Final FONSI and EA for hot cargo pad on Kirtland AFB - Kirtland Air ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

<strong>Final</strong> <strong>EA</strong> Addressing Construction, Operation, <strong>and</strong> Maintenance of a Hot Cargo Pad issue was investigated <strong>and</strong> resolved. In addition, appropriate health <strong>and</strong> safety procedures would need to be established to prevent exposure to groundwater contaminants when existing monitoring wells are modified (i.e., made flush with the ground surface). Military Personnel Safety. No effects on military personnel health <strong>and</strong> safety would be expected during implementation of the Proposed Action. Installation personnel would be required to vacate the area of the Proposed Action during construction activities. The Proposed Action work site would be fenced <strong>and</strong> appropriate signs posted to further reduce safety risks to installation personnel. The current <strong>hot</strong> <strong>cargo</strong> <strong>pad</strong> (Pad 5) would remain in service during the implementation of the Proposed Action. Following the implementation of the Proposed Action, Kirtl<strong>and</strong> AFB would have two <strong>hot</strong> <strong>cargo</strong> <strong>pad</strong>s, which would act as contingencies if the other <strong>pad</strong> was unavailable. Pad 5 would no longer need to be in continuous service, <strong>and</strong> either <strong>pad</strong> could be shut down <strong>for</strong> required maintenance <strong>and</strong> safety improvements. With two available <strong>hot</strong> <strong>cargo</strong> <strong>pad</strong>s, critical <strong>hot</strong> <strong>cargo</strong> missions would no longer be in jeopardy of being delayed or aborted due to un<strong>for</strong>eseen circumstances occurring at one of the <strong>hot</strong> <strong>cargo</strong> <strong>pad</strong>s. The Proposed Action would also improve lighting conditions <strong>and</strong> enhance security barricades at both Pad 5 <strong>and</strong> the proposed <strong>hot</strong> <strong>cargo</strong> <strong>pad</strong>; both lighting <strong>and</strong> security improvements would create a safer environment <strong>for</strong> military personnel working at the <strong>hot</strong> <strong>cargo</strong> <strong>pad</strong>s. The implementation of the Proposed Action would result in beneficial effects on military personnel safety. Public Safety. No effects on public health <strong>and</strong> safety would result from the implementation of the Proposed Action. Construction activities would not pose a safety risk to the public or to off-installation areas. The Proposed Action work site would be fenced <strong>and</strong> appropriate signs posted to further reduce safety risks to the public. Access to the proposed <strong>hot</strong> <strong>cargo</strong> <strong>pad</strong> would be limited to authorized personnel. As such, the use of the proposed <strong>hot</strong> <strong>cargo</strong> <strong>pad</strong> at Kirtl<strong>and</strong> AFB would not be expected to result in effects on the public safety. Explosives <strong>and</strong> Munitions Safety. No significant effects on explosives <strong>and</strong> munitions safety would be expected during the implementation of the Proposed Action. Following implementation of the Proposed Action, the use of the proposed <strong>hot</strong> <strong>cargo</strong> <strong>pad</strong> would result in changes to the h<strong>and</strong>ling of explosives <strong>and</strong> munitions at Kirtl<strong>and</strong> AFB, because, by its very definition, the proposed <strong>hot</strong> <strong>cargo</strong> <strong>pad</strong> would be used to load <strong>and</strong> unload <strong>hot</strong> <strong>cargo</strong> (i.e., weapons, ammunition, <strong>and</strong> explosives). In order to maintain explosive <strong>and</strong> munitions safety, USAF regulations m<strong>and</strong>ate QD safety clearance zones of a specific separation distance between PESs <strong>and</strong> ESs. Under the Proposed Action, the proposed <strong>hot</strong> <strong>cargo</strong> <strong>pad</strong> would be the PES <strong>and</strong> any inhabited buildings or public traffic routes would be ESs, <strong>and</strong> a separation distance of 1,250 feet (approximately 0.24 miles) would be required between the PES <strong>and</strong> ESs. No inhabited buildings, public roads, or other ESs are currently within this zone, <strong>and</strong> no future construction would be permitted in this zone. Figure 2-1 illustrates the QD clear zones <strong>for</strong> the proposed <strong>hot</strong> <strong>cargo</strong> <strong>pad</strong> <strong>and</strong> Pad 5. The Proposed Action does not call <strong>for</strong> an increase in the quantity of <strong>hot</strong> <strong>cargo</strong> aircraft traffic at Kirtl<strong>and</strong> AFB; there<strong>for</strong>e, the amount of explosives <strong>and</strong> munitions transported via the existing <strong>and</strong> proposed <strong>hot</strong> <strong>cargo</strong> <strong>pad</strong>s together would not change. Additionally, the Proposed Action would not alter the storage or usage of explosives <strong>and</strong> munitions at Kirtl<strong>and</strong> AFB. The implementation of the Proposed Action would result in adverse effects on explosives <strong>and</strong> munitions safety; however, with the establishment of a QD clear zone around the proposed <strong>hot</strong> <strong>cargo</strong> <strong>pad</strong>, these effects would be expected to be less than significant. 4.11.2.2 No Action Alternative The No Action Alternative would result in continuation of the existing safety conditions <strong>and</strong> their associated impacts, as discussed in Section 3.11.2. Kirtl<strong>and</strong> AFB, NM January 2011 4-20
