joint amphibious exercise conducted at the end of the year, although, because of its relevanceto ‘Confrontation’, this was one of the few activities from which East was excluded.The pattern of instruction was normally lectures followed by syndicate discussions, writtenassignments, student lectures and lengthy periodic written examinations. Each student wasrequired to give three presentations of two hours duration. East selected the Korean War, theMalayan Emergency 1958-60 and the Pentropic Division as the subjects of his presentations.Two essays were also set—one on the meaning of the Muslim fasting month and another ona military topic. 11Hospitality in the midst of conflictEast kept a daily diary of his time in Indonesia. Understandably, it was a fairly guarded documentwith very few mentions of political affairs. However, it is clear from his diary and the officialreports he produced—along with an article he wrote—that he was very well received, despitethe increasing tempo of operations and political mobilisation in support of ‘Confrontation’.He had been farewelled by the Indonesian Ambassador to Australia, Brigadier General Suadi,and was met in Jakarta by the <strong>Australian</strong> military attaché, Colonel Freddie Whitelaw, andLieutenant Colonel Tambunan, who had returned from the <strong>Australian</strong> Staff College a yearbefore to become an instructor at SESKOAD and was to be East’s sponsor for the year.In his opening speech to the course on 6 January, the Minister for the Army (and ArmyCommander), Lieutenant General Ahmad Jani (who would perish in a failed coup d’etat inOctober 1965), personally greeted East en route to the podium and mentioned in his speechthat East’s presence marked the beginning of attendance by other foreign students to fosterbetter understanding between their respective countries. Before departing, Jani wished Eastwell with his studies. Then, in his opening address, the Commandant, Major General Sudirman,referred to East in glowing terms and said that he and Shirley would now be members of theSESKOAD family. 12Although Sudirman was the commandant, the dominant officer in East’s time at SESKOADwas Brigadier General Suwarto, the deputy commandant. Like most of the Army, both werestrongly anti-communist. Suwarto, who had lost a leg to cancer the previous year, was oftendescribed as a ‘PSI leaning officer’, which meant he was sympathetic to the policies of theIndonesian Socialist Party, which emphasised ‘modernisation, economic development andrational planning and organisation’. 13 He wanted to revamp the course to meet the higheststandards. He was very supportive of East, entertained him occasionally and sponsored hismembership of the Bumi Sangkuriang Club—which became the centre of East’s social life. Healso pressed East on several occasions for his critique of the course and of the arrangementsfor hosting foreign students.The other senior staff member was the chief instructor, Colonel Raden Saleh Sadeli. He was oneof the last of 18 Indonesians to graduate from the Royal Military Academy in Holland betweenthe First and Second World Wars. 14 He was captured by the Germans in mid-1940 and, afterthe war, returned with Dutch forces to suppress the Indonesian independence movement.However, after independence, he was forgiven and accepted into the Indonesian Army. Sadeliwas responsible for the day-to-day management of the course and personally escorted East ona trip to Central Java to see its ancient Hindu and Buddhist monuments. With such high level48
support, it is not surprising that the staff and student body were generally welcoming andsupportive. Moreover, in SESKOAD’s drive to attract more foreign students, it was imperativethat East leave with favourable impressions.The impact of ‘Confrontation’East listened to Radio Australia and Radio Malaysia morning and night. 15 On 7 January, RadioMalaysia reported on East’s attendance at SESKOAD and claimed that he was an intelligenceofficer who had spent four years in Malaya. Certainly, news of East’s attendance came at asensitive time in relations between Australia, Britain and Malaysia. Although Australia waspressing Indonesia to end ‘Confrontation’ it was reluctant to commit troops to Borneo, despiteincreasing pressure from Britain and Malaysia. Concerned that the news of East’s presence atSESKOAD might be interpreted as further evidence of Australia’s ambivalence, the Departmentof External Affairs advised its British and Malaysian counterparts on 8 January that:Acceptance of the Indonesian invitation to attend the Staff College follows a long-standing recognitionby the Government of the value to <strong>Australian</strong> service personnel of attending courses in Indonesia. 16In mid February, East recorded that his morale was low and that he was uneasy about theuncertain international situation. He also noted that the senior student, Brigadier GeneralSurjosumpeno, who shared East’s duplex, mentioned a Radio Australia report on faminein Central Java, half-jokingly implying that East might have been the source of the reportfollowing his recent visit there. 