mistrust. An example is the recent agreement in principle for an East Asian free trade area,demonstrating that the major regional powers can come together where there is collectiveself-interest. 51This presents an opportunity for Australia to play a leadership role in the development ofspace security policy in the Asia-Pacific region, where Australia’s leading export partners areChina, Japan and South Korea.Australia’s middle power diplomacyAustralia has a long history of shaping and influencing opinion on particular global issues.The Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions and the protection of the Antarctic underthe Antarctic Treaty are two good examples. Both suggest Australia could play a similar rolein global space security issues. Indeed, as a close ally of the US, a key trading partner andincreasingly a friend to China, an important member of the Asia-Pacific region and a respected‘middle power’ in global diplomacy, Australia is ideally positioned to take an active role inprogressing space security policy.The European UnionThe primary motivation in examining the EU’s approach to space security is the maturity ofits current policy and its leadership in calling for a rules-based code of conduct for spacesecurity. In 2008, the EU adopted a ‘Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities’, 52 taking theopportunity to play a leading role in global strategic affairs—immediately after the ChineseASAT incident—when space security was high on the international security agenda. The EUcode is less restraining than the treaty proposed by China and Russia at the Conference forDisarmament in 2002 (and again in 2008), as it is not legally binding and relies on voluntaryadherence. 53 An extract is as follows:The purpose of the present code is to enhance the safety, security and predictability of outer spaceactivities for all, recognising that a comprehensive approach to safety and security in outer spaceshould be guided by the following principles:i. freedom of access to space for all for peaceful purposes,ii. (preservation of the security and integrity of space objects in orbit, andiii. due consideration for the legitimate defence interests of states. 54There are several examples where similar codes have been successful, including the 1972 Codeof Conduct in the High Seas. 55 Over the years, Australia has shown a willingness to participateactively in the development and honouring of such codes, as well as some latent interest in a‘rules-based’ international community. 56 In the space domain, a code of conduct would beginthe process of providing behavioural regulation in space. This may or may not lead to moreformal arrangements, such as treaties. But it would codify global behavioural expectations.8
Domestic considerationsThe argument for a ‘National Space Agency’Australia has a decentralised approach to space, with multiple entities in the Department of<strong>Defence</strong>, the Department of Industry, Innovation, Science and Research, CSIRO, the <strong>Australian</strong>Communications and Media Authority, the Bureau of Meteorology, the Department of ClimateChange and several other government departments. These tend to develop their own policywithin their own ‘stovepipes’, with very few national-level or cross-portfolio investments. Thisis both inefficient and confusing for other nations and organisations trying to reach into the<strong>Australian</strong> space community. As a result, Australia is missing opportunities to engage in theglobal space security debate and to expand its space enterprise.Of the six recommendations in the ‘Lost in Space’ report, five were focused on the need toestablish a national space agency. 57 The arguments revolve around efficiency, developing andmaintaining a cohesive national approach to space development, and providing an informedand appropriate government-level point-of-contact for external space contacts. The CanadianSpace Agency is referred to in the report because Canada is ‘arguably the most similar country toAustralia.’ 58 It was established in 1989 and now includes a number of facilities, 575 permanentstaff and some 100 rotating positions for students. 59 It is very active in global space activitiesand has well-established relationships with most of the world’s significant space agencies. 60This paper agrees that Australia needs a national space agency. Under the current <strong>Australian</strong>Government departmental organisation, the obvious department to provide the necessarywhole-of-government vision and perspective is the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet(PM&C). Within PM&C, there is an existing high-level National Security Adviser, with a growingspan of influence over whole-of-government security issues. This would appear to be a logicalplace initially to establish a body that could grow into an <strong>Australian</strong> Space Agency (ASA).The level of statutory authority, control, staffing and budgeting would need to be subject todetailed study, as would the practicalities of relocating the existing space entities from theircurrent departments into the ASA.Economic considerationsInvestment in space security should be seen as an essential and sensible national security cost,much like maintaining maritime or air surveillance capabilities, or maintaining alliances andregional relationships. While it is relatively easy to identify costs associated with developingspace security capabilities, it can be difficult to quantify potential savings, that is, how dowe cost ‘security’? If space security policy has the desired effect, there would be no hostileincidents in space, which would obviously be of significant economic and national securitybenefit.The Canadian Space Agency is funded at approximately CA$375m per year. 61 Apart from thesecurity outcomes that would be expected with such a level of investment, investment inspace security can also return a measurable economic benefit to industry. For example, by theyear 2000, ‘[Canadian] exports in space technologies had become greater than governmentbudgets each year for supporting space activities’. 629
- Page 1 and 2: Australian Defence ForceCONTENTSISS
- Page 3 and 4: Securing Space: Australia’s urgen
- Page 5 and 6: Australia’s space security policy
- Page 7: ChinaChina is the major space power
- Page 11 and 12: An Australian space security policy
- Page 13 and 14: 18. Graeme Hooper as quoted in ‘L
- Page 15 and 16: BIBLIOGRAPHYBall, Desmond, ‘Asses
- Page 17 and 18: Pakistan-US bilateral relations: a
- Page 19 and 20: Bhutto, it was his unyielding stanc
- Page 21 and 22: Unfortunately, there is little the
- Page 23 and 24: negative than positive. The one pos
- Page 25 and 26: NOTES1. ‘Floods caused losses wor
- Page 27 and 28: The Difficulties in Predicting Futu
- Page 29 and 30: main attack into Western Europe thr
- Page 31 and 32: In order to more accurately predict
- Page 33 and 34: BIBLIOGRAPHYBoot, Max, War Made New
- Page 35 and 36: for the parachute capability to be
- Page 37 and 38: Redundancy of platforms is importan
- Page 39 and 40: The option of employing both C-17 a
- Page 41 and 42: parachute insertions, the psycholog
- Page 43 and 44: NOTES1. Air Chief Marshal Angus Hou
- Page 45 and 46: Colin East goes to SESKOAD - in ‘
- Page 47 and 48: He was the top graduate of the Aust
- Page 49 and 50: support, it is not surprising that
- Page 51 and 52: East was an assiduous letter writer
- Page 53 and 54: East brought 4RAR back to Australia
- Page 55 and 56: 23. East diary, 21 December 1964.24
- Page 57 and 58: • to promote partnerships among c
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theatres. In its 2006 Quadrennial D
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SOF by their nature are suited to m
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The longer-term vision for NATO SOF
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25. NATO, ‘Allied Joint Doctrine
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Peacekeepers: Athena’s championsC
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Mobs as adversariesMobs do not fit
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• There is always the presence of
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policies and customs may serve as g
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Higher on the continuum would come
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Managing Global Supply ChainsWing C
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Many OEMs of commercial equipment a
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Similarly, the initial and ongoing
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providers or host nation support. T
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22. UK Ministry of Defence, ‘The
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Sustainable Defence Capability: Aus
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The major strategic risk is resourc
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This provides a national opportunit
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The drive towards sustainability by
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NOTES1. Commonwealth of Australia,
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Book reviewsTales of War: great sto
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Some of Kainikara’s proposals cou
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CounterinsurgencyDavid KilcullenCar
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and political level against an incr
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Religion, Conflict and Military Int
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Challinger’s explanations are sup
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destroyed in airborne operations in
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How Wars EndDan ReiterNew Jersey, U