<strong>Final</strong> <strong>EA</strong> Addressing Construction, Operation, <strong>and</strong> Maintenance of a Hot Cargo Pad 4.12 Aircraft Safety 4.12.1 Evaluation Criteria Explosives risk assessments are a subset of the comm<strong>and</strong>er’s overall risk management program. An explosives risk assessment analyzes hazards associated with transporting, storing, disposing of, h<strong>and</strong>ling or firing ammunition <strong>and</strong> explosive materials. Operational Risk Assessments, per AFPAM 91-215, Operational Risk Management Guidelines <strong>and</strong> Tools, can range from examining the relationship between a PES <strong>and</strong> an ES, to determine what effect one has on the other in the event of an accidental explosion, to ascertaining the worst credible event ramifications of an explosives h<strong>and</strong>ling mishap (USAF 1998b). Risk levels are calculated based on three criteria: the likelihood of a mishap, the exposure of personnel <strong>and</strong> resources to an explosives hazard, <strong>and</strong> the possible consequences of a mishap (USAF 1998b). The likelihood of a mishap is the relative probability an explosives mishap will occur based on the type of explosives involved, the level of activity at the PES, <strong>and</strong> external threats to the location. Each PES is categorized according to one of five generalized probability levels as defined in AFMAN 91-215, which include frequent, likely, occasional, seldom, <strong>and</strong> unlikely (USAF 1998b). The severity of an explosive accident is categorized based on their effect on personnel, mission capability, <strong>and</strong> other resources according to Table 4-4. Category Table 4-4. Severity of a Mishap Criteria Greater than 5 related personnel fatalities or any unrelated fatality Catastrophic Mission curtailed $10 million in damage Less than 5 related personnel fatalities Serious injury to unrelated personnel Critical Mission interrupted $500,000 in damage Some serious injury to related personnel Moderate Mission degraded $50,000 damage Minor injury Negligible Mission unaffected $1,000 damage Source: USAF 2009 Combining the severity <strong>and</strong> probability estimates <strong>for</strong> a mishap <strong>for</strong>ms a risk assessment <strong>for</strong> the potential hazard. By combining the probability of occurrence with severity, a matrix is created where intersecting rows <strong>and</strong> columns define a Risk Assessment Matrix. The Risk Assessment Matrix <strong>for</strong>ms the basis <strong>for</strong> judging both the acceptability of a risk <strong>and</strong> the management level at which the decision on acceptability will be made. The matrix might also be used to prioritize resources to resolve risks due to hazards or to st<strong>and</strong>ardize hazard notification or response actions (USAF 1998b). A sample Risk Assessment Matrix is shown in Figure 4-1. Kirtl<strong>and</strong> AFB, NM January 2011 4-21
Page 1:
FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT FO
Page 10 and 11:
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS µg/L mi
Page 13:
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT ADDR
Page 17 and 18:
Final EA</
Page 19 and 20:
Final EA</
Page 21 and 22:
Final EA</
Page 23 and 24:
Final EA</
Page 25 and 26:
Final EA</
Page 27 and 28:
Final EA</
Page 29 and 30:
Final EA</
Page 31 and 32:
Final EA</
Page 33 and 34:
Final EA</
Page 35 and 36:
Final EA</
Page 37 and 38:
Final EA</
Page 39 and 40:
Final EA</
Page 41 and 42:
Final EA</
Page 43 and 44:
Final EA</
Page 45 and 46:
Final EA</
Page 47 and 48:
Final EA</
Page 49 and 50: Final EA</
Page 99: Final EA</
Page 121: APPENDIX A APPLICABLE LAWS, REGULAT
Page 124 and 125: Land Use L
Page 126 and 127: typically calls for</strong
Page 128 and 129: species. All Federal agencies must
Page 130 and 131: comment on the alteration, demoliti
Page 132 and 133: monitoring, detection, and<
Page 135 and 136: Appendix B Interagency and<
Page 137 and 138: Native American Tribes Isleta Puebl
Page 139 and 140: Example IICEP Letter to Native Amer
Page 141 and 142: B-7
Page 143 and 144: Comments Received on the Draft Envi
Page 145 and 146: B-11
Page 147 and 148: Table B-1. Responses to Comments Re
Page 149: APPENDIX C AIR QUALITY SUPPORTING D
Page 152 and 153:
Air Quality Emissions from Proposed
Page 154 and 155:
Combustion Emissions Combustion Emi
Page 156 and 157:
Architectural Coatings No. Reqd. a
Page 158 and 159:
Construction Fugitive Dust Emission
Page 160 and 161:
Grading Schedule Estimate of time r
Page 162 and 163:
Construction Commuter Emissions Emi
Page 164:
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
show all

Final FONSI and EA for hot cargo pad on Kirtland AFB - Kirtland Air ...

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?