Party Autonomy in International Property Law - Peace Palace Library
Party Autonomy in International Property Law - Peace Palace Library
Party Autonomy in International Property Law - Peace Palace Library
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D. Assignment; F<strong>in</strong>ancial Instruments; Insolvency <strong>Law</strong><br />
the amounts paid out under the credit protection sold by the protection<br />
seller. Moreover, credit default swaps enable protection sellers to take on<br />
credit risks aga<strong>in</strong>st entities without hav<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>in</strong>vest directly <strong>in</strong> securities<br />
issued by those entities. In our example, there may be regulatory reasons<br />
that make it difficult for Rock Solid Bank to purchase debt <strong>in</strong>struments<br />
issued by Issuer directly, but by sell<strong>in</strong>g credit protection it has assumed<br />
the risk without need<strong>in</strong>g to purchase debt <strong>in</strong>struments. This is also one of<br />
the reasons why sell<strong>in</strong>g credit protection may be quite dangerous; without<br />
credit default swaps, tak<strong>in</strong>g on the credit risk of EUR 20,000,000<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st Issuer <strong>in</strong> our example would require an <strong>in</strong>itial <strong>in</strong>vestment of EUR<br />
20,000,000. If the risk is taken on through a credit default swap, no such<br />
<strong>in</strong>itial <strong>in</strong>vestment by the protection seller is required. Consequently,<br />
credit default swaps <strong>in</strong>crease leverage. 5<br />
Moreover, as was shown dur<strong>in</strong>g the credit crisis, they <strong>in</strong>crease the overall<br />
stra<strong>in</strong>s on the f<strong>in</strong>ancial system because total losses of all market participants<br />
may well <strong>in</strong>crease due to a s<strong>in</strong>gle issuer of debt default<strong>in</strong>g on its<br />
obligations. There is no need to actually have a credit exposure aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
the reference entity (Issuer) to purchase credit protection. Many parties<br />
may have bought (and sold credit) protection and consequently, a s<strong>in</strong>gle<br />
default by Issuer may give rise to a great number of payment obligations<br />
that <strong>in</strong> aggregate may be many times larger than the total amount of debt<br />
issued by Issuer.<br />
The above shows that a credit default swap <strong>in</strong> its most basic form could<br />
be seen as an <strong>in</strong>surance aga<strong>in</strong>st a credit risk. It provides protection aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
non-performance of a debtor usually by a third party (the protection<br />
seller) undertak<strong>in</strong>g to pay an amount to the creditor if its debtor does<br />
not perform its obligations. 6 From a legal perspective, however, credit<br />
default swaps are not (and should not be) qualified as <strong>in</strong>surance contracts.<br />
Qualification as an <strong>in</strong>surance contract would lead to regulatory issues<br />
which might lead to the contracts be<strong>in</strong>g void because <strong>in</strong>surance may only<br />
be provided by licensed <strong>in</strong>surance undertak<strong>in</strong>gs. The key po<strong>in</strong>t here as a<br />
matter of English law is that under a credit default swap, payments must be<br />
5<br />
See EC Commission Communication, ‘Ensur<strong>in</strong>g efficient, safe and sound<br />
derivatives markets: Future policy actions’, 20 October 2009, COM(2009)<br />
563 / 4, available at ec.europa.eu / <strong>in</strong>ternal_market / f<strong>in</strong>ancial-markets / docs / <br />
derivatives / 20091020_563_en.pdf.<br />
6<br />
See Hudson 2009, § 43-42 et seq.; and Eric Dick<strong>in</strong>son, ‘Credit Default Swaps:<br />
So Dear To Us, So Dangerous’, available at ssrn.com / abstract=1315535.<br />
228<br />
Re<strong>in</strong>out M. Wibier<br />
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