strong>the</strong> 1800s (Levene and<br />
Roberts, 1999). However, economic subsidies and investments in <strong>the</strong><br />
non-Russian republics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union (as well as <strong>the</strong> grant <strong>of</strong> some<br />
political autonomy) had greatly reduced such tensions under communism<br />
(Marcy, 1990) and eliminated <strong>the</strong> need for ethnic-related repression<br />
(Getty, Rittersporn and Zemskov, 1993). The ethnic problems<br />
reemerged only under Gorbachev's capitalist reforms in <strong>the</strong> mid-I980s<br />
under Perestroika, as those free market policies resanctified <strong>the</strong> quest<br />
for personal or regional gain (at <strong>the</strong> expense <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs), which encouraged<br />
ethnic or nationalist movements (Marcy, 1990). For instance, an<br />
CHAPTER 1 65<br />
earlier Soviet policy <strong>of</strong> investing substantial sums into less developed<br />
areas <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union (in order to bring <strong>the</strong>ir income closer to that<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> historically richer Russians) was drastically cut back under Pere<br />
stroika for reasons <strong>of</strong> economic efficiency, and those who opposed such<br />
reforms under Gorbachev were purged from power, <strong>the</strong>reby magnify<br />
ing <strong>the</strong> resentment <strong>of</strong> Russian domination and causing a reawakening <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> nationalist or independence movements (Marcy, 1990). The Soviet<br />
Union's decision to charge its Eastern European allies capitalist market<br />
prices for oil in <strong>the</strong> late 1980s also contributed to <strong>the</strong> 1989 revolutions<br />
among its Eastern European allies, as <strong>the</strong> resulting slowing <strong>of</strong> eco<br />
nomic growth <strong>the</strong>re increased <strong>the</strong> people's dissatisfaction with <strong>the</strong> com<br />
munist system (and <strong>the</strong>ir Russian defenders), especially in East Ger<br />
many (Ritschl, 1996) where <strong>the</strong> original revolution broke out. The Joint<br />
Economic Committee (1988) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> USA Congress itself was well<br />
aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> capitalist reforms whicn <strong>the</strong> USA was pres<br />
suring Eastern Europe to undertake quite naturally increased income<br />
inequality, which caused "tensions among <strong>the</strong> nationality groups."<br />
The War in Afghanistan<br />
Also potentially contributing to unrest among ethnic groups in <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviet bloc (especially in <strong>the</strong> Moslem republics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> USSR), and to<br />
dissatisfaction amongst <strong>the</strong> Soviet people in general, was <strong>the</strong> 1979-89<br />
military participation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> USSR in a civil war in Moslem Afghani<br />
stan, which provided some evidence <strong>of</strong> actual Soviet atrocities that led<br />
many people in <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union to question <strong>the</strong> legitimacy and moral<br />
ity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir government and leaders (Kuperman, 1999). The conflict<br />
started when CIA-financed rebels began terrorist attacks against a com<br />
munist government (Blum, 1995), which bad (completely independent<br />
<strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Soviet Union or its agents) overthrown a feudal dictatorship ear<br />
lier in 1978 (Rodman, 1994). This government <strong>the</strong>n invited Soviet mili<br />
tary forces into <strong>the</strong> country to aid in stopping <strong>the</strong> CIA-sponsored terror<br />
ism (Blum, 1995). The rebel terrorists were being led by ''Ultra-conser<br />
vative" Moslem religious leaders and landowners, who initially were<br />
largely supported by bandits and smugglers (especially on <strong>the</strong> border<br />
with Pakistan), and later by many Afghan males (especially in rural<br />
areas) who opposed <strong>the</strong> communist government acts which decom<br />
modified women (i.e., forbid <strong>the</strong>ir sale) and which <strong>of</strong>fered education<br />
(including literacy) and o<strong>the</strong>r rights to Afghan females (Urban, 1990).