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THIRD QUARTER 2010<br />

Electrolux<br />

Squeezed from all sides<br />

We believe Electrolux is unlikely to replicate its strong performance<br />

in 2009 for 2010. In 2009 it benefitted from both its US-rebranding<br />

and a dramatic fall in its raw materials bill. Fundamentally Electrolux<br />

is in a challenged position, with little power over either its suppliers<br />

or customers, white-hot competition from Asian manufacturers and a<br />

raw materials bill that has increased in 2010, despite recent easing of<br />

some material prices. We reiterate our Sell rating and SEK164 price<br />

target.<br />

Raw materials headwind continues into 2011<br />

Raw materials constitute 17% of sales, and fluctuations in price are a major driver of<br />

earnings. Since 2004 Electrolux has absorbed an increase in its raw material bill of<br />

Skr7.0bn. In 2009, the company positioned itself for falling raw materials prices by<br />

moving to shorter-term contracts. This paid off in 2009, but the company failed to<br />

lock in these lower rates for 2010 believing they would continue to fall. We believe<br />

2Q10 will be the first quarter in which Electrolux experiences a headwind and that<br />

this will continue through the remainder of 2010 (albeit with little additional risk<br />

given 70% of steel required for 2010 has been locked-in with suppliers). Our<br />

analysis indicates a Skr1bn raw material headwind in 2010 and a further Skr1.7bn<br />

headwind in 2011. Without further restructuring savings, this headwind will directly<br />

impact EBIT margins in the same way it can be shown has happened historically.<br />

Margin gap to Capital Goods sector has widened<br />

Electrolux has narrowed the margin gap to its appliance peers from 270bp in 2000<br />

to 80bp in 2009 through restructuring and brand structure rationalisation, but it<br />

has actually increased relative to the Capital Goods sector from 400bp in 2000 to<br />

760bp in 2009. Electrolux’s valuation over the same period has recovered to such<br />

an extent that it now trades inline with Cap Goods peers. Fundamentally<br />

Electrolux is coming from a weaker position than the broader European Capital<br />

Goods due to the characteristics of the appliance industry in which it operates.<br />

Absent a change in the structure of the white goods industry we would continue to<br />

argue a significant discount for Electrolux relative to the Capital Goods sector.<br />

6.0% EBIT margin will be a challenge to achieve<br />

Electrolux introduced a 6.0% EBIT margin goal in 2007 but even with the boost<br />

from lower raw materials and ‘crisis management’ initiatives in 2009, it only<br />

achieved 4.9% last year. In 2010, operational gearing, restructuring savings and the<br />

North American rebranding will help the margin reach 6.1%, we believe, but<br />

thereafter we see the margin falling in the absence of another significant<br />

restructuring programme and charge. This is not inconsistent with Electrolux’s<br />

guidance which is on a pre-restructuring basis, but we believe the market may be<br />

overestimating profitability by assuming a 6.0% post restructuring margin.<br />

Valuation: Deserves a discount to Capital Goods Sector<br />

Electrolux is currently trading on 9.1x2011E EV/EBITA, inline with the European<br />

Capital Goods sector average of 9.2x 2011E EV/EBITA. Our target price applies an<br />

8.5x 2011E EV/EBITA multiple on which we find Skr164 per share value. We believe<br />

Electrolux deserves this discount because 1. its growth has significantly<br />

underperformed the sector over the last 10 years, 2. its margins are structurally<br />

lower and under more pressure, 3. its value proposition to customers is weak<br />

compared to companies with industrial customers, 4. it has limited emerging<br />

market exposure and 5. its financial performance is too heavily dependent on raw<br />

materials and factors beyond management’s control. Our DCF valuation yields<br />

Skr154 per share value.<br />

http://www.execution-noble.com<br />

SELL<br />

13% downside<br />

Fair Value SEK 164<br />

RIC, Bloomberg Code ELUXb.ST, ELUXB SS<br />

Share Price SEK 190<br />

Market Capitalisation $7,516m<br />

Free Float 100%<br />

$m 2009 2010E 2011E 2012E<br />

Sales 109,132 109,123 112,790 116,696<br />

Adjusted EBITA 4,940 6,229 6,205 6,054<br />

Adjusted EPS 11.10 14.22 14.18 13.98<br />

Dividend 4.00 4.60 4.95 4.62<br />

FCF* 5,757 3,647 3,427 4,367<br />

EV Adjustments** 2,168 2,233 2,300 2,369<br />

Net Debt 4,068 1,657 -350 -3,187<br />

* FCF = EBITDA - capex - NWC - int ex. - tax<br />

** Pension, Tax, Equity and non-consolidated assets<br />

X (unless stated) 2009 2010E 2011E 2012E<br />

EV/Sales 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.5<br />

EV/EBITA Adjusted 8.6 10.0 9.8 9.6<br />

P/E Adjusted 10.6 13.4 13.4 13.6<br />

Dividend Yield (%) 2.1% 2.4% 2.6% 2.4%<br />

FCF Yield (%) 15.8% 6.2% 5.8% 7.4%<br />

Net Debt/EBITDA 0.5 0.2 0.0 -0.3<br />

Analysts<br />

Nick Paton, CFA<br />

+44 20 7456 1190<br />

nick.paton@execution-noble.com<br />

Rob Virdee<br />

+44 20 7456 9222<br />

rob.virdee@execution-noble.com<br />

Page 33 of 44

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