Final Report (all chapters)

to extract benefits for their members or to prevent or mitigate costly laws and regulations. Even
positions advocated by public interest groups can be explained by selfish motives.
Perhaps surprisingly, such a simplistic and cynical view of modern politics has considerable
explanatory power. 2 A central finding emerging from this body of literature is that organized
interest groups tend to have an influence over legislatures and regulatory agencies
disproportionate to their actual political weight. Undue influence often translates into laws, rules,
and regulations that directly benefit these interest groups at the expense of broader societal
interests. Their influence reflects their financial support for election campaigns and their ability
to deliver important blocks of votes. To some extent, they also provide Congressional
representatives with valuable technical information. Administrators obviously do not depend on
generous campaign contributions to do their job, but their dependency on key political
constituencies is real nonetheless. Complex regulations often can only be implemented with the
help and cooperation of the groups directly affected by them. Regulators may depend on
obtaining technical and scientific information that is available exclusively to the regulated
communities. Good professional relationships with these groups are essential to administrators
operating in a charged political environment.
The general public does have a role to play in this scenario, but only as a political pawn.
Public choice assumes that it is rational for the public to be uninterested. Modern policy
decisions are complex; for an average citizen, the costs of forming his or her opinion far
outweigh the benefits. As a practical matter, it is much easier and convenient to orient one’s
opinion to the recommendations expressed by the interest group or political party of choice, or
simply yield to the bombardment of political messages. At the regulatory level, the public is
generally not heard, simply because many regulations are simply too obscure and complex to be
of any real interest to a broader audience. In the few instances where members of the general
public submit a large number of comments to a proposed new rule, this is generally the result of
mobilization efforts by an organized interest group rather than an expression of spontaneous
political interest.
From a public choice perspective, this depressing view of modern politics is no reason for
pessimism. Policy-making can be described as a competitive process, as a market for political
influence. And competitive markets are known for their benign effects. The operative term here
2
There has been a great deal of empirical analysis informed by this analytical perspective. Examples include
government protection of the dairy industry to the detriment of margarine producers: Geoffrey P. Miller, "Public
Choice at the Dawn of the Special Interest State: The Story of Butter and Margarine," California Law Review 77
(1989). Chronically inadequate health standards in the meat and poultry industry: Dion Casey, "Agency Capture:
The USDA's Struggle to Pass Food Safety Regulations," Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy 7 (1998). The
persistent importance of agricultural subsidies in the European Union: Matthew Elliott and Allister Heath, "The
Failure of CAP Reform: A Public Choice Analysis," Economic Affairs 20, no. 2 (2000). The popularity of a
losing financial proposition such as the public financing of sport stadiums: Veronica Z. Kalich, "A Public Choice
Perspective on the Subsidization of Private Industry: A Case Study of Three Cities and Three Stadiums," Journal
of Urban Affairs 20, no. 2 (1998). The capture of social housing programs in the UK by their beneficiaries:
David Mullins, "From Regulatory Capture to Regulated Competition: An Interest Group Analysis of Housing
Associations in England," Housing Studies 12, no. 3 (1997).
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