solve scientifically many not less important problems from wea<strong>the</strong>rforecast<strong>in</strong>g to prevention <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> flu.Elsewhere Tolstoi compares natural sciences with pleasures, −games, rid<strong>in</strong>g, skat<strong>in</strong>g, etc, out<strong>in</strong>gs, − <strong>and</strong> concludes that enjoymentshould not impede <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> bus<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>of</strong> life. In his time, scientistsapparently yet constituted such a th<strong>in</strong> layer <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> population, that <strong>the</strong>great writer had no occasion to feel <strong>the</strong> labour<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>of</strong> sciences’nature 16 . Briefly, natural sciences constitute one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> many spheres<strong>of</strong> human activity with all <strong>the</strong> thus follow<strong>in</strong>g shortcom<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> merits.Consequently, for example <strong>the</strong> criticism <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> probability <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> speculative k<strong>in</strong>d (cf. § 1.2) can only pursue restrictive aims.Indeed, it logically shows that <strong>the</strong> premises for apply<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong>orycan not be verified. This, however, concerns <strong>the</strong> premises <strong>of</strong> anyscience; although <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> logic undoubtedly somewhat lowers <strong>the</strong>certa<strong>in</strong>ty <strong>of</strong> knowledge, <strong>in</strong> many cases <strong>the</strong> conclusions <strong>of</strong> probability<strong>the</strong>ory still have a quite sufficient certa<strong>in</strong>ty for admitt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m asscientific.Many authors <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Laplace discussed how <strong>the</strong> practicalapplicability <strong>and</strong> certa<strong>in</strong>ty <strong>of</strong> those conclusions is established. Hisreason<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Essai is not rich <strong>in</strong> content <strong>and</strong> is reduced to stat<strong>in</strong>gthat <strong>in</strong>duction was not reliable [cf. his criticism <strong>of</strong> Bacon <strong>in</strong> § 1.1] <strong>and</strong>that analogies were still worse. In my context, <strong>the</strong> response is utmostsimple: <strong>the</strong> practical verification is achieved by <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> manypeople <strong>and</strong> many generations; <strong>the</strong>y ever aga<strong>in</strong> return to study<strong>in</strong>g agiven problem.If several large boulders were ly<strong>in</strong>g on a peasant’s plot, he had tobypass <strong>the</strong>m when plough<strong>in</strong>g. But if his son becomes able to remove<strong>the</strong>m, he will do it. Just <strong>the</strong> same, <strong>in</strong> science it is not forbidden toapproach old problems by new methods <strong>and</strong> ei<strong>the</strong>r to confirm or refute<strong>the</strong> previous results. In statistics, this means that, hav<strong>in</strong>g a smallamount <strong>of</strong> data, it is impossible to say anyth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a certa<strong>in</strong> way, butdur<strong>in</strong>g a prolonged statistical <strong>in</strong>vestigation, with new material be<strong>in</strong>gever aga<strong>in</strong> available, no doubts are f<strong>in</strong>ally left.Alimov is <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> right when assert<strong>in</strong>g that, hav<strong>in</strong>g one sample, it isnot at all possible to verify whe<strong>the</strong>r we are deal<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>in</strong>dependentr<strong>and</strong>om variables. However, <strong>the</strong> situation is sharply changed after afew new samples become available. Then, <strong>in</strong> particular, we can check<strong>the</strong> previously calculated confidence <strong>in</strong>tervals.I had occasion to encounter some people keep<strong>in</strong>g to logicalreason<strong>in</strong>g for whom <strong>the</strong> very concept <strong>of</strong> statistical test<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>hypo<strong>the</strong>ses caused a feel<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> displeasure. That concept from <strong>the</strong> verybeg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g fixes <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> significance, i. e. some non-zeroprobability to reject mistakenly an actually true hypo<strong>the</strong>sis. Someconsider this unacceptable, but <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> cognition does notconsist <strong>of</strong> a s<strong>in</strong>gle test, <strong>and</strong> even when we reject a hypo<strong>the</strong>sis, we donot, happily, pass a death sentence. If new data appear, we will test itanew.Tolstoi would have hardly rejected <strong>the</strong> viewpo<strong>in</strong>t that science issome sphere <strong>of</strong> labour not higher, not lower than any o<strong>the</strong>r sphere(<strong>in</strong>dustry, agriculture, fish<strong>in</strong>g etc). To support this assumption I cancite his admission, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> same book, that <strong>in</strong> its sphere <strong>of</strong> cognition <strong>of</strong>98
<strong>the</strong> material world science had <strong>in</strong>deed essentially advanced. Andmodern development leaves no doubt <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> existence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> really truescience <strong>in</strong> contrast to <strong>the</strong> false science.What are <strong>the</strong> practical conclusions from <strong>the</strong> considerations above?Once we acknowledge science as a k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> active human work, itfollows, on <strong>the</strong> one h<strong>and</strong>, that at each moment it is <strong>in</strong>complete <strong>and</strong>fragmentary; <strong>in</strong>deed, active work always lacks someth<strong>in</strong>g (or evenvery much). On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>, what also follows is universality: manwill always engage <strong>in</strong> science <strong>and</strong> attempt to widen <strong>the</strong> sphere <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>certa<strong>in</strong>ty known.In a number <strong>of</strong> fields <strong>of</strong> application <strong>of</strong> ma<strong>the</strong>matics <strong>and</strong> probability<strong>the</strong>ory <strong>in</strong> particular to real phenomena <strong>the</strong> situation became abnormals<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> practical possibilities <strong>of</strong> application are overestimated. Insuch cases it is expedient to stress <strong>the</strong> unavoidable fragmentary state <strong>of</strong>all <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g applications: <strong>in</strong> ma<strong>the</strong>matics, too gr<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tentions canoccur unatta<strong>in</strong>able <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>evitable failure will create for thatscience an extremely undesirable blow to its prestige, a situation <strong>in</strong>which science can not normally develop.Thus, some years ago it was thought that, had <strong>the</strong>re occurred apossibility <strong>of</strong> solv<strong>in</strong>g great problems <strong>of</strong> l<strong>in</strong>ear programm<strong>in</strong>g cover<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> economics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> entire nation, economic plann<strong>in</strong>g should bereorganized on that foundation. It is now absolutely clear that such aproblem can not be ei<strong>the</strong>r formulated or solved at least because, giventhat global sett<strong>in</strong>g, such a notion <strong>of</strong> l<strong>in</strong>ear programm<strong>in</strong>g as set <strong>of</strong>possible technological methods has no sense 17 . As a result, <strong>the</strong> study <strong>of</strong>local problems for which l<strong>in</strong>ear programm<strong>in</strong>g can be effective, is not atall sufficiently developed.Awkward <strong>and</strong> absolutely useless concepts emerge when attempt<strong>in</strong>gto comb<strong>in</strong>e global problems <strong>of</strong> l<strong>in</strong>ear programm<strong>in</strong>g with a stochasticdescription <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> possible <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ateness. Here also only properlyisolated local problems can have sense. In general, when apply<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>probability <strong>the</strong>ory to describe an <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate situation, it isextremely important to atta<strong>in</strong> some unity between <strong>the</strong> extent <strong>of</strong>rough<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>the</strong> reality still admissible for a stochastic model <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>amount <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation to be extracted from reality for determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>parameters <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> model. This situation is perfectly well described by<strong>the</strong> proverb: You can not run with <strong>the</strong> hare <strong>and</strong> hunt with <strong>the</strong> hounds.In o<strong>the</strong>r words, a model that adequately describes reality <strong>in</strong> detail c<strong>and</strong>em<strong>and</strong> so much <strong>in</strong>formation for determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g its parameters, that it isimpossible to collect it. And a rough model only dem<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g a littleamount <strong>of</strong> statistical <strong>in</strong>formation can be unsuited for describ<strong>in</strong>g reality.The ma<strong>in</strong> dem<strong>and</strong> on a researcher who practically applies <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong>probability is <strong>in</strong>deed to be able to f<strong>in</strong>d a way out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se difficulties.2. Logical <strong>and</strong> Illogical Applications <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Theory <strong>of</strong> <strong>Probability</strong>Five years ago I thought it expedient to explicate, <strong>in</strong> a popularbooklet, <strong>the</strong> elements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>the</strong>matical arsenal <strong>of</strong> probability<strong>the</strong>ory. However, almost at <strong>the</strong> same time as that booklet hadappeared, a sufficient number <strong>of</strong> textbooks on <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> probabilityhad been published with <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>the</strong>matical aspect be<strong>in</strong>g described evenmore than completely. Then, a tradition beg<strong>in</strong>s to take shape (<strong>and</strong>99
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Studies in the History of Statistic
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Introduction by CompilerI am presen
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(Lect. Notes Math., No. 1021, 1983,
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sufficiently securely that a carefu
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is energy?) from chapter 4 of Feynm
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demand to apply transfinite numbers
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for stating that Ω consists of ele
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chances to draw a more suitable apa
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Let the space of elementary events
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2.3. Independence. When desiring to
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Eξ = ∑ aipi.Our form of definiti
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absolutely precisely if the pertine
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where x is any real number. If dens
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probability can be coupled with an
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Nowadays we are sure that no indepe
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λ = λ(T)with λ(T) being actually
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(1/B n )(m − A n )instead of the
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along with ξ. For example, if ξ i
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µ( − p0) ÷np0 (1 − p0)nhas an
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distribution of the maximal term |s
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ξ (ω) + ... + ξ (ω)n1n{ω :|
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P{max ξ(t) ≥ x} = 0.01, 0 ≤ t
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1. This example and considerations
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