Final Report (all chapters)

(principle (e)). 43 Canada affords equal access to ART technologies to any (presumably adult)
individual independent of sexual orientation and marital status. Accordingly, couples –
heterosexual or not – as well as singles are granted equal access to ART technologies.
A deductive approach to ethical controversies is not without problems however, especially
for the regulators charged with implementing the provisions of the AHRA. For example,
principle (a) is clearly intended to protect the health and well-being of children. As a matter of
principle, very few would disagree that the health and well-being of children is a moral good
worthy of protection, yet any attempt to give the terms “health” and “well-being” a precise
operational meaning is likely to be controversial. Principle (b) identifies human dignity and
human rights as two moral goods deserving protection, but leaves entirely unspecified the notion
of human dignity, and does not bother to identify which human rights should be protected.
Again, it would be only too easy to fault regulators for not adequately protecting human rights,
or for taking too expansive a view of human dignity for that matter. Furthermore, it is quite
possible that some of these principles may inspire conflicting regulatory interventions.
That guiding principles leave considerable room for interpretation does not justify
dismissing a deductive approach to modern ethical dilemmas as irrelevant or impracticable. It is,
however, a good reason for establishing specific rules and institutions for addressing these
interpretive ambiguities. In this regard, the AHRA leaves much to be desired, as it does not
include any provisions as to how regulators may go about resolving the ambiguities that a
principled approach inevitably will produce.
The principles themselves are only in minimal part derived from a consistent ethical
framework, and they seem to reflect the outcome of a political compromise. An American
observer might regard them as politically liberal, for example, when they afford gay and lesbian
couples equal access to reproductive technologies. On the other end, the principles prohibit the
commercial trade of human gametes and embryos, a measure many Americans would find too
restrictive. Being the result of a political compromise, these principles ignore some important
issues. For example, the distinction between therapeutic and enhancing applications of new
reproductive technologies has not been formalized, though it seems to inform several provisions
of this act. At the same time, the fact that these principles represent a political compromise
suggests that they will likely enjoy broad public support.
Prohibited Activities
AHRA Sections 5 through 9 enumerate proscribed reproductive procedures and research
activities. Taken together, these prohibitions suggest a restrictive approach to reproductive
medicine; the act prohibits many reproductive treatments now common in the United States.
These prohibitions are remarkable for two main reasons. First, they apply to certain procreative
ends, not to the specific technological means to achieve them. While scientific and medical
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Principle (e) does not completely resolve this thorny issue. For example, it is not entirely clear whether this
principle would afford a woman the right to become impregnated with the sperm of her deceased husband.
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