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Online Papers - Brian Weatherson

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David Lewis<br />

David Lewis (1941–2001) was one of the most important philosophers<br />

of the 20th Century. He made significant contributions to philosophy<br />

of language, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of science, decision<br />

theory, epistemology, meta-ethics and aesthetics. In most of these fields<br />

he is essential reading; in many of them he is among the most important<br />

figures of recent decades. And this list leaves out his two most significant<br />

contributions.<br />

In philosophy of mind, Lewis developed and defended at length a new<br />

version of materialism (see the entry on physicalism). He started by<br />

showing how the motivations driving the identity theory of mind and<br />

functionalism could be reconciled in his theory of mind. He called<br />

this an identity theory, though his theory motivated the position now<br />

known as analytic functionalism. And he developed detailed accounts<br />

of mental content (building on Davidson’s interpretationism) and phenomenal<br />

knowledge (building on Nemirow’s ability hypothesis) that are<br />

consistent with his materialism. The synthesis Lewis ended up with is<br />

one of the central positions in contemporary debates in philosophy of<br />

mind.<br />

But his largest contributions were in metaphysics. One branch of his<br />

metaphysics was his Hume-inspired reductionism about the nomological.<br />

He developed a position he called “Humean supervenience”, the theory<br />

that said that there was nothing to reality except the spatio-temporal<br />

distribution of local natural properties. And he did this by showing in<br />

detail how laws, chances, counterfactual dependence, causation, dispositions<br />

and colours could be located within this Humean mosaic. The<br />

other branch of his metaphysics was his modal realism. Lewis held that<br />

the best theory of modality posited concrete possible worlds. A proposition<br />

is possible iff it is true at one of these worlds. Lewis defended this<br />

view in his most significant book, On the Plurality of Worlds. Alongside<br />

this, Lewis developed a new account of how to think about modal properties<br />

of individuals, namely counterpart theory, and showed how this<br />

theory resolved several long-standing puzzles about modal properties.<br />

† Penultimate draft only. Please cite published version if possible. Final version published in Stanford<br />

Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. I’ve learned a lot over the years from talking about Lewis’s philosophy with<br />

Wolfgang Schwarz. I trust his book (2009) is excellent on all these topics, but unfortunately it’s only out in<br />

German so far, which I don’t read. But a lot of important points are collected on his blog, which is listed<br />

under other internet resources. The best book in English on Lewis is Daniel Nolan’s David Lewis (2005).<br />

Without that book, section 7.5 of this entry wouldn’t exist, section 6.3 would be unintelligible, and every<br />

section would be worse. Much of the biographical information in the introduction is taken from Hájek<br />

(2010). Many people helpfully spotted typos and infelicities of expression in earlier versions of this entry.<br />

Thanks especially to Zachary Miller for many suggested improvements and revisions. The bibliography is<br />

based in large part on a bibliography provided to me by Stephanie Lewis.

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