21. Rickard, ‘The Employment of Airborne (Parachute) <strong>Force</strong>s in Modern Asymmetrical Warfare’, p. 114.22. Donna Miles, ‘82nd Airborne Trains to Re-assume Global response <strong>Force</strong> Mission’, American<strong>Force</strong>s Press Service, Fort Bragg, 28 October 2008, accessed 29 August <strong>2010</strong>.23. The Parachute Regiment provides the capability to deploy an infantry force at short notice, inthe vanguard of operations and in the most demanding circumstances. As such, it is trained andready to form the spearhead for the Army’s rapid intervention capability. It is light by design,because this confers speed of reaction, and is expert at air-land deployments, by helicopter,aeroplane or parachute. See , accessed29 August <strong>2010</strong>.24. For discussion of the encroachment of Special <strong>Force</strong>s on the role of the Infantry, see Major JimHammett, ‘We Were Soldiers Once’, <strong>Australian</strong> Army <strong>Journal</strong>, Vol. V, No. 1, 2006, pp. 39-50.25. The ACT has conducted tactical descents from a mix of C-17 and C-130 type aircraft in <strong>2010</strong>.26. Lieutenant Colonel Jonathon Hawkins, ‘The Amphibious Amp theatre’, in Albert Palazzo et al,Projecting force: the <strong>Australian</strong> Army and maritime strategy, Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre,<strong>2010</strong>, p. 35.27. LWD 3-0 ‘Operations, Developing Doctrine’, Puckapunyal: Land Warfare Development Centre, 2008,p. 29.28. Miles, ‘82nd Airborne Trains to Re-assume Global response <strong>Force</strong> Mission’.29. Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston and Dr Ian Watt, ‘The Chief of <strong>Defence</strong> <strong>Force</strong> and Secretary of<strong>Defence</strong> Strategic Reform Program Media Roundtable’, p. 4.30. Department of <strong>Defence</strong> Intranet Strategic Reform Program ‘frequently asked questions’- How willwe ensure there is no adverse impact on capability? See ,accessed 29 August <strong>2010</strong>.31. Hammett, ‘We Were Soldiers Once’, p. 42.32. Hammett, ‘We Were Soldiers Once’, p. 47.33. For a brief description of this capability decision see Dunstan in Horner and Bou, Duty First –A history of the Royal <strong>Australian</strong> Regiment, p. 252.34. Lieutenant Colonel Jim Connolly, quoted by Dunstan in Horner and Bou, Duty First – A history of theRoyal <strong>Australian</strong> Regiment, p. 273.44
Colin East goes to SESKOAD – in ‘a year of livingdangerously’, 1964Lieutenant Colonel Bob Lowry (Retd)IntroductionBy late 1962, the Dutch had been forced to surrender West New Guinea—the last bastion ofthe former Netherlands East Indies—to Indonesia via an interim UN administration and thepromise of an act of ‘free choice’ by its people within five years. Then, in January 1963, after afoiled revolt in Brunei a month earlier, President Sukarno declared ‘Confrontation’ against theproposal to amalgamate the British colonies in Borneo into the new Federation of Malaysia,set to be proclaimed on 31 August 1963.Cross-border raids into Borneo by Indonesian ‘volunteers’ commenced soon after, elicitinga measured British response that escalated as more Indonesian troops and resources werecommitted. The <strong>Australian</strong> Government declared its support for the formation of Malaysiabut was reluctant to commit its ground forces stationed in Malaya, although it did agreeto their use on the Malayan Peninsula (and some individuals were already attached toBritish units in Borneo). This reluctance arose from the Government’s desire to preserveits longer-term interests with Indonesia and distance itself from British obligations andcommitments. However, in frequent confidential communications, it pressed Indonesia to halt‘Confrontation’ and advised that it would provide military support if pressed by the Malaysianand British governments.Surprisingly, in the midst of these mounting tensions, Indonesia issued an invitation toAustralia to send a student to its Army Command and Staff College (SESKOAD) in Bandung. Theinvitation was accepted and Lieutenant Colonel Colin East was duly dispatched in <strong>Dec</strong>ember1963 to become not only the first <strong>Australian</strong> but the first