ISSUE 183 : Nov/Dec - 2010 - Australian Defence Force Journal

Bhutto, it was his unyielding stance on the nuclear issue which caused his eventual politicaldownfall. In his book, If I Am Assassinated, which he wrote from his death cell, he accused theAmericans of having been the main driving force behind the 1977 coup d’état led by the Chiefof Army Staff, General Zia-ul-Haq. 10 Nevertheless, US-Pakistan relations following the militarytakeover were at their nadir.However, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, in order to propupthe communist government in Kabul, Pakistan once again became an important player inWashington’s global game. It is important to remember the geopolitical context at that time,notably the fact that the Soviet invasion occurred at about the same time as the ‘loss’ of Iranto Ayatollah Khomeini. Accordingly, the US decided that Pakistan had an important ‘frontline’role to play in helping the West counter the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and stopping theUSSR from potentially obtaining a warm-water port on the Indian Ocean. Having establishedthe Carter Doctrine, which included among other things that the violation of Pakistan’sintegrity would not be tolerated, the US offered Pakistan US$400 million in military aid. 11General Zia rejected the offer on the grounds that since this low level of assistance wouldbring more trouble than benefits, there was no incentive for him to accept.With hindsight, and from Pakistan’s point of view, General Zia made the right move in rejectingthis aid, since President Reagan, who began his term in office less than two months later, tooka very different approach to Pakistan and its nuclear program. Instead of cutting off aid, hebelieved that a much more fruitful means to induce Pakistan to end its nuclear program wouldbe to offer it massive military and economic assistance. The Reagan Administration managedto convince the US Congress to waive the restrictions (Symington Amendment) on militaryassistance to Pakistan and offer Pakistan a six-year US$3.2 billion military and economic aidpackage aimed at helping Pakistan deal with increased threats in the region and assistingit with its economic development needs. However, if Pakistan detonated a nuclear device,peaceful or otherwise, the aid would be immediately terminated.In March 1986, the two countries agreed on a second multi-year (1988-93) US$4 billioneconomic and security assistance program. According to then Under-Secretary of State, JamesBuckley, ‘Pakistan was an essential anchor in the entire Southwest Asian region’. 12 Having thusbecome a ‘frontline’ state, Pakistan—with massive economic help from the West, the ArabGulf states and China—gave shelter to some four million Afghan refugees, as well as armingand supporting thousands of Afghan and Muslim mujahideen (‘freedom fighters’), who usedPakistani territory to launch their attacks against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. This strategicpartnership with Pakistan turned out to be a successful strategy for the US: the Soviets wereunable to defeat the mujahideen and the US had not needed to commit ground troops.But when the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, Pakistan lost its strategic value; it was onceagain forgotten. This was compounded with the end of the Cold War, the demise of the SovietUnion and the liberalisation of India’s economy, making India increasingly more attractive as astrategic partner. Moreover, in October 1990, the US suspended all military assistance and neweconomic aid to Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment, which required that the presidentcertify annually that Pakistan ‘does not possess a nuclear explosive device’. 13Bilateral relations with the West hit rock bottom again following the 1998 Pakistani nucleartests in response to India’s in May 1998. A scheduled visit by President Clinton was postponedand, under the Glenn Amendment, sanctions restricted the provision of credits, military19