Final Report (all chapters)

justifiable is the assumption that in the case of modern biomedical research, the adoption of a
system of oversight inspired by the RAC would be equally effective. In the 1970s, scientists’
cooperative behavior was fueled in large measure by a genuine fear of a public health disaster. It
was the existence of a perceived collective threat that prompted the scientific community to
voluntarily accept significant constraints to their research freedom. As soon as this threat
subsided, scientists began pressuring the RAC for a more expeditious and less strict review
process. For its part, the biotech industry quickly lost interest in submitting rDNA research
protocols to the RAC. In sum, both the RAC’s effectiveness and authority were predicated on the
existence of a serious external threat. Absent this threat, the RAC quickly lost much of its moral
authority.
This sequence of events is by no means unique. In the late nineteenth century, it was the
rapidly deteriorating public image of the legal profession in Chicago and New York that
prompted these two legal communities to create local bar associations and to adopt ethical
guidelines. 64 The adoption by many sectors of the chemical industry of extensive safety and
environmental management programs ultimately can be attributed to the devastating impact that
the disastrous gas leak in Bhopal, India, had on that industry’s public image. The efforts
undertaken by the nuclear power industry to improve nuclear power plant safety above and
beyond federal standards are a consequence of the Three Mile Island accident. 65
The
international maritime industry has an extensive system of self-regulation whose adoption was
prompted in part out of concern for the industry’s deteriorating public image. 66 This body of
literature demonstrates not only that trade and professional associations adopt programs of selfregulation
mostly (but not exclusively) in reaction to a collective external threat; it also shows
that the effectiveness of these measures crucially depends on the sustained presence of a threat.
Absent this threat, a private body of governance quickly looses its authority.
The RAC is an inadequate model of governance for another reason as well. Two core
functions of a contemporary self-regulatory body are to ensure that a broad range of ethical
concerns be heard and that competing ethical claims be adjudicated. Preventing ethical debates
from turning into an exceedingly narrow discussion of mostly procedural questions would
require broadening the participation in this deliberative body to social scientists and to
representatives of the general public. During its entire history, the RAC has rarely attempted to
broaden the scope of its ethical inquiries. In its early days, it was simply a body of scientists
responsible for examining largely scientific issues. In its late incarnation, the RAC did include
bioethicists on its gene therapy subcommittee, but the focus of its ethical inquiry remained
64
65
66
Jerome E. Carlin, Lawyers' Ethics: A Survey of the New York City Bar (New York: Sage, 1966); William T.
Gallagher, "Ideologies of Professionalism and the Politics of Self-Regulation in the California State Bar,"
Pepperdine Law Review 22 (1995).
Joseph V. Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety since Three Mile Island
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
Furger, "Accountability and Self-Governance Systems: The Case of the Maritime Industry."
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