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Subjectivism and Economic Analysis: Essays in memory of Ludwig ...

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SUBJECTIVISM AND IDEAL TYPES1 B wanted to achieve y.2 B thought (believed) that she could achieve y best by do<strong>in</strong>g x.Therefore3 B did x.When we construe empirically adequate ideal types <strong>of</strong> this k<strong>in</strong>d,then, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Weber, we arrive at a motivational, as dist<strong>in</strong>ctfrom actual, underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> human action. ‘Actual’underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g is equivalent to select<strong>in</strong>g the ‘right’, i.e., theempirically adequate, <strong>in</strong>tentionalistic description. 14 Motivationalunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, argues Weber, rests on our nomological knowledge.To have the required type <strong>and</strong> amount <strong>of</strong> nomological knowledge atour disposal is the same as to know—either by acqua<strong>in</strong>tance or bydescription—the rules <strong>of</strong> experience that <strong>in</strong> the eyes <strong>of</strong> people liv<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong> a particular society or culture assign given means to given ends.In the case <strong>of</strong> objectively rational ideal types the reason<strong>in</strong>g ishypothetical, <strong>and</strong>, <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>strumental or technical sense <strong>of</strong> theword, normative. Tak<strong>in</strong>g as our paradigm the simplest possiblesituation aga<strong>in</strong>, we have the follow<strong>in</strong>g constra<strong>in</strong>ed maximisationtype argument.1 Let us assume BB wanted to achieve y.2 In the light <strong>of</strong> the available evidence, <strong>and</strong> under the exist<strong>in</strong>gconstra<strong>in</strong>ts, B could have achieved y only if she had done x.Therefore3 B should have done x.It requires only a modicum <strong>of</strong> methodological imag<strong>in</strong>ation torecognise <strong>in</strong> the forego<strong>in</strong>g primitive models the germ or analyticalcore <strong>of</strong> marg<strong>in</strong>al utility or, for that matter, modern microeconomictheory. In fact, argued Weber, economic analysis is founded not onsome allegedly fundamental psychological laws, but on the use <strong>of</strong>the categories ‘ends’ <strong>and</strong> ‘means’, that is, on the use <strong>of</strong> more or lesssophisticated ‘praxeological’ ideal types (Weber 1908:3).Conclusion<strong>Economic</strong> analysis, for both Weber <strong>and</strong> Lachmann, is possible onlybecause we are capable <strong>of</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dividual humanconduct. By imput<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>tentions (or, <strong>in</strong> Lachmann’s term<strong>in</strong>ology,plans) to persons, we <strong>in</strong>terpret <strong>in</strong>dividual behaviour as deliberate,subsume it under some specific ‘action type’ (utility maximisation,97

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