Development of an <strong>Australian</strong> space industryAustralia’s space industry is characterised by a series of highly-specialised companiesproducing technology, components and applications that generally support other nations’space activities. 63 These ‘niche’ capabilities are well-respected around the world but, in reality,even as a combined grouping they employ very few people and do not represent a significantindustry sector in Australia. It is difficult to make an argument that supports Australia tryingto build a space industry to compete with the established overseas producers, launchersor operators of satellites. This would require substantial Government seed investment and,in reality, it is unlikely that Australia would be able to create and then sustain a seriouscompetitive market.What <strong>Australian</strong> industry can do better is identify global opportunities and priorities as a sector,and focus its investment on these opportunities. With the aid of its space agency, Canadianindustry has done just that and has been very successful. 64 To do the same, <strong>Australian</strong> industryneeds a clear understanding of what Australia’s priorities—and, perhaps more importantly,its realistic opportunities—are for space and a roadmap that identifies where Australia islikely to invest in the coming years. If space security is to be a national priority for Australia,then <strong>Australian</strong> industry should be encouraged to become involved in programs that supportAustralia’s space security endeavours. <strong>Australian</strong> industry needs some degree of certaintybefore it invests in space. The development of policy should provide that certainty.National space educationAustralia has a pressing need to educate a future space workforce. Such a workforce wouldneed to include operators, technicians, engineers, scientists and, importantly, policy makers.Australia has historically been able to train operators, technical and scientific staff to work atsites in Woomera, Pine Gap and the various defence and scientific sites around Australia andin the US.However, even though training and education opportunities still exist, there are few perceivedcareer opportunities in the space industry in Australia. As a result, it is difficult to attract newstudents and retain graduates in Australia, particularly outside the defence area. 65 <strong>Australian</strong>eeds to attract engineers, technicians and scientists into key space technology areas, suchas signal processing, space-focused physics, systems engineering, and network design andmanagement. One of the benefits of introducing an ASA is the opportunity it would provide tofocus on building both a sustainable national education effort and industry opportunities thatwould offer interesting and rewarding employment for space graduates.Apart from professional space training, <strong>Australian</strong> executives, managers and public officials—and the general public for that matter—are largely unaware of the dependence Australia hason space. Again, the formation of an ASA would enable a targeted and coordinated educationprogram to be initiated across all domains and disciplines within the <strong>Australian</strong> community.10
An <strong>Australian</strong> space security policy proposalAustralia must decide what it seeks to secure with regards to space, before it develops policyand implementation strategies. The following vision statement is proposed for Australia’sspace security policy: 66Australia’s space security policy seeks to ensure that Australia has assured and secure access tospace-based services, irrespective of the owner or provider of those services, which support all formsof national endeavour and which operate in space free from the threat of interference, damage ordestruction.The vision statement is simple yet comprehensive and would be suitable for the next iterationof the National Security Statement. In implementing that vision, it is suggested Australiashould pursue its space security policy through three key strategies:• Strategy 1. By increasing its investment over the short to medium term in the developmentof space surveillance infrastructure, technical and operational expertise, and informationsharing with the US, Australia would raise its profile and contribution to the internationaldevelopment of a space security framework.• Strategy 2. By engaging diplomatically with the US, China, the EU and our Asia-Pacificpartners, Australia would investigate the applicability of a code of conduct for spaceactivities for the Asia-Pacific region.• Strategy 3. By the creation of the <strong>Australian</strong> Space Agency, Australia’s would advance itsinterests in space, in particular in space security, and provide a single centre of spaceexpertise in Australia, linking investment and existing programs with the national spacesecurity policy and the broader national strategic agenda.ConclusionAustralia is increasingly dependent on space-based systems for its economic, security,environmental, cultural and social interests, and yet the space environment is becomingincreasingly vulnerable. While many nations are publicly debating and championing variousspace security options, Australia has no space security policy and to date has shown littleinterest in the global debate. This should change if Australia is serious about securing itsspace-based national endeavours.Australia’s space policy must be developed within the US alliance framework. It must alsorecognise China’s strategic space aspirations and, crucially, the importance of the relationshipbetween China and the US in future space security. It should also be cognisant of the dynamicsof the Asia-Pacific region and the increasing interest in that region of space and space security.The space security policy proposed in this paper is developed around the broad approach ofchampioning a code of conduct in the Asia-Pacific region and bringing together the US andChina in space security policy. It provides investment, predominantly in the space surveillancearea, and seeks ultimately to bring together Australia’s national space endeavours under asingle policy and a single statutory authority—the <strong>Australian</strong> Space Agency.Air Commodore Chris Westwood joined the RAAF in 1982 and, following air defence controllertraining, was posted to various operational and instructional posts. His executive posts include11
- Page 1 and 2: Australian Defence ForceCONTENTSISS
- Page 3 and 4: Securing Space: Australia’s urgen
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- Page 9: Domestic considerationsThe argument
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- Page 19 and 20: Bhutto, it was his unyielding stanc
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- Page 33 and 34: BIBLIOGRAPHYBoot, Max, War Made New
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- Page 45 and 46: Colin East goes to SESKOAD - in ‘
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- Page 55 and 56: 23. East diary, 21 December 1964.24
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SOF by their nature are suited to m
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The longer-term vision for NATO SOF
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25. NATO, ‘Allied Joint Doctrine
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Peacekeepers: Athena’s championsC
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Mobs as adversariesMobs do not fit
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• There is always the presence of
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policies and customs may serve as g
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Higher on the continuum would come
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Managing Global Supply ChainsWing C
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Many OEMs of commercial equipment a
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Similarly, the initial and ongoing
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providers or host nation support. T
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22. UK Ministry of Defence, ‘The
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Sustainable Defence Capability: Aus
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The major strategic risk is resourc
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This provides a national opportunit
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The drive towards sustainability by
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NOTES1. Commonwealth of Australia,
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Book reviewsTales of War: great sto
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Some of Kainikara’s proposals cou
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CounterinsurgencyDavid KilcullenCar
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and political level against an incr
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Religion, Conflict and Military Int
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Challinger’s explanations are sup
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destroyed in airborne operations in
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How Wars EndDan ReiterNew Jersey, U