Today it is difficult to truly appreciate the scale and intensity of the planned invasion of Japan.By 1946, over five million Allied servicemen (including naval, air and army personnel) wouldbe required to subjugate Japan. One pre-Hiroshima report estimated Allied casualties between1.7 and 4 million, including some 400,000 to 800,000 killed. The same report envisaged atleast 5 to 10 million Japanese (service and civilian) deaths. Japanese plans contemplated a‘sacrifice’ of 20 million Japanese in the home islands.At the same time, approximately 400,000 people per month were losing their lives acrossthe Asia-Pacific region, from Indonesia through Manchuria. The first American units to hit thebeach at Kyushu expected 70 to 80 per cent casualties. At the time, men and women acrossthe Pacific believed that the two years from <strong>Nov</strong>ember 1945 would be a period of impendingdisaster or ‘punishment from heaven’. That being the case, it is not surprising that manyreacted, like James Michener, with ‘a gigantic sigh of relief, not exultation because of ourvictory, but a deep gut-wrenching sigh of deliverance’.A number of books on Operation DOWNFALL are already available; Richard B. Frank’s Downfall:the end of the Imperial Japanese Empire is one of the better ones. 2 These works, however,have tended to concentrate on the political and military strategic level without gettinginto the nitty-gritty of warfare in the Pacific as it was conducted during 1945. Hell to Pay isdifferent from its predecessors as it burrows into the large body of operational and tacticallevel planning documents, both Japanese and American, associated with the campaign. TheOkinawa campaign clearly demonstrated that the Japanese armed forces could and wouldadapt to the direct Allied threat their homeland faced. The introduction of decentralisedcommands with their own industries, resources and logistics, the extensive use of integrateddefences, the local organisation of suicide boats, submarines and wooden suicide planes, andthe introduction of ‘guerrilla’ forces, are just a few of the tactical initiatives introduced by theJapanese for their homeland defence.Unfortunately, with the passage of time, the absolute fear a Japanese invasion once held formany Pacific War veterans has become watered down into a somewhat abstract modern debateabout ethical decision-making in politics and strategy. It is only by examining the operationaland tactical implications of the impending campaign that one can truly understand the factorsthat led to Truman’s decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki.D. M. Giangreco’s Hell to Pay: Operation DOWNFALL and the invasion of Japan, 1945-1947 isessential reading for anyone who wants to understand the Japanese surrender and the endof the Pacific War. For <strong>Australian</strong>s, this book provides details of a little known operation that,although it never came to pass, was of critical importance for our engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. If the RAN and RAAF had supported the 1st <strong>Australian</strong> Corps in an invasion ofHonshu in 1946, with Tokyo as its objective, we would most probably be mourning the loss ofanother 4,000 <strong>Australian</strong>s.NOTES1. J. Samuel Walker, ‘Recent Literature on Truman’s Atomic Bomb <strong>Dec</strong>ision: A Search for Middle Ground’,Diplomatic History, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2005, p. 311f.2. Richard B. Frank, Downfall: the end of the Imperial Japanese Empire, New York: Random House,1999.110
How Wars EndDan ReiterNew Jersey, US: Princeton University Press, 2009ISBN: 978-0-6911-4059-9Reviewed by Colonel Chris Field, <strong>Australian</strong> ArmySo long as I have not overthrown my opponent, I am bound to fear he may overthrow me.Carl von Clausewitz 1For the <strong>Australian</strong> <strong>Defence</strong> Organisation, ‘strategy’ means the calculated relationship betweenends, ways and means, and is defined as a process that ‘identifies goals [ends], determineshow to pursue these goals [ways] and decides what resources are applied [means] 2 ’. In HowWars End, Dan Reiter focuses on national strategic ends, using an analysis of six wars, placingan emphasis on understanding national goals in support of war termination.Despite Reiter’s belief that ‘quantitative analysis [is] the most productive way to test scientificpropositions’, in How Wars End he decides to ‘let go of quantitative tests and really embracecase studies’. This led Reiter to survey 22 war-termination decisions—employing empirical wartermination models—for the following six wars: Korean War 1950-53, the Allies from 1940-42,Finland and the USSR 1939-44, American Civil War 1861-65, Germany from 1917-18 and Japanfrom 1944-45. His analysis supports the premise that warfighting is a human endeavour thatrequires a synthesis in the art and science of war.Reiter argues that while we have ‘mountain ranges of ideas and scholarship … about howwars start …. [we] know relatively little about how wars end’. Readers who have struggledwith selecting, defining and measuring an ‘end state’ for an operation can sympathise withDan Reiter’s challenge. Another theme of the book is understanding how to make the endingof wars permanent, with Reiter noting that ‘over the 1914-2001 period, nearly one third of allinterstate war ceasefires (56 out of 188) eventually broke down into renewed war’. These areasof analysis make How Wars End a valuable reference for practitioners, especially during thisperiod of persistent ADF operational deployments.In simple terms, Reiter’s book ‘describes two functions of war, two purposes that fighting ismeant to serve: providing information and solving commitment problems’. More formally, thesix case studies are analysed using the bargaining theory of war termination. Reiter arguesthat this theory incorporates two insights about international relations: first, that uncertaintyabout the power and intentions of states pervades the international system; and, second, thatstates cannot make binding commitments to each other. He notes, for example:After 9/11, the George W. Bush Administration thought about wars in the context of commitmentproblems, that rogue states like Iraq could not be trusted to adhere to international commitments,meaning that war culminating in absolute victory, such as foreign imposed regime change, may bethe only way of assuring American national security.111
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Australian Defence ForceCONTENTSISS
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Securing Space: Australia’s urgen
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Australia’s space security policy
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ChinaChina is the major space power
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Domestic considerationsThe argument
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An Australian space security policy
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18. Graeme Hooper as quoted in ‘L
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BIBLIOGRAPHYBall, Desmond, ‘Asses
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Pakistan-US bilateral relations: a
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Bhutto, it was his unyielding stanc
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negative than positive. The one pos
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The Difficulties in Predicting Futu
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main attack into Western Europe thr
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BIBLIOGRAPHYBoot, Max, War Made New
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Redundancy of platforms is importan
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Colin East goes to SESKOAD - in ‘
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