austin-murphy-the-triumph-of-evil

178 THE TRIUMPH OF EVIL
German secret police hindered efforts sufficiently to prevent procure­
ment of a large enough sample to conduct statistical analysis (only 5
surveys were completed before I was blatantly told that there would be
no fu rther cooperation, and that I was endangering myself and anyone
involved in the survey). The limited sample collected did indicate emi­
grants would on average be willing to pay 3.13%, 6. 1 5%, 6.82%,
1.89%, and 3.05% (cumulating to 21.04%) of their annual West German
income to eliminate unemployment, drugs, crime, uncertain prices, and
life-sustaining money anxieties (like for fo od and shelter) in West Ger­
many, respectively.15 The emigrants were fo und on average to have been
willing to have paid 3.06% of their East German income in return for
free elections in East Germany according to Western standards.
Separately, the emigrants also were fo und to have been willing to pay
an average 3.63% of their East German income to eliminate the East
German secret police. This number may be much higher than for most
East Germans, most of whom were not harassed by the Stasi for want­
ing to leave the country (Henke and Engelmann, 1995). In addition, a
similar question on the West German secret police was unfortunately
not included in the survey (my own neglect in this respect resulted from
me still being partially under the incredibly strong influence of Western
propaganda about the "kindness" of the West).
From my personal experiences in East Germany prior to and during
the revolution, from stories from individuals, and from anticommunist
books on the subject, such as by Gauck ( 1991) and Furian ( 1991 ), the
East German secret police appears to be less heinous than the West
German secret police, whose organization, leaders, agents, and laws
were inherited from Hitler's fascist Germany (Schulz, 1982). Although
both secret police fo rces tend to come into play only when one bas
the "wrong" political opinion, the West German secret police probably
operates more negatively, as explained in Chapter 3. For instance,
the West German secret police may be much more active in opening
mail without justification (Berliner Allgemeine, 1990a) than their East
German counterparts ever were (Diedrich, Ehlert, and Wenzke, 1998).
In addition, the total extent of their other illegal activities like engaging
in arms smuggling activities (Wochenpost, 1991) and harassing peaceful
environmentalists and leftists in West Germany (including tailing, infil·
trating organizations with spies, and spreading information to damage
CHAPTER 4
179
the careers and personal lives of people with the "wrong" political opin­
ion) is unknown (Der Spiegel, l992b, l993b ), but the number of vic­
tims of West German secret police harassment is definitely in the mil­
lions (Schulz, 1982). It is possible that domestic spying, harassment,
and assassinations by the secret police in "free" countries like West
Germany may exceed that of the former eastern bloc countries, just as
it may in the USA itself (Cockburn, 1993). A 1993 survey is consistent
with the latter hypothesis, as it indicated that more East Germans fe lt
safe from encroachments by the state in their lives in 1988 under East
German government rule than they did under united West German gov­
ernment rule in the 1990s (Northoff, 1995).
Moreover, the socially undesirable predominance in pure capitalism
of naked self-interest and monetarization of personal worth, family,
human relationships, and life itself should also be factored into the anal­
ysis (Marx and Engels, l988a). Besides contributing to huge black mar­
kets for sex (Falck, 1998), narcotics (Dietz, 1983), weapons (Schmidt­
Eenboom, 1995), and tax evasion (McGee, 1999) in West Germany,
these factors also contribute to a much higher level of social dissatis­
faction, sexual misuse of children and women, and violence in capital­
ist countries (Nordeutsche Neueste Nachrichten, 1992). Although some
of these capitalist variables might have positive utility to some people
(s�ch as to perverts and criminals), and although monetary consider­
atto . ns also existed to a lesser degree in East German life, the relative
desirability of such variables might significantly affect conclusions on
relative quality of life and living standards. In addition, a nonfinancial
a_n alysis of relative living standards should also incorporate an evalua­
�10� of the fact that the communist East German system created a "nour­
l�hm � " cultural life about which Olshausen (1996) states, "Those who
hved 1t do miss it."
Cia� considerations is further verified in a 1999 survey of East Germans
. The superiority of the communist system with respect to nonfinan­
which indicated that, despite a significantly higher standard of living
after the merger with the richer West Germany (and despite greater
travel freedom), over 40% of East Germans were happier under the old
cornm . .
unlst system (CNN, 1999a). The superiority of commurnsm on
nonfinanc· 1 · · 'ty 'f
Eas t Germany had not had such adverse postwar treatment.
· 1
Ia ISSues would have reinforced its financta supenon t