different countries. In simple terms, the supply chain model is ‘globalised’ by locating thenodal points in different countries and separating those countries by an international border.Global supply chains have emerged as a direct result of commercial globalisation, that is,the worldwide integration and coordination of economic activities supported by globalcommunications, a global financial system and global logistics services. 5 In this context,stakeholders seeking to reduce costs are able to exploit both their own advantages and thecomparative advantages offered by other countries, such as lower labour costs, access totechnology and production capacity. 6 Understandably, global supply chains are complex, notleast because of issues of culture, distance, the requirement for intermediaries at key nodalpoints, differing standards of infrastructure, border crossing regulations and so on. 7Much of the materiel comprising the inputs to ADF capability is acquired from overseas. Hence,the reality is that <strong>Defence</strong> has been managing global supply chains in one form or other forsome time. The support to imported capability has traditionally involved large amounts of<strong>Defence</strong> control and ownership. However, over the last two decades—and driven by a seriesof <strong>Defence</strong> reviews aimed at increasing efficiency and reducing costs—internal ownershipand control of logistics and support functions in <strong>Defence</strong> has progressively been released.<strong>Defence</strong>’s confidence in its own ability to outsource non-core logistics functions has increasedto where third-party provider support has become the norm.Nevertheless, while much of the responsibility for various activities within the <strong>Defence</strong> supplychain may have been outsourced, <strong>Defence</strong> remains accountable for the combined effect.Complex supply chains obviously require skilled management and supply chain management(SCM) has emerged as a recognised business discipline that:… encompasses the planning and management of all activities involved in the sourcing andprocurement, conversion and all logistics management activities. Importantly, it also includescoordination and collaboration with channel partners, which can be suppliers, intermediaries, thirdpartyservice providers and customers. In essence, SCM integrates supply and demand managementwithin and across companies. 8The appointment of Commander Joint Logistics (CJLOG) as the senior military officeraccountable for the oversight and assurance of the <strong>Defence</strong> logistics capability 9 effectivelymakes CJLOG the senior <strong>Defence</strong> SCM. CJLOG provides either direct management or oversightof the <strong>Defence</strong> supply chain ‘in order to ensure effective integration and coordination of<strong>Defence</strong> logistics support for all domestic and operational requirements’. 10 In executing thisresponsibility—and in order to remain fully accountable—CJLOG must be able to achievecomplete supply chain visibility.Global fleet support arrangementsAn increasing number of <strong>Defence</strong> acquisitions involving original equipment manufacturers(OEMs) are to be provided under a ‘global fleet support arrangement’. These are common inthe airline industry, where a complete logistics solution package is often offered the customerairline, typically incorporating research and development, spare parts pooling and warehouse/inventory management. 11 The logic is that an OEM can achieve economies of scale acrossan entire (and often globally-dispersed) fleet, much of which would be expected to flow tothe customer. 1278
Many OEMs of commercial equipment are also OEMs of military hardware and many haveaggressively marketed the potential benefits of global fleet support arrangements. <strong>Defence</strong>has become involved in a number of these arrangements, most notably in support of C-17Globemaster aircraft (and similar arrangements are planned in support of the Joint StrikeFighter). The perceived benefits of a direct reduction in ownership costs, access to establishedsupport infrastructure, and interoperability with allied nations are clearly attractive. However,there are concerns that some decisions may have been made without sufficient regard to theindirect costs and the potential impact that future support requirements may have on the<strong>Defence</strong> supply chain.Where a global fleet support arrangement is proposed, a robust business case analysis (BCA)must support the proposal. This should comprise a full analysis and comparison of the options.It must define the performance requirements that all support solution options must achieveand, as accurately as possible, estimate and compare the total cost of ownership over thecapability life cycle. The BCA should include a full analysis and comparison of explicit andimplied <strong>Defence</strong> supply chain tasks, including the training requirement, the costs associatedwith equipping personnel to execute those tasks and the costs associated with necessarychanges to the <strong>Defence</strong> supply chain infrastructure.There are also certain specific risks and concerns that must be considered and, if necessary,mitigated which include:• The perceived limited <strong>Defence</strong> influence on contractor and other customer behaviour,• Allowable knowledge sharing,• The security and assurance of supply,• Use of proprietary logistics information systems,• Use of an OEM’s proprietary parts inventory codification system, and• The deployability of supply systems.<strong>Defence</strong> influence on the contractor and other customer behaviourOnce <strong>Defence</strong> commits itself to a global fleet support arrangement, control over strategicfleet management policy as it affects the <strong>Australian</strong> portion of the fleet may be compromisedor lost. By definition, a global fleet support arrangement involves other customers who havea stake in goods and services that are part of the arrangement. Of concern is the potentialbehaviour of other customers. Where their interests do not necessarily align, the customercommunity may operate in a condition known as ‘co-opetition’. 13Examples are where customers compete for more than their fair share of the common resource.Some competitors may indulge in selfish behaviour, such as stockpiling and the abuse ofany priority system that may exist. Two potential effects are of concern; loss of control overinventory share (where others deplete the inventory to satisfy their own national interests)and loss of control over inventory apportionment (where the OEM acts to regulate customerbehaviour ‘for the greater good’ as perceived by the OEM). Hence, any partnering arrangementmust include an examination of the strategy to retain control over strategic fleet managementpolicy as it affects the <strong>Australian</strong> portion of the global fleet. Also scrutinised should be thestrategy to ensure that <strong>Australian</strong> interests prevail in conditions of ‘co-opetition’, particularlyin relation to pooled inventory share and apportionment.79
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Australian Defence ForceCONTENTSISS
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Securing Space: Australia’s urgen
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Australia’s space security policy
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ChinaChina is the major space power
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Domestic considerationsThe argument
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An Australian space security policy
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18. Graeme Hooper as quoted in ‘L
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BIBLIOGRAPHYBall, Desmond, ‘Asses
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Pakistan-US bilateral relations: a
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Bhutto, it was his unyielding stanc
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Unfortunately, there is little the
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negative than positive. The one pos
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NOTES1. ‘Floods caused losses wor
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- Page 33 and 34: BIBLIOGRAPHYBoot, Max, War Made New
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- Page 37 and 38: Redundancy of platforms is importan
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- Page 45 and 46: Colin East goes to SESKOAD - in ‘
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- Page 51 and 52: East was an assiduous letter writer
- Page 53 and 54: East brought 4RAR back to Australia
- Page 55 and 56: 23. East diary, 21 December 1964.24
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- Page 95 and 96: NOTES1. Commonwealth of Australia,
- Page 97 and 98: Book reviewsTales of War: great sto
- Page 99 and 100: Some of Kainikara’s proposals cou
- Page 101 and 102: CounterinsurgencyDavid KilcullenCar
- Page 103 and 104: and political level against an incr
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- Page 107 and 108: Challinger’s explanations are sup
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- Page 111 and 112: How Wars EndDan ReiterNew Jersey, U