Final Report (all chapters)

progress over time may provide new means, they will not undermine the corresponding
prohibitions. Second, the prohibitions are worded in such a way as to ensure that reproductive
technologies are used exclusively for reproductive purposes narrowly defined, though as we
show below, the intent to reproduce does not justify the use of each and every reproductive
technology.
The centerpiece of these prohibitions is Section 5. Section 5(1)(a) bans any kind of cloning,
including research cloning, but does so not by specifically prohibiting somatic cell nuclear
transfer. Rather, it defines cloning in functional terms. Thus, this section simply proscribes the
creation of “a human clone, by using any technique.” Consistent with its focus on human
reproduction, Section 5 bans the creation of embryos for any purpose other then procreation,
medical training, or the improvement of reproductive technologies. 44
Medical and clinical
research on human embryos remains legal, though it may be difficult, as a matter of practice, to
determine whether a research protocol involving human embryos is indeed designed to improve
the safety and efficacy of existing reproductive technologies. This distinction becomes
particularly problematic when research protocols are designed to explore questions impinging
only indirectly on actual medical practice. 45
Reproductive intent alone does not justify resorting to any and every reproductive
technology. Accordingly, Section 5 prohibits several reproductive procedures. For example, it
bans any technique that could lead to the creation of embryos from fetuses or from embryonic
stem cells. 46 This prohibition is a direct response to the announcement made in 2003 by an Israeli
research group that it had successfully retrieved viable oocytes from aborted fetuses, and to other
experiments in mice showing that it may be possible to derive sperm-like cells and oocytes from
stem cells (see chapter 4 for details). In keeping with a narrow understanding of reproduction,
Section 5 also proscribes the use of sex-selection technologies except for preventing sex-linked
diseases. 47 As with other prohibitions discussed in this section, this ban does not refer to a
specific sex-selection technology; it simply proscribes the use of any and all technological means
for elective sex selection. Also proscribed are all forms of genetic engineering that would
produce an inheritable genetic modification. 48 Presumably this prohibition extends to ooplasm
transfer, as this procedure indeed produces an inheritable genetic modification by passing on
mitochondrial DNA from a third party. Furthermore, innovative reproductive approaches that
involve the use of animal tissues, such as co-culture, are also prohibited. 49 In keeping with
44
45
46
47
48
49
See Section 5(1)(b).
The AHRA does not ban stem cell research, however. Section 5(1)(b) only bans the creation of in vitro embryos
for any purpose other than human reproduction. The act does not explicitly require the transfer of all in vitro
embryos into a woman’s uterus. This introduces the possibility that existing, cryopreserved embryos can be
donated for research, a solution that is reminiscent of the Australian approach to legalizing stem cell research.
See Section 5(1)(c).
See Section 5(1)(e).
See Section 5(1)(f).
See Section 5(1)(h).
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