Subjectivism and Economic Analysis: Essays in memory of Ludwig ...

LÁSLÓ CSONTOStheory both belong to the realm of the ‘pure logic of choice’, i.e.,both of them are tautological constructs used to classify action typescreated or generated by introspection and the researchers’theoretical imagination.Methodological solipsism imputes eternal validity to the theoreicalstatements of the social sciences just because they were formulatedon the basis of data to which we allegedly have privileged access,thus repudiating the trivial insight according to which the truth andreliability of our knowledge is guaranteed by its testability and notby the royal or less royal method that helped us acquire it. Notice,however, that the same argument is also being used to neutralise thetheoretical social sciences against the impact of any eventual correctivemeasure grounded in empirical evidence.Let me recapitulate the reasoning that makes methodologicalsolipsists question the empirical nature of social sciences and rejectthe idea of factual verification or falsification. The argumentillustrates the interconnections between the basic postulates ofmethodological solipsism. In Hayek’s view (1964:42, 65; 1967:21),for instance, the social sciences can aim not at the ‘detailedexplanations’ supplied by the natural sciences, but at ‘explanationsof principle’ only; that is, at most they can, with the help of simplifiedmodels, provide an intuitive understanding of general principles. Thetruth value of an explanation of principle cannot be decided on thebasis of some kind of a mechanical test.The social sciences have to be content with explanations ofprinciple because their subject matter is strikingly complex and thenumber of constraints and specific conditions to be taken into accountwhen trying to construct a genuine explanation is so large that noteven computers, not to mention the human mind, are able to masterthem. Because the social sciences cannot devise simplifiedexperimental conditions, it is the same complexity that prevents themfrom checking the validity of their explanations by subjecting themto the critique of facts and of reality.It is noteworthy that Menger, although from a somewhat differentmethodological perspective, had already made a similar argument.In his view:the main objective of the method to be called exact in thefuture is…to establish strict laws of phenomena;…laws whichnot only appear to be uniform to us but their uniformity isguaranteed by the cognitive routes leading to them.(Menger 1883:38)88