17 This was unlikely as Tambunan had accompanied East onthe trip and the itinerary shows that East would not have had the opportunity to obtain suchinformation which, in any case, was readily available from other sources. 18From early March, East seems to have taken a more philosophical view, recording developmentsand conversations more matter-of-factly. He made note of the mass rallies in Jakarta andBandung in April; a discussion with Brigadier General Adjie, the Commander of West Java,who was strongly anti-communist but pro-Sukarno and pro-Confrontation; the failure of talksin Tokyo in June to resolve the dispute; a talk during a break with Brigadier General Jasin, theassistant deputy commandant, who saw the British as the villains; and the closing of the BritishCouncil in Bandung and elsewhere in August, from which he gained a few free books. 19Meanwhile, in April, the British had begun covert cross-border raids in Borneo to pushIndonesian military bases further from the border. The <strong>Australian</strong> Government also announcedit would be sending an Army engineer squadron to Borneo, along with two minesweepers, fourhelicopters and other air support, and that the infantry battalion in Malaysia could be usedagainst incursions on the peninsula. In response, Nasution warned Australia not to becomeinvolved and, in May, Sukarno formed his ‘crush Malaysia’ command, warning he could call on21 million volunteers. There was uproar in the Indonesian press in June when <strong>Australian</strong> Armyfield engineers arrived in Sabah to build roads and facilities. As the pressure mounted, the<strong>Australian</strong> Embassy revamped evacuation plans for the 280 <strong>Australian</strong>s in Indonesia.Nevertheless, East was invited to all important national and armed forces ceremonies. He waspresent at the National Day ceremony in Jakarta on 17 August when President Sukarno gave histhree-hour ‘A Year of Living Dangerously’ address. The same day, Indonesia launched its firstraid on the Malay peninsula in Johore but the 100 troops involved were quickly rounded-up.The next day, East had a long chat with the <strong>Australian</strong> Ambassador, Keith Shann, who later gave49
- Page 1 and 2: Australian Defence ForceCONTENTSISS
- Page 3 and 4: Securing Space: Australia’s urgen
- Page 5 and 6: Australia’s space security policy
- Page 7 and 8: ChinaChina is the major space power
- Page 9 and 10: Domestic considerationsThe argument
- Page 11 and 12: An Australian space security policy
- Page 13 and 14: 18. Graeme Hooper as quoted in ‘L
- Page 15 and 16: BIBLIOGRAPHYBall, Desmond, ‘Asses
- Page 17 and 18: Pakistan-US bilateral relations: a
- Page 19 and 20: Bhutto, it was his unyielding stanc
- Page 21 and 22: Unfortunately, there is little the
- Page 23 and 24: negative than positive. The one pos
- Page 25 and 26: NOTES1. ‘Floods caused losses wor
- Page 27 and 28: The Difficulties in Predicting Futu
- Page 29 and 30: main attack into Western Europe thr
- Page 31 and 32: In order to more accurately predict
- Page 33 and 34: BIBLIOGRAPHYBoot, Max, War Made New
- Page 35 and 36: for the parachute capability to be
- Page 37 and 38: Redundancy of platforms is importan
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- Page 41 and 42: parachute insertions, the psycholog
- Page 43 and 44: NOTES1. Air Chief Marshal Angus Hou
- Page 45 and 46: Colin East goes to SESKOAD - in ‘
- Page 47: He was the top graduate of the Aust
- Page 51 and 52: East was an assiduous letter writer
- Page 53 and 54: East brought 4RAR back to Australia
- Page 55 and 56: 23. East diary, 21 December 1964.24
- Page 57 and 58: • to promote partnerships among c
- Page 59 and 60: theatres. In its 2006 Quadrennial D
- Page 61 and 62: SOF by their nature are suited to m
- Page 63 and 64: The longer-term vision for NATO SOF
- Page 65 and 66: 25. NATO, ‘Allied Joint Doctrine
- Page 67 and 68: Peacekeepers: Athena’s championsC
- Page 69 and 70: Mobs as adversariesMobs do not fit
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- Page 77 and 78: Managing Global Supply ChainsWing C
- Page 79 and 80: Many OEMs of commercial equipment a
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- Page 83 and 84: providers or host nation support. T
- Page 85 and 86: 22. UK Ministry of Defence, ‘The
- Page 87 and 88: Sustainable Defence Capability: Aus
- Page 89 and 90: The major strategic risk is resourc
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- Page 95 and 96: NOTES1. Commonwealth of Australia,
- Page 97 and 98: Book reviewsTales of War: great sto
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Some of Kainikara’s proposals cou
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CounterinsurgencyDavid KilcullenCar
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and political level against an incr
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Religion, Conflict and Military Int
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Challinger’s explanations are sup
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destroyed in airborne operations in
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How Wars EndDan ReiterNew Jersey, U