ConclusionWars and other conflicts requiring the deployment of military force are not often predictedwith any accuracy, and success in joint lodgement operations is often predicated on possessinga balanced force able to meet most, if not all, eventualities. For ADF joint entry operations,that will demand a mix of both air and maritime-delivered force in most credible scenarios.The loss of a functional and robust capability, such as the current conventional airborne force,seems inexplicable from a capability basis.This article has attempted to explain why the ADF should maintain the ACT. It will hopefullyprompt engagement with subject-matter experts as to what the conventional airborne forceis capable of and whether it has an integral place in the ADF’s renewed focus on joint entryoperations. The conventional airborne force alone is clearly not the solution to all of ourpotential joint entry operations of the present or future. Nor is any single ADF capability alonecapable of providing this—success will be predicated on balanced capabilities to project naval,land and air power. In a balanced ADF, the maintenance of an already-formed and frequentlytestedconventional airborne force, the Airborne Combat Team, is a sound investment for anunknowable future.Major Giles Cornelia has served regimentally with 3 RAR, instructed at RMC-D and held the staffappointments of SO3 Plans, HQ RMC-A and ADC to Commander 1st Division. His regimentalservice has included wide experience of airborne collective training as a rifle platoon commander,rifle company second-in-command, combat team commander and operations officer. He holdsa BA (History/Politics) and a Graduate Diploma in Arts (War Studies) from University College,University of New South Wales. His current appointment is Operations Officer 3 RAR.42
NOTES1. Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston and Dr Ian Watt, ‘The Chief of <strong>Defence</strong> <strong>Force</strong> and Secretary of<strong>Defence</strong> Strategic Reform Program Media Roundtable’, Department of <strong>Defence</strong> media room,Canberra, 16 April <strong>2010</strong>, accessed 29 August <strong>2010</strong>, p. 1.2. Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston and Dr Ian Watt, ‘The Chief of <strong>Defence</strong> <strong>Force</strong> and Secretary of<strong>Defence</strong> Strategic Reform Program Media Roundtable’, p. 3.3. ADDP 3.9 defines an Airborne <strong>Force</strong> as a ‘force composed primarily of ground and air units organised,equipped and trained for airborne operations’.4. D. Zakheim, ‘The South Atlantic Conflict: Strategic, Military and Technological Lessons’ in A. Arendand A. Coll (eds.), The Falklands War: lessons for strategy diplomacy and international law, Boston:Allen & Unwin, 1985, p. 164.5. Common misquote of the speech to the House of Commons by British Prime Minister WinstonChurchill on 13 May 1940, from , accessed 1 September <strong>2010</strong>.6. But also from the Airborne <strong>Force</strong> Planning Team which once existed in HQ 1st Division, ‘A’ FieldBattery, RAA and a number of other units.7. The <strong>Australian</strong> Army had two earlier versions of a conventional airborne force—the first being the1st <strong>Australian</strong> Parachute Battalion formed during the Second World War. The paratroopers of 3 RARproudly wear the wings of this unit and have done so since 1985. The second such force was theParachute Company based in 6 RAR in the late 1970s.8. General Don Dunstan in D. Horner and J. Bou (eds.), Duty First – A history of the Royal <strong>Australian</strong>Regiment, 2nd Edition, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2008, p. 272.9. Lieutenant Colonel G.A Bornholt, ‘Parachute Allowance Witness Statement’, unpublished paper inauthor’s possession.10. 3 RAR is a parachute-capable light infantry battalion that maintains parachute qualifications acrossall its combat teams. It is currently based at Holsworthy in Sydney but is scheduled to move toTownsville in 2012.11. Kapyong Kronicle, 1983, p. 274.12. L. Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign – Volume 2 War and Diplomacy, London:Routledge, 2005, p. 723.13. Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, p. 726.14. The enduring features of war according to the capstone doctrine of the <strong>Australian</strong> Army, LWD1,‘The Fundamentals of Land Warfare’, Puckapunyal: Land Warfare Development Centre, 2008, p. 10.15. For a full discussion of these concepts see Robert Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver – ManeuverWarfare Theory and AirLand Battle, <strong>Nov</strong>ato, California: Presido, 1991, pp. 93-9.16. Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, quoted in ADDP 3.9, p. 1-1.17. <strong>Defence</strong> White Paper 2009, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: <strong>Force</strong> 2030, Canberra:Department of <strong>Defence</strong>, 2009, p. 65.18. Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century, p. 65.19. All these tasks demand a mass that is inherently absent from Special <strong>Force</strong>s and/or the requirementto defend localities for a period of time. Provision of mass and the ability to hold ground andconduct defence are best performed by an infantry force in comparison with Special <strong>Force</strong>s. For thefull list of the tasks capable of execution by both conventional and Special <strong>Force</strong>s, see ADDP 3.9, p.2-6.20. Captain J.N. Rickard, ‘The Employment of Airborne (Parachute) <strong>Force</strong>s in Modern AsymmetricalWarfare’, Canadian Army <strong>Journal</strong>, Issue No. 7.3/7.4, Fall/Winter 2004, p. 113.43
- Page 1 and 2: Australian Defence ForceCONTENTSISS
- Page 3 and 4: Securing Space: Australia’s urgen
- Page 5 and 6: Australia’s space security policy
- Page 7 and 8: ChinaChina is the major space power
- Page 9 and 10: Domestic considerationsThe argument
- Page 11 and 12: An Australian space security policy
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The drive towards sustainability by
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NOTES1. Commonwealth of Australia,
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Book reviewsTales of War: great sto
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Some of Kainikara’s proposals cou
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CounterinsurgencyDavid KilcullenCar
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and political level against an incr
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Religion, Conflict and Military Int
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Challinger’s explanations are sup
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destroyed in airborne operations in
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How Wars EndDan ReiterNew Jersey, U