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Final Report (all chapters)

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members and instructed to reach consensus on the punishment. Common sense suggests that the<br />

consensus rating should approximate the average of the views represented on each jury. The<br />

actual results were quite different. Juries whose median pre-deliberation punishment rating was 4<br />

or higher produced an even higher consensus rating. Conversely, juries whose pre-deliberation<br />

rating was sm<strong>all</strong>er than 4 shifted toward an even lower consensus rating. It appears that<br />

deliberation amplifies a jury’s pre-deliberation tendency, whatever that tendency may be. 49<br />

Fortunately, polarization is not an inevitable feature of group deliberation. Just as<br />

deliberative groups under certain circumstances polarize, under other circumstances, they<br />

depolarize. Producing “depolarization” is a surprisingly straightforward process. It merely<br />

requires that opposing views within a group be represented in sufficiently high numbers. If this<br />

structural condition is met, deliberation is very likely to move the participants closer to the<br />

median view. Deliberation in this case produces the expected outcome – it fosters compromise,<br />

and perhaps even a consensus. To the extent that minority views are represented in roughly equal<br />

numbers, the evidence suggests that reputational cascades (or the tendency to conform to the<br />

majority’s view) do not occur.<br />

The data discussed in chapter 8 provides some evidence, albeit indirect, that even<br />

individuals holding what seem to be unshakeable moral views may not be immune to<br />

depolarization. Even religious and conservative voters norm<strong>all</strong>y opposed to abortion rights show<br />

a measure of support for federal funding of embryonic stem cell research. Similar tendencies can<br />

be observed in Congress, where a growing number of Republican leaders, including many<br />

opposed to abortion, have expressed their support for a stronger role of the government in<br />

supporting stem cell research. Although the evidence in this case is only anecdotal, it appears<br />

that having a family member or a friend affected by a devastating disease may have prompted<br />

many conservative voters and their Congressional representatives to reconsider their firm<br />

opposition to stem cell research.<br />

In short, deliberation as understood in this report increases the credibility of a process of<br />

public consultation. It may also contribute to producing broadly acceptable political<br />

compromises, but only if the consultative process is designed to prevent group polarization and<br />

cascades. This can be accomplished by ensuring that the broadest possible range of societal<br />

positions is heard, and that these views are represented in roughly equal numbers.<br />

10.7.2 Other Features<br />

In addition to deliberation, institutions of public consultation have other distinctive features.<br />

Before diving into specifics, however, a qualification is in order. Throughout this report, we<br />

frequently use the term “consultation” instead of the more common “participation.” The term<br />

“public participation” has generated both considerable interest and considerable confusion, in<br />

large measure because its advocates often fail to specify the role public participation should play<br />

in the administrative and regulatory context. This becomes especi<strong>all</strong>y problematic at the federal<br />

49<br />

Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent, p.114.<br />

268

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