Online Papers - Brian Weatherson

Deontology and Descartes’ Demon 178
(Arguably blameworthiness is as well, but saying so sounds somewhat more counterintuitive
than saying praiseworthiness is a matter of luck.) For example, imagine two
people dive into ponds in which they believe there are drowning children. The first
saves two children. The second was mistaken; there are no children to be rescued in
the pond they dive into. Both are praiseworthy for their efforts, but they are not
equally praiseworthy. The first, in particular, is praiseworthy for rescuing two children.
As we saw in the examples of the writer and the good cricket captain above,
praiseworthiness depends on outputs as well as inputs, and if the victim of deception
produces beliefs that are defective, i.e. false, then through no fault of their own they
are less praiseworthy.
9 Praise and Blame
As Pryor notes, many philosophers have thought that a deontological conception
of justification supports an internalist theory of justification. I rather think that is
mistaken, and that at least one common deontological understanding of what justification
is entails a very strong kind of externalism. This is probably a reason to not
adopt that deontological understanding.
Assume, for reductio, that S’s belief that p is justified iff S is blameless in believing
that p. I will call this principle J=B to note the close connection it posits between
justification and blamelessness. Alston (1988) seems to identify the deontological
conception of justification with J=B, or at least to slide between the two when offering
critiques. But one of Alston’s own examples, the ‘culturally isolated tribesman’,
suggests a principle that can be used to pull these two ideas apart. The example, along
with Pryor’s three brains case, suggests that A1 is true.
A1 It is possible for S to have a justified but false belief that her belief in p is justified.
A1 is a special instance of the principle that justification does not entail truth. Some
externalists about justification will want to reject the general principle, but all internalists
(and indeed most externalists) will accept it. Now some may think that
the general principle is right, but that beliefs about what we are justified in believing
are special, and if they are justified they are true. But such an exception seems
intolerably ad hoc. If we can have false but justified beliefs about some things, then
presumably we can have false but justified beliefs about our evidence, since in principle
our evidence could be practically anything. So the following situation seems
possible; indeed it seems likely that something of this form happens frequently in
real life. S has a false but justified belief that e is part of her evidence. S knows both
that anyone with evidence e is justified in believing p in the absence of defeaters, and
that there are no defeaters present. So S comes to believe, quite reasonably, that she
is justified in believing that p. But S does not have this evidence, and in fact all of her
evidence points towards ˜p. 15 So it is false that she is justified in believing p.
15 I am assuming here that evidence of evidence need not be evidence. This seems likely to be true. In
Bayesian terms, something can raise the probability of e, while lowering the probability of p, even though
the probability of p given e is greater than the probability of p. Bayesian models are not fully general, but
usually things that are possible in Bayesian models are possible in real life.