Third, while force is the predominant means of imposing the will of a commander in warfightingoperations, it can actually be counter-productive in peacekeeping missions. The imposition ofpeace at any cost can be viewed as tyranny. The Roman historian Tacitus once noted that ‘abad peace is even worse than war’. 4 Victory is elusive but it is more likely to be determined byhow a situation is handled than whether peacekeepers prevailed.Fourth, the inherent destructive influences in a community are always in competitionwith society’s legitimate right to restrain them. These influences are manifested as eithercompliance to mandates imposed by legitimate authority or as defiance in contempt of effortsto enforce them. Because these factors never exist in perfect harmony, there is a dynamictension between those who comply with the rules and behaviour that govern civilised societyand those individuals or groups who defy them. Consequently, a peacekeeping mission willnever be completely achieved. When stability is restored, the mission remains, whereby themilitary peacekeeping force is merely exchanged for civilian law enforcement.Citizens as warriorsThe evolution of a law-abiding member of the community to a dangerous and menacingantagonist is one that has been studied for centuries. In 408 BC, Euripides noted that ‘mobsin their emotions are much like children, subject to the same tantrums and fits of fury’. 5Like children, members of mobs tend to be emotional, unreasoning and immature. They areinclined to act out their frustrations rather than make attempts at meaningful resolution. Andthe manner in which this occurs tends to be one of growth and escalation. Mobs do not simplyappear—they evolve.As a result of demonstrations in the US over the Vietnam War and civil rights, a large amountof research was done in this area during the late 1960s and early 1970s. After a hiatus ofsome years, more advancement was made in the 1990s with studies of the Intifada uprisingsin Israel and the ‘marching season’ disturbances in Ireland. 6 Based on this research, somegeneralisations can be made which provide a snapshot view of the process. One of the mostimportant is that the long-held and widespread belief that individuals in mobs are transformedinto mindless automatons, surrendering to the desires and actions of the masses, has largelybeen debunked. 7 Modern sociological research suggests that:• Crowds are not simply a collection of individuals who happen to be at the same time andplace but rather are comprised of ‘companion clusters’. These are small groups of peoplewho are friends, family members or acquaintances and they tend to arrive, gather, act andleave together.• Crowds are not homogenous entities; that is, participants retain their personal feelings ofidentity, goals, mores, motivations and inhibitions.• The behaviour of individual members of a crowd is always ‘objective oriented’; that is,individual motivations are purposive and directed at attaining some goal. Actions that donot achieve satisfactory results or result in personal penalties tend not to be repeated.• Members of a crowd nearly never act in unison and, when they do, their actions tend to beshort-lived. Even benign collective actions that seem to be unanimous, such as applause,booing, singing etc, will not achieve 100 per cent participation. The more complex andmalevolent the behaviour, the less likely it is that uncommitted members of the crowd willparticipate. And the more complex the behaviour, the more short-lived it will tend to be.68
Mobs as adversariesMobs do not fit the customary understanding of an ‘enemy’. While a violent mob can be everybit as formidable as an army, it lacks conventional attributes such as a formal command andcontrol architecture, definable objectives or a unified focus of effort. There is no independentwill but rather a loose and temporary coalition of intentions. Its motivation may be moreevil than ideology, and its members are likely driven by emotion rather than a sense of duty.Leaders are more likely to be charismatic than competent. The ‘operation’ is more likely tobe spontaneous than pre-planned. Furthermore, unlike armies, mobs can win by losing,because issues are ultimately decided by how a mob is treated not whether their actionswere successful.Nevertheless, the lack of an ‘enemy’ in peacekeeping operations should not be confused witha lack of adversaries. In fact, adversaries abound. Factions of the community may be alignedalong family or ethnic lines, or based on religious, economic or political beliefs, or somecombination of several. Further complicating matters is that when circumstances dictate,these factions often seek temporary alliances with other factions to further their own ends.The relationships between these groups are perpetual and dynamic. The only thing certain isthat intervention of any type will appease some while infuriating others.Because mobs are evolutionary in nature, there are distinct phases that comprise the ‘lifecycle’ of a crowd. Even an