Subjectivism and Economic Analysis: Essays in memory of Ludwig ...

STEPHEN D.PARSONSGiven these various problems with Mises’s account, it is fruitfulto make the transition to Lachmann’s explanation of human action.Earlier it was suggested that Mises’s sharp demarcation between themethods of economics and the methods of history cannot besustained. It has been argued that Mises’s defence of an a priorieconomics is not sustainable, although it may be possible to defendthe weaker claim that comprehending human action requires someform of a priori concepts or principles. 8 However, in so far as onlythis weaker claim seems capable of defence, then Mises’s claim thatwe can somehow ‘deduce’ truths about human action a priori mustbe rejected. Consequently, although we may now know how humanaction is to be approached (through constitutive concepts orprinciples), we do not know of what such action consists. Indeed,because Mises is committed to an a priori approach, his analysis ofhuman action is deficient, and requires supplementing withLachmann’s account. In appreciating how, their differentunderstandings as to what human action consists in must beinvestigated.The problem of future intentionsEbeling outlines Mises’s theory of human action as follows.Purposeful behaviour is characterised by:Dissatisfaction with existing or expected conditions orcircumstances; and imagined preferred state of affairs; andbeliefs that methods were or could be available to bring aboutthe desired change. ‘Action’ was a relationship betweenchosen ends, selected means and conduct or consciousbehaviour to achieve the ends preferred with the meansavailable.(Ebeling 1994:87)Consequently, we have a desire or preference, beliefs and consciousbehaviour. In contrast, Lachmann suggests that conscious behaviourcan only be understood in the context of ‘a plan’. Consequently,Lachmann argues that the historian: ‘Has to ascertain “The Plan”,the coherent design behind the observable action in which thevarious purposes as well as the means employed are bound together’(Lachmann 1971:20).The argument that purposive or intentional behaviour can onlybe understood in the context of a plan is reiterated by Lachmann in42