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Wilhelm Mohr

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<strong>Wilhelm</strong> <strong>Mohr</strong>. On World War II<br />

the skies in the same way the Army had towards territory and the Navy<br />

at sea.<br />

Independence not only in terms of mastering the craftsmanship of<br />

flying and all technical assistance of the like. But also independence in<br />

terms of thinking on how to organize and use airpower. It was on the<br />

basis of this – in 1936, while shimmers of clouds were gathering on<br />

the horizon – that Colonel Ruge, 46 then Army Chief-of-Staff, could<br />

develop a plan for establishing a united Air Force. The lack of an Air<br />

Force felt pressing – an Air Force where airplanes and ground-based air<br />

defence would supplement each other, with an integrated surveillance<br />

service. But the plan from Colonel Ruge went much further than that.<br />

For the first time one could see a clear strategic thought of how a united<br />

Air Force could be organized and used. Not only could an Air Force be<br />

used as point and regional defence, but also for reconnaissance and the<br />

inherent offensive ability to strike the enemy’s base area and invasion<br />

targets.<br />

The enthusiasts had influenced this process. There were critical voices,<br />

of course. Conformist attitudes will always be on the alert. But<br />

when this suggestion of a unified Air Force was stopped it was probably<br />

more due to the heavy expenditure this would include, together with the<br />

societal and security policy development at the time, when hopeful trust<br />

and political manoeuvring to ensure our nations security held a higher<br />

currency than to meet the demands of our Defence Forces. When some<br />

time later, one rather extraordinarily decided to buy aircraft – it was too<br />

late.<br />

In retrospect, we must allow ourselves to reflect upon what role and<br />

impact German airpower had on the attack on Norway 9 April 1940.<br />

We know the effect on Poland, but considering the distance to Norway,<br />

and with the build-up and organization Ruge’s air plan contained, it is at<br />

least my perception that the entire German enterprise would have been<br />

46 Refers to Otto Ruge, who <strong>Mohr</strong> later met for one hour close to Otta when Ruge had<br />

become the Commanding General for the Norwegian Defence Forces, and who shortly<br />

thereafter was appointed Norwegian Chief of Defence.<br />

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