foreign officer to attend the course.This article describes East’s experience, as recorded in his diary 1 , as well as the <strong>Australian</strong> andIndonesian governments’ policy considerations surrounding his attendance at the course.Why was the invitation issued and accepted?By the late 1950s, a small number of Indonesian officers had undertaken specialist trainingin Australia. In <strong>Dec</strong>ember 1959, the <strong>Australian</strong> Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, during hisonly visit to Indonesia, promised—at the prompting of General A.H. Nasution, Indonesia’sMinister for <strong>Defence</strong> and Chief of Staff of the Army—to confirm the possibility of trainingmilitary officers in Australia, including at the staff colleges. There was some <strong>Australian</strong>press controversy over the nature of the training offered but, in March 1960, Nasution toldthe new <strong>Australian</strong> Ambassador to Indonesia, Patrick Shaw, that he was pleased the PrimeMinister’s commitment had been confirmed and wanted to take up the offer of higher stafftraining immediately. 2Reciprocal funding arrangements were agreed and the first Indonesian students attendedthe <strong>Australian</strong> Staff College at Queenscliff in 1961. At the same time, East was instructed to45
- Page 1 and 2: Australian Defence ForceCONTENTSISS
- Page 3 and 4: Securing Space: Australia’s urgen
- Page 5 and 6: Australia’s space security policy
- Page 7 and 8: ChinaChina is the major space power
- Page 9 and 10: Domestic considerationsThe argument
- Page 11 and 12: An Australian space security policy
- Page 13 and 14: 18. Graeme Hooper as quoted in ‘L
- Page 15 and 16: BIBLIOGRAPHYBall, Desmond, ‘Asses
- Page 17 and 18: Pakistan-US bilateral relations: a
- Page 19 and 20: Bhutto, it was his unyielding stanc
- Page 21 and 22: Unfortunately, there is little the
- Page 23 and 24: negative than positive. The one pos
- Page 25 and 26: NOTES1. ‘Floods caused losses wor
- Page 27 and 28: The Difficulties in Predicting Futu
- Page 29 and 30: main attack into Western Europe thr
- Page 31 and 32: In order to more accurately predict
- Page 33 and 34: BIBLIOGRAPHYBoot, Max, War Made New
- Page 35 and 36: for the parachute capability to be
- Page 37 and 38: Redundancy of platforms is importan
- Page 39 and 40: The option of employing both C-17 a
- Page 41 and 42: parachute insertions, the psycholog
- Page 43: NOTES1. Air Chief Marshal Angus Hou
- Page 47 and 48: He was the top graduate of the Aust
- Page 49 and 50: support, it is not surprising that
- Page 51 and 52: East was an assiduous letter writer
- Page 53 and 54: East brought 4RAR back to Australia
- Page 55 and 56: 23. East diary, 21 December 1964.24
- Page 57 and 58: • to promote partnerships among c
- Page 59 and 60: theatres. In its 2006 Quadrennial D
- Page 61 and 62: SOF by their nature are suited to m
- Page 63 and 64: The longer-term vision for NATO SOF
- Page 65 and 66: 25. NATO, ‘Allied Joint Doctrine
- Page 67 and 68: Peacekeepers: Athena’s championsC
- Page 69 and 70: Mobs as adversariesMobs do not fit
- Page 71 and 72: • There is always the presence of
- Page 73 and 74: policies and customs may serve as g
- Page 75 and 76: Higher on the continuum would come
- Page 77 and 78: Managing Global Supply ChainsWing C
- Page 79 and 80: Many OEMs of commercial equipment a
- Page 81 and 82: Similarly, the initial and ongoing
- Page 83 and 84: providers or host nation support. T
- Page 85 and 86: 22. UK Ministry of Defence, ‘The
- Page 87 and 88: Sustainable Defence Capability: Aus
- Page 89 and 90: The major strategic risk is resourc
- Page 91 and 92: This provides a national opportunit
- Page 93 and 94: The drive towards sustainability by
- Page 95 and 96:
NOTES1. Commonwealth of Australia,
- Page 97 and 98:
Book reviewsTales of War: great sto
- Page 99 and 100:
Some of Kainikara’s proposals cou
- Page 101 and 102:
CounterinsurgencyDavid KilcullenCar
- Page 103 and 104:
and political level against an incr
- Page 105 and 106:
Religion, Conflict and Military Int
- Page 107 and 108:
Challinger’s explanations are sup
- Page 109 and 110:
destroyed in airborne operations in
- Page 111 and 112:
How Wars EndDan ReiterNew Jersey, U