ISSUE 183 : Nov/Dec - 2010 - Australian Defence Force Journal

sales, economic assistance and loans to the Pakistani government. Moreover, the overthrowof the elected Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, by the Chief of Army Staff, General PervezMusharraf, in October 1999 triggered an additional layer of sanctions under Section 508 ofthe Foreign Appropriation Act, which include restrictions on foreign military financing andeconomic assistance. 14Post-September 11 and the Bush yearsIn the wake of 9/11, Pakistan once again became a ‘frontline’ state, this time in the pursuit ofal Qa’ida and Taliban fighters who had fled Afghanistan to seek refuge in the tribal areas ofwestern Pakistan. So while there was a degree of similarity to events in Afghanistan some 20years earlier, when General Zia was then heading Pakistan and the US had to rely on Pakistan’ssupport to oust the Soviets, in this case General Musharraf was given very little choice aboutjoining the ‘war on terror’. 15 Accordingly, the Pakistan Government officially terminated itsrelationship with the Taliban, which it had nurtured since the early 1990s and had helped in itstakeover of power in Afghanistan in 1996.In return, Washington provided Pakistan over US$11 billion worth of military and economicaid between 2001 and 2008, with the bulk going to security–related assistance. 16 The US alsogranted Pakistan ‘major non-NATO ally’ status in 2004. This allowed Pakistan to purchase orreceive otherwise restricted US military equipment, such as the sale in 2006 of F-16 aircraft. Inthe wake of President Bush’s visit to Pakistan in March 2006, during which he and his Pakistanicounterpart reaffirmed the importance of the strategic partnership, the US-Pakistan ‘strategicdialogue’ was established in April 2006. While this dialogue was meant to go beyond thenarrow focus of defence, its strategic aspects stalled and the focus remained defence-focused. 17In return for this substantial American military aid, Pakistan has captured more than 600 alQa’ida members who had found refuge in western Pakistan. Unfortunately, while this has beengood news for Washington’s objective of capturing and destroying the al Qa’ida network, thiscooperation only reveals part of the picture. The reality on the ground is far from being asclear-cut and simple as that. Instead of being a bulwark against these terrorists and becominga completely reliable strategic partner, Pakistan has become the soft underbelly of the West’sfight against al Qa’ida, the Taliban and other Afghan jihadists.On the one hand, the Pakistan state—led until 2008 by former Army Chief of Staff GeneralMusharraf—has been assisting the US-led coalition against the terrorists, including losingclose to 2000 military personnel in the process of hunting down these fighters in the tribalareas. But, on the other hand, elements of its powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), theArmy’s all powerful intelligence service, have continued to provide back-channel supportto the Taliban and other Afghan groups hiding in Pakistan, even after Pakistan officially andpublicly changed its policy vis-à-vis the Taliban. 18 A recent study by the London School ofEconomics has reaffirmed the suspicion most Western analysts have had about Pakistan: theArmy is willing to go after al Qa’ida fighters (who are mainly non-Pakhtun) but the ISI continuesto support the Taliban (mainly Pakhtun) and other jihadist groups which could potentiallybe helpful to Pakistan once NATO and the US have left Afghanistan. 19 Needless to say, thiscontradictory and duplicitous behaviour on the part of Pakistan has created tension betweenit and Western countries, including Australia, which have troop commitments in Afghanistan.20