Christian Thomas Kohl The Metaphysical Foundations of Buddhism and Modern Science

it, but is itself the 'inclusive whole' which is the required connectedness
of 'many in one'.
In this I thoroughly agree, holding that the connectedness of things is
nothing else than the togetherness of things in occasions of experience.
Of course, such occasions are only rarely occasions of human experience.
Curiously enough Hume also agrees. For his only togetherness of the
stream of impressions of sensation, which in his doctrine are distinct
existences at distinct times, lies in the 'gentle force' of association
which must lie wholly within an occasion of experience. This is also one
aspect of Kant's doctrine, that the occasions of experience provide the
forms of connectedness.
Of course there are important differences between all these doctrines.
But they agree in their general principle - to look on occasions of
experience as the ground of connectedness.
Section XIII. Also Leibniz can find no other connectedness between
reals except that lying wholly within the individual experiences of the
monads, including the Supreme Monad. He employed the terms
'perception' and 'apperception' for the lower and higher way in which one
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