elementary understanding of these phases provides reliable cluesfor making decisions, exploiting weaknesses and avoiding conflict.The first phase is the assembling process. This involves the congregation of people fromdifferent locations to a common place and time. During the assembling process, thecompanion clusters autonomously arrive and move to an assembly area, either impromptuor as part of an organised effort, as in a protest or demonstration. Impromptu assembliesare, by nature, spontaneous and ad hoc, and the process proceeds by general consensus,usually by word-of-mouth. Besides an attraction of some sort, the two conditions that favourthe impromptu assembling process are easy access to the assembly area and no competingdemands. Organised assemblies, however, tend to follow suggestions from a common source.Accordingly, strong clues are available for determining intentions. Furthermore, organisedassemblies heavily rely on networks to attract, coordinate and focus the individual membersinto a cohesive force. 8 During the assembling process, the dispersion, lack of cohesion and lackof focus of the still-evolving crowd present the best opportunities for interventions withoutwidespread resistance.The second phase is the temporary gathering. This is achieved when individuals and smallgroups are converged and often (but not always) engage in some type of collective behaviour.While about 40 different types of behaviour have been observed, they can be generally groupedinto six distinct categories. These are locomotion, as in marching in a protest; orientation, asin facing a common attraction during a speech or other activity; vocalisation, as in whistling,hissing or booing; verbalisation, as in speaking, chanting or singing; gesticulation, as ingesturing, ‘flipping the finger’ or waving fists; and manipulation, as in applauding, grasping,lifting or throwing objects, overturning cars, barricades and so forth.When disturbances begin, they also tend to follow an evolutionary progression. The processusually begins with disruptive acts that may be obnoxious, and even illegal, but relatively69
- Page 1 and 2:
Australian Defence ForceCONTENTSISS
- Page 3 and 4:
Securing Space: Australia’s urgen
- Page 5 and 6:
Australia’s space security policy
- Page 7 and 8:
ChinaChina is the major space power
- Page 9 and 10:
Domestic considerationsThe argument
- Page 11 and 12:
An Australian space security policy
- Page 13 and 14:
18. Graeme Hooper as quoted in ‘L
- Page 15 and 16:
BIBLIOGRAPHYBall, Desmond, ‘Asses
- Page 17 and 18: Pakistan-US bilateral relations: a
- Page 19 and 20: Bhutto, it was his unyielding stanc
- Page 21 and 22: Unfortunately, there is little the
- Page 23 and 24: negative than positive. The one pos
- Page 25 and 26: NOTES1. ‘Floods caused losses wor
- Page 27 and 28: The Difficulties in Predicting Futu
- Page 29 and 30: main attack into Western Europe thr
- Page 31 and 32: In order to more accurately predict
- Page 33 and 34: BIBLIOGRAPHYBoot, Max, War Made New
- Page 35 and 36: for the parachute capability to be
- Page 37 and 38: Redundancy of platforms is importan
- Page 39 and 40: The option of employing both C-17 a
- Page 41 and 42: parachute insertions, the psycholog
- Page 43 and 44: NOTES1. Air Chief Marshal Angus Hou
- Page 45 and 46: Colin East goes to SESKOAD - in ‘
- Page 47 and 48: He was the top graduate of the Aust
- Page 49 and 50: support, it is not surprising that
- Page 51 and 52: East was an assiduous letter writer
- Page 53 and 54: East brought 4RAR back to Australia
- Page 55 and 56: 23. East diary, 21 December 1964.24
- Page 57 and 58: • to promote partnerships among c
- Page 59 and 60: theatres. In its 2006 Quadrennial D
- Page 61 and 62: SOF by their nature are suited to m
- Page 63 and 64: The longer-term vision for NATO SOF
- Page 65 and 66: 25. NATO, ‘Allied Joint Doctrine
- Page 67: Peacekeepers: Athena’s championsC
- Page 71 and 72: • There is always the presence of
- Page 73 and 74: policies and customs may serve as g
- Page 75 and 76: Higher on the continuum would come
- Page 77 and 78: Managing Global Supply ChainsWing C
- Page 79 and 80: Many OEMs of commercial equipment a
- Page 81 and 82: Similarly, the initial and ongoing
- Page 83 and 84: providers or host nation support. T
- Page 85 and 86: 22. UK Ministry of Defence, ‘The
- Page 87 and 88: Sustainable Defence Capability: Aus
- Page 89 and 90: The major strategic risk is resourc
- Page 91 and 92: This provides a national opportunit
- Page 93 and 94: The drive towards sustainability by
- Page 95 and 96: NOTES1. Commonwealth of Australia,
- Page 97 and 98: Book reviewsTales of War: great sto
- Page 99 and 100: Some of Kainikara’s proposals cou
- Page 101 and 102: CounterinsurgencyDavid KilcullenCar
- Page 103 and 104: and political level against an incr
- Page 105 and 106: Religion, Conflict and Military Int
- Page 107 and 108: Challinger’s explanations are sup
- Page 109 and 110: destroyed in airborne operations in
- Page 111 and 112: How Wars EndDan ReiterNew Jersey, U