SUBJECTIVISM AND IDEAL TYPES1 B wanted to achieve y.2 B thought (believed) that she could achieve y best by do<strong>in</strong>g x.Therefore3 B did x.When we construe empirically adequate ideal types <strong>of</strong> this k<strong>in</strong>d,then, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Weber, we arrive at a motivational, as dist<strong>in</strong>ctfrom actual, underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> human action. ‘Actual’underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g is equivalent to select<strong>in</strong>g the ‘right’, i.e., theempirically adequate, <strong>in</strong>tentionalistic description. 14 Motivationalunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, argues Weber, rests on our nomological knowledge.To have the required type <strong>and</strong> amount <strong>of</strong> nomological knowledge atour disposal is the same as to know—either by acqua<strong>in</strong>tance or bydescription—the rules <strong>of</strong> experience that <strong>in</strong> the eyes <strong>of</strong> people liv<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong> a particular society or culture assign given means to given ends.In the case <strong>of</strong> objectively rational ideal types the reason<strong>in</strong>g ishypothetical, <strong>and</strong>, <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>strumental or technical sense <strong>of</strong> theword, normative. Tak<strong>in</strong>g as our paradigm the simplest possiblesituation aga<strong>in</strong>, we have the follow<strong>in</strong>g constra<strong>in</strong>ed maximisationtype argument.1 Let us assume BB wanted to achieve y.2 In the light <strong>of</strong> the available evidence, <strong>and</strong> under the exist<strong>in</strong>gconstra<strong>in</strong>ts, B could have achieved y only if she had done x.Therefore3 B should have done x.It requires only a modicum <strong>of</strong> methodological imag<strong>in</strong>ation torecognise <strong>in</strong> the forego<strong>in</strong>g primitive models the germ or analyticalcore <strong>of</strong> marg<strong>in</strong>al utility or, for that matter, modern microeconomictheory. In fact, argued Weber, economic analysis is founded not onsome allegedly fundamental psychological laws, but on the use <strong>of</strong>the categories ‘ends’ <strong>and</strong> ‘means’, that is, on the use <strong>of</strong> more or lesssophisticated ‘praxeological’ ideal types (Weber 1908:3).Conclusion<strong>Economic</strong> analysis, for both Weber <strong>and</strong> Lachmann, is possible onlybecause we are capable <strong>of</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dividual humanconduct. By imput<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>tentions (or, <strong>in</strong> Lachmann’s term<strong>in</strong>ology,plans) to persons, we <strong>in</strong>terpret <strong>in</strong>dividual behaviour as deliberate,subsume it under some specific ‘action type’ (utility maximisation,97
LÁSLÓ CSONTOScost m<strong>in</strong>imisation, etc.), <strong>and</strong> clear the ground for an <strong>in</strong>tentionalexplanation <strong>of</strong> a particular <strong>in</strong>stance <strong>of</strong> the action type <strong>in</strong> question.This is the rational core, if there is one, <strong>of</strong> the more radicalsubjectivist claims <strong>of</strong> methodological solipsism.Intentional explanations <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual actions <strong>in</strong> economictheory, Lachmann’s misguided criticism notwithst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, arebased on ideal types. Ideal types, <strong>in</strong> turn, are theoreticalconstructs, the logical structure <strong>of</strong> which is just about the same <strong>in</strong>both the natural <strong>and</strong> the social sciences. Moreover, the use <strong>of</strong>properly constructed ideal types is methodologically fundamental,because these constructs fulfil <strong>in</strong>dispensable classificatory,heuristic, <strong>and</strong> explanatory functions (Weber 1978:21). Theconstra<strong>in</strong>ed maximisation models <strong>of</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ard economic theory,for <strong>in</strong>stance, help us pigeonhole economic behaviour <strong>in</strong>to thecategories <strong>of</strong> expected utility maximisation, pr<strong>of</strong>it maximisation,price discrim<strong>in</strong>ation, etc. Furthermore, if we want to expla<strong>in</strong> aparticular <strong>in</strong>stance <strong>of</strong> any <strong>of</strong> these categories (the actions taken bythe managers <strong>of</strong> a specific firm, for example), <strong>and</strong> it turns out thatthese actions deviate from the course <strong>of</strong> action ‘prescribed’ orpredicted by our pet model, we are still go<strong>in</strong>g to have to use ourideal type as a benchmark, because without hav<strong>in</strong>g that heuristicdevice at our disposal we will not be able to arrive at mean<strong>in</strong>gfulhypotheses about the possible causes <strong>of</strong> this clash between theory<strong>and</strong> reality.Notes1 For a good overview <strong>of</strong> different forms <strong>of</strong> methodological<strong>in</strong>dividualism see Bhargava (1992). The term ‘methodologicalsolipsism’ itself was first used <strong>in</strong> a somewhat different sense from theone <strong>in</strong>tended here (Carnap 1928).2 We should heed Schumpeter s advice with regard to Gottl’s work: ‘Ifear that the only way <strong>of</strong> appreciat<strong>in</strong>g Pr<strong>of</strong>essor F. von Gottl-Ottlilienfeld, who held a conspicuous place <strong>and</strong> found manyadherents…is to read him’ (Schumpeter 1954:854). For a sympathetic<strong>and</strong> tolerant, but <strong>in</strong> the end devastat<strong>in</strong>g, criticism <strong>of</strong> Gottl’s views onthe epistemology <strong>of</strong> the social sciences, see Weber’s essay on ‘Knies <strong>and</strong>the problem <strong>of</strong> irrationality’ (Weber 1975). In Weber’s view, Gottl:scrupulously eschews conventional, conceptually bound,<strong>and</strong>, from his po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> view, ‘denatured’ language. Instead,he attempts to reproduce the contents <strong>of</strong> immediate‘experience’ <strong>in</strong> some sort <strong>of</strong> ideogram. Admittedly, many <strong>of</strong>Gottl’s views, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the pr<strong>in</strong>cipal theses <strong>of</strong> his work, arecontroversial. Nor has he succeeded <strong>in</strong> establish<strong>in</strong>g genu<strong>in</strong>e98