28. Alex Rodriguez, ‘Clinton unveils an array of projects for Pakistan’, Los Angeles Times,19 July <strong>2010</strong> accessed 2 September <strong>2010</strong>.29. ‘National Security Strategy’, Washington, the White House, May <strong>2010</strong>, pp. 20-1.30. Out of a total of 152 drone strikes in the last six years, 107 were launched under President Obama. BillRoggio and Alexander Mayer, ‘Charting the data for US airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004-<strong>2010</strong>’, The LongWar <strong>Journal</strong>, accessed 3 September <strong>2010</strong>.31. Out of a total of 853 Taliban and al Qa’ida fighters killed over the last six years, only 53 civilians havebeen killed. See Roggio, ‘Charting the data for US airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004-<strong>2010</strong>’.32. Clay Ramsay, Steven Kull, Stephen Weber and Evan Lewis, ‘Pakistani Public Opinion on the SwatConflict, Afghanistan, and the US’, World Public Opinion.org, 1 July 2009, p. 8.33. As cited in Khadija Khosa, ‘Anti-Americanism in Pakistan’, Newsbrief, RUSI, July <strong>2010</strong>, Vol. 30. No. 4,p. 14. These results are also confirmed with my own on anecdotal evidence collected over severaltrips to Pakistan and communications with politicians, journalists, academics and diplomats in thelast three years. It is important to remember that these strong anti-American feelings are nothingnew in Pakistan. For example, a mob burned the American embassy in Islamabad in <strong>Nov</strong>ember1979 when false rumours circulated that the US was involved in the seizure of the Grand Mosquein Mecca.34. Khosa, ‘Anti-Americanism in Pakistan’, p. 16.35. Claude Rakisits, ‘Battle with the Bad Guys’, The <strong>Australian</strong>, 17 June 2009.36. Julian E. Barnes, Siobhan Gorman and Tom Wright, ‘Pakistan fight stalls for U.S.’, The Wall Street<strong>Journal</strong>, 13 August <strong>2010</strong>. accessed 16 August <strong>2010</strong>.37. A grouping of countries, which includes Australia, established in 2009 aimed at assisting Pakistanwith the consolidation of democracy.SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHYBurke, S.M., Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: a historical analysis, London: Oxford University Press, 1973.Choudhury, G.W., India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers: politics of a divided subcontinent,New York: Free Press, 1975.Fair, C. Christine, Keith Crane, Christopher S. Chivvis, Samir Puri and Michael Spirtas, Pakistan – Can theUnited States Secure an Insecure State?, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, <strong>2010</strong>.Hussain, Zahid, Frontline Pakistan – the Struggle with Militant Islam, New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 2007.Paris, Jonathan, Prospects for Pakistan, London: Legatum Institute, January <strong>2010</strong>.Rakisits, C.G.P., ‘National Integration in Pakistan: The Role of Religion, Ethnicity and the ExternalEnvironment’, PhD thesis, University of Queensland, 1986.26
The Difficulties in Predicting Future WarfareIan WallaceAviation is fine as a sport. But as an instrument of war, it is worthless.[French] General Ferdinand Foch, March 1913 1I have a mathematical certainty that the future will confirm my assertion thataerial warfare will be the most important element in future wars.[Italian] General Giulio Douhet, 1921 2IntroductionWhen we take a look at past predictions regarding the shape of future warfare, one factimmediately jumps to the fore: how inaccurate such presages have usually been. At firstglance, this seems somewhat surprising, as a vital part of the strategic commander’s role issurely the planning of where, why, when and how tomorrow’s battles will be fought. Yet it isalso a common maxim that generals plan to fight their last war.As an example, take the contradictory quotes above—each made by senior militarycommanders within ten years of the other. Difficulties in predicting the future stem fromseveral issues. These include the way our brains work, the nature of the world we live in andthe character of warfare itself. All these factors act in concert seemingly to imply that the onlyreliable prediction we can make about tomorrow’s warfare is that any predictions are morethan likely to be wrong! A closer examination reveals that military forecasting is beset by amyriad of difficulties. Such examination also reveals why even inaccurate predictions are stillimportant and how, almost paradoxically, a simple acknowledgment and awareness of suchfactors can lead towards better forecasts.Human nature: past performance does not guarantee future returnsWar is a human activity, comprised of political, social and cultural elements. 3 As such, it hasalways been subject to problems of human perception. If you have ever read the detail of aninvestment statement, you will likely have come across the words ‘past performance does notguarantee future returns’. Surprisingly, despite the absolute unlikelihood of this statementever not being true, words such as these are legally required on most product disclosurestatements. This serves to illustrate how we need protection from the limitations of our ownminds—our reasoning tends to suffer from linearity and a confined viewpoint. We naturallytend to place events within a straight-line narrative (or trend) and then project that trend’scontinuance into the future. 4Alternatively or worse, we also often only project a single trend forwards, ignoring the effectof other factors, while some trends may prove self-negating, as recognition of such trendsspurs the development of countervailing trends. 5 For example, the dominance of nuclearweaponry in the 1950s led to an American government seemingly uninterested in developingconventional weapons. Such thinking, however, ignored the possibility that traditional, non-27
- Page 1 and 2: Australian Defence ForceCONTENTSISS
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Managing Global Supply ChainsWing C
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Many OEMs of commercial equipment a
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Sustainable Defence Capability: Aus
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The major strategic risk is resourc
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This provides a national opportunit
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The drive towards sustainability by
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NOTES1. Commonwealth of Australia,
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Book reviewsTales of War: great sto
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Some of Kainikara’s proposals cou
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CounterinsurgencyDavid KilcullenCar
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and political level against an incr
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Religion, Conflict and Military Int
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Challinger’s explanations are sup
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How Wars EndDan ReiterNew Jersey, U