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Subjectivism and Economic Analysis: Essays in memory of Ludwig ...

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THE SUBJECTIVISM OF ACTIVE MINDSor less unreliable. This po<strong>in</strong>t is illustrated by three propositionsdiscussed by Fritz Machlup (1978) <strong>in</strong> a paper <strong>in</strong>tended to conveysome <strong>of</strong> Schutz’s ideas to an audience <strong>of</strong> economists (see also thediscussion <strong>in</strong> Langlois 1986 <strong>and</strong> Langlois <strong>and</strong> Koppl 1991).Statement (1): If, because <strong>of</strong> an abundant crop, the output <strong>of</strong>wheat is much <strong>in</strong>creased, the price <strong>of</strong> wheat will fall.’Statement (2): ‘If, because <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>creased wage-rates <strong>and</strong>decreased <strong>in</strong>terest rates, capital becomes relatively cheaperthan labor, new labor-sav<strong>in</strong>g devices will be <strong>in</strong>vented.’Statement (3): ‘If, because <strong>of</strong> heavy withdrawals <strong>of</strong> foreigndeposits, the banks are <strong>in</strong> danger <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>solvency, the CentralBank Authorities will extend the necessary credit.’(Machlup 1978:64)The first statement is more reliable than the second <strong>and</strong> the second ismore reliable than the third. Why? As we go down from the firststatement, we reach ideal types <strong>of</strong> lower anonymity. Machlupexpla<strong>in</strong>ed that:the causal relations such as stated <strong>in</strong> (2) <strong>and</strong> (3) are derived fromtypes <strong>of</strong> human conduct <strong>of</strong> a lesser generality or anonymity. Tomake a statement about the actions <strong>of</strong> bank authorities (such as(3)) calls for reason<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a stratum <strong>of</strong> behavior conceptions <strong>of</strong>much less anonymous types <strong>of</strong> actors. We have to know orimag<strong>in</strong>e the act<strong>in</strong>g persons much more <strong>in</strong>timately.(Machlup 1978:68)That greater <strong>in</strong>timacy implies a greater chance that the actor willsurprise us by act<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>of</strong> character. (Later I will discuss the role <strong>of</strong>the ‘system constra<strong>in</strong>t’ <strong>in</strong> determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g when to use anonymoustypes.) We cannot be sure the central bank authorities will extendcredit. It is a good guess they will; but they may surprise us with anact <strong>of</strong> monetary restra<strong>in</strong>t. We can be much more confident <strong>in</strong> thecom<strong>in</strong>g reduction <strong>of</strong> wheat prices. We can rely on an anonymoustypification <strong>of</strong> the wheat farmer. We need non-anonymoustypifications <strong>of</strong> the central bank’s high <strong>of</strong>ficials.The Lachmann problem aga<strong>in</strong>I identified the Lachmann problem as the need to have a theory <strong>of</strong>expectations that builds on the idea that each person’s actions are71

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