09.07.2015 Views

Subjectivism and Economic Analysis: Essays in memory of Ludwig ...

Subjectivism and Economic Analysis: Essays in memory of Ludwig ...

Subjectivism and Economic Analysis: Essays in memory of Ludwig ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

STEPHEN D.PARSONS<strong>of</strong> action ‘<strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> the mean<strong>in</strong>g attached to it by theactor’.(Lachmann 1971:31)Lachmann takes this Weberian legacy seriously: the notion <strong>of</strong> a planprovides ‘a firmer <strong>and</strong> more convenient start<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t for themethodology <strong>of</strong> the social sciences than the controversial notion <strong>of</strong>the Ideal Type’ (ibid.: 33). Lachmann thus appears to acceptSchutz’s (1972) criticism <strong>of</strong> Weber’s ‘ideal type’. For Weber, the‘ideal types’ were both methodological constructs that permitted thesocial scientist to <strong>in</strong>vestigate social life <strong>and</strong> yet were themselvesgenerated <strong>in</strong> social life. However, as Schutz noted, if ‘ideal types’were generated <strong>in</strong> everyday social life, then the social scientist hadno privileged access to them. Lachmann also <strong>in</strong>tends his ‘plan’ tosignify a phenomenon generated by <strong>in</strong>dividual actors themselves(Lachmann 1971:29).However, although Lachmann’s explanation <strong>of</strong> human actioncan consequently be read as an advance upon, <strong>and</strong> improvement <strong>of</strong>,Mises’s own account, it generates certa<strong>in</strong> problems <strong>of</strong> its own. Inattempt<strong>in</strong>g to extend Weber’s own analysis, Lachmannacknowledges that Weber identified purposes as causes <strong>of</strong> action.Lachmann situates this concern for a causal explanation with<strong>in</strong> hisexploration <strong>of</strong> the significance <strong>of</strong> plans as follows:It is readily seen (with the benefit <strong>of</strong> h<strong>in</strong>dsight) that thisconception <strong>of</strong> the nature <strong>of</strong> causal explanation <strong>of</strong> humanaction <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> purposes would have provided a firmer <strong>and</strong>more convenient start<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t for the methodology <strong>of</strong> thesocial sciences than the controversial notion <strong>of</strong> the Ideal Type.It is also easy to see how it is naturally l<strong>in</strong>ked to our concept <strong>of</strong>Plan. In fact, ‘plan’ is but a generalization <strong>of</strong> purpose.(Lachmann 1971:33)However, Lachmann appears to be unaware <strong>of</strong> the extent to whichhis <strong>in</strong>corporation <strong>of</strong> the ‘plan’ <strong>in</strong>to the <strong>in</strong>vestigation seriouslydisrupts the possibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>troduc<strong>in</strong>g causal explanation <strong>in</strong> therequired form. Lachmann argues that the coherence <strong>of</strong> any plan canbe tested on two levels:1 whether the purposes he ascribes are <strong>in</strong> fact consistent with oneanother <strong>and</strong> fit <strong>in</strong>to the framework <strong>of</strong> a general plan, theexecution <strong>of</strong> which would account for the known facts;50

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!