NATO SOF have also been directed to provide the capability lead in for conventional forceinitiatives within the Alliance, both in terms of operational deployments as well as force restructuringand modernisation.As a result of the Riga Summit, NATO now has the mechanism through which SOF can be utilisedfor NATO-sponsored missions. The formation of the NSCC gives NATO a dedicated effort forspecial operations, weighted in the same context as the other functional components. Oncemature, NATO SOF will provide the Alliance with an effective, legitimate, credible capabilitywhich could effectively counter the political and military efforts of terrorist and other nonnationstate threats, as well as act as the catalyst for further transformational reform acrossthe Alliance.Case study: the International Security <strong>Force</strong> in AfghanistanThe terrorist threat from Salafist extremism in Afghanistan has now mutated from a centralisedTaliban into a decentralised, hierarchical, coherent insurgency across the entire nation, as wellas in the sanctuaries that straddle the borders of neighbouring countries. While al Qaedaand the Taliban have been partly defeated, its new form—unstructured, flattened, distributedand ever-changing—is harder to locate, isolate and destroy. NATO, through its deploymentof the International Security <strong>Force</strong> in Afghanistan (ISAF), is now the principal operating forcefighting the Taliban. The operational challenge for ISAF is particularly challenging, as it hasexperienced real difficulty in finding, tracking and engaging terrorists, whether in remote,rugged terrain or crowded cities. 32The urgency for a SOF capability within NATO is no better demonstrated than in this currentoperation. Since 2002, NATO has been involved in enhancing the security and reconstructionof Afghanistan. While the operation has not been without its challenges, most experts agreethat the use of SOF has been an essential component of NATO’s capacity to defeat the Taliban.Upon its formation in 2006, the NSCC immediately deployed a special operations componentto Afghanistan, with the mission of supporting Commander ISAF’s plan to defeat the Talibaninsurgency through the conduct of special operations. 33 SOF have been used to conduct tasksranging from attacks on terrorist camps, training the Afghan National Army and conductinghostage recovery operations. Direct action, strike and special reconnaissance intelligenceoperations have also led to the successful targeting of key Taliban leaders.NATO SOF have so far proven to be lethal, well-trained and appropriately conditioned for thisenvironment. The capabilities and strategic freedom of action that these forces have providedCommander ISAF have negated many of the traditional political and physical risks that haveprevented close collaboration between NATO members in the past. Under the stewardship ofthe NSCC, a unity of effort among all special operations tactical units has emerged, enabling allSOF elements to conduct full spectrum operations by leveraging off each other’s capabilities.The missions and skills that NATO SOF have demonstrated through its ISAF deployment haveexpanded the capacity, capabilities and contingency options for NATO both in its currentoperational theatres and future emerging environments. NATO SOF now provide a range ofoptions that effectively expand the operational continuum for NATO, from passive surveillanceand military assistance with local forces, to tasks such as direct action. Framework nations,such as the US via the facilitation of the NSCC, present significant national SOF capabilitiesthat, when deployed in a collaborative context with fellow members, can be a multilateral toolfor NATO military capability.62
The longer-term vision for NATO SOFThere is every expectation that NATO SOF will be able to generate a world-class operationalforce, capable of deploying expeditionary tactical units to perform specialised missions inharsh, uncertain, hostile, denied and sensitive environments. This force will be capable ofperforming the aggressive F3EA targeting model mentioned earlier. NATO SOF, through jointforce training and accreditation, will also continue to develop a high level of operationalplanning capacity through its training and accreditation centres, enabling NATO members toassign SOF to NSCC-led task forces that are trained, equipped and organised to conduct highendspecial operations. This force will also act as the transformational conduit for the rest ofNATO, who will modernise as a result of the NSTI demonstrating its effectiveness within SOF.ConclusionJust as NATO prevailed during the Cold War, NATO is compelled to stand against the threatof global terrorist groups. In order to generate the military effectiveness required to defeatextremism, a capable and relevant organisation must be built to prosecute the current war.NATO in its recent past has proven its resolve and has shown the willingness to transformitself in light of this new global security environment. NATO must continue to embrace SOFcapability development.SOF provide the capability to worry the enemy, keep him off balance and ultimately defeathim. Terrorists in Afghanistan have witnessed first-hand what NATO SOF can do. To them, theprospect of a high-performing NATO counterterrorism force, able to operate anywhere withspeed, agility and lethality, while displaying democratic resolve and unity, is highly problematicand unwelcome. This is precisely how NATO and the broader Alliance can build a road maptowards victory in the global war on terror.Lieutenant Colonel Ian Langford, DSC is a Commando officer within Special OperationsCommand. He has deployed as an operational commander with the Special Operations TaskGroup to Afghanistan. He has additionally served in that theatre with the NATO SpecialOperations Coordination Centre on the 2008 review of ISAF special operations. He is aDistinguished Graduate of the US Marine Command and Staff College (2009) and was the <strong>2010</strong>Honour Graduate the USMC School of Advanced War-fighting. He has also served on multipletours to Timor Leste, the broader Middle East, Bougainville, the Solomon Islands and as part ofAustralia’s domestic counter-terrorist response.63
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Australian Defence ForceCONTENTSISS
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Securing Space: Australia’s urgen
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Australia’s space security policy
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ChinaChina is the major space power
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Domestic considerationsThe argument
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- Page 15 and 16: BIBLIOGRAPHYBall, Desmond, ‘Asses
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- Page 19 and 20: Bhutto, it was his unyielding stanc
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- Page 23 and 24: negative than positive. The one pos
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- Page 27 and 28: The Difficulties in Predicting Futu
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- Page 33 and 34: BIBLIOGRAPHYBoot, Max, War Made New
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- Page 37 and 38: Redundancy of platforms is importan
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- Page 45 and 46: Colin East goes to SESKOAD - in ‘
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- Page 51 and 52: East was an assiduous letter writer
- Page 53 and 54: East brought 4RAR back to Australia
- Page 55 and 56: 23. East diary, 21 December 1964.24
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- Page 59 and 60: theatres. In its 2006 Quadrennial D
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- Page 67 and 68: Peacekeepers: Athena’s championsC
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- Page 73 and 74: policies and customs may serve as g
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- Page 77 and 78: Managing Global Supply ChainsWing C
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- Page 85 and 86: 22. UK Ministry of Defence, ‘The
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- Page 95 and 96: NOTES1. Commonwealth of Australia,
- Page 97 and 98: Book reviewsTales of War: great sto
- Page 99 and 100: Some of Kainikara’s proposals cou
- Page 101 and 102: CounterinsurgencyDavid KilcullenCar
- Page 103 and 104: and political level against an incr
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- Page 107 and 108: Challinger’s explanations are sup
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- Page 111 and 112: How Wars EndDan ReiterNew Jersey, U