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Than Shwe. But what has happened there since Suharto fell should still interest him for two reasons. The
first is that there has been almost total impunity both for the grasping dynasty and the torturing soldiers
who guarded it. One obstacle to political reform in Myanmar is the generals’ fear of war-crimes trials,
truth-and-justice commissions, or perhaps lynch-mobs. Indonesia should offer them hope that political
change need not inevitably bring retribution.
But Indonesia is an encouraging example for Myanmar for a better reason, too. Facing multiple long-lived
insurgencies, Myanmar’s generals fear for their country’s unity. In the late 1990s, Indonesians also
worried about national disintegration and communal strife. Yet except for tiny East Timor, the country
remains in one piece. Moreover, under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, just re-elected president, it is
politically stable, economically resilient and largely peaceful. All political transitions are bumpy. But
Indonesia’s has been surprisingly free of turbulence. And the country is showing signs of some political
self-confidence. This week it reverted to the timid, “non-interfering traditions” of the Association of South-
East Asian Nations (ASEAN), curtailing a gathering in Jakarta of exiled Burmese opposition leaders. But at
ASEAN’s summit in July, it spoke out for more robust regional human-rights standards and against the
Burmese junta.
There are two ways, however, in which the Burmese dictatorship differs crucially from Suharto’s. The first
is that, whereas Suharto faced only insipid opposition leaders, Than Shwe has a nemesis, Aung San Suu
Kyi, who is hugely popular at home and internationally revered. There was something personally vindictive
about the Alice in Wonderland trial to which his junta has just subjected her. Not just the proceedings
(“sentence first—verdict afterwards”) but the supposed crime itself—in effect, being poorly guarded—were
beyond ridicule. His intervention to show “clemency” by cutting her sentence was salt in her wounds. The
whole farce speaks of Than Shwe’s determination at all costs to keep her incarcerated during next year’s
election. The army will never forget its embarrassment in 1990 when her party trounced the army’s
candidates. She was already in detention.
The Pyongyang consensus
Second, Suharto’s claim to paternity over development was not all hot air. Under him Indonesia achieved
average annual economic growth of over 6% for three decades. Inequality was stark, but the benefits of
growth were felt by most Indonesians. In Myanmar, a tiny, pampered middle class enjoy luxury hotels,
golf and shopping malls in Yangon; the generals bask in comfort in the mountain fastness of Naypyidaw,
their absurdist capital. But most of Myanmar’s people still toil away as subsistence farmers. Economic
collapse is not a risk. There is nothing to collapse.
In this respect, perhaps Than Shwe has, after all, found a new role model. That other vicious, nutty
recluse, Kim Jong Il, shows the same almost infinite capacity to let his people suffer to keep him in power
and cognac, and has an appealing knack for nukes. However, he exudes neither the durability nor the
respectability commanded by Suharto in his pomp—let alone by the popularly elected Mr Yudhoyono, who,
Than Shwe’s underlings might like to recall, used to be one of Suharto’s generals.
* “Military Politics, Islam and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation”, Institute of South-East Asian
Studies, Singapore
Copyright © 2009 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserved.
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