Subjectivism and Economic Analysis: Essays in memory of Ludwig ...

SUBJECTIVISM AND IDEAL TYPESIn the view of Avenarius (1891:6–7), the ‘naturalistic conceptionof the world’ is made up of two components. One of them is a generalexperience, the other is a hypothesis. The experience in question‘encompasses me and my environment, together with its constituentparts (including my fellow human beings), plus certain relationships’.The hypothesis under discussion ‘lies in the interpretation I give tothe motions of fellow human beings (including the linguisticinstruments and the noises and sounds used and made by them)—inthe interpretation that is, according to which these motions areassertions (Aussagen) that refer to sounds, noises or tastes or wills orfeelings, etc. again, just like my words and deeds do.’ Somewhatlater Avenarius has this to say about the hypothesis under discussion:To say that other people are human beings just like me and Iam a human being just like they is nothing but to assume thatmotions (and sounds) made by humans have not onlymechanistic meanings. This form of the hypothesis could becalled the cardinal empiriocriticist assumption of basic humanequality.(Avenarius 1891:9)The objective structure of the world and reality, according to Mach,falls apart into unanalysable elements—sensations—and there areno permanent, constant or autonomous entities over and above theamorphous and chaotic mass of these sensations (Mach 1905:435–6; 1915: passim). Moreover, in Mach’s view, observing ‘other people’sbehavior…makes me assume…that my recollections, desires etc. existfor them only as a result of a compelling inference by analogy just astheir recollections, desires, etc. do for me’(Mach 1905:6).Notice, however, that although the hypothesis underlying andvindicating this inference by analogy is intimately related to the worldview of methodological solipsism, it is not an ontological but anepistemological assumption, and as such belongs to the generalcategory of epistemological isolationism. I want to emphasise againthough that its compelling force (and the compelling force of theinference by analogy) derives from the world view under discussion.To fix ideas, let me review the epistemological stance ofmethodological solipsism. Suppose that on the basis of previousexperience we know what acting means, that is, we know that humanaction always involves beliefs, desires, objectives and intentions.Suppose also that these beliefs, desires, objectives and intentions arenot only the subjective data of actors but are also inaccessible to85