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Online Papers - Brian Weatherson

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Indicatives and Subjunctives 347<br />

But two problems remain for all theories saying A → B has the truth value of A ⊃ B.<br />

First, they make some apparently true negated conditionals turn out false, such as It<br />

is not true that if there is a nuclear war tomorrow, life will go on as normal. It is hard<br />

to see how an appeal to Gricean pragmatics will avoid this problem. Secondly, such<br />

theories fail the third task we set ourselves at the start of the section: explaining the<br />

close connections between indicatives and subjunctives.<br />

So we might be tempted to try a different path. Let’s take the data at face value<br />

and say that A → B is true in a context if there is some S such that some person in<br />

that context knows S, and A and S together entail B. We can formalise this claim as<br />

follows. Let d(x, y) be the ‘distance’ from x to y. This function will satisfy few of<br />

the formal properties of a distance relationship, so remember this is just an analogy.<br />

Let K be the set of all propositions S known by someone in the context, W the set<br />

of all possible worlds, and i the impossible world, where everything is true. Then d:<br />

W × W ∪ {i} → ℜ is as follows:<br />

If y = x then d(x, y) = 0<br />

If y ∈ W , y �= x and ∀S: S ∈ K ⊃ y<br />

If y = i then d(x, y) = 2<br />

Otherwise, d(x, y) = 3<br />

y<br />

S, then d(x, y) = 1<br />

Less formally, the nearest world to a world is itself. The next closest worlds are<br />

any compatible with everything known in the context, then the impossible world,<br />

then the possible worlds incompatible with something known in the context. It may<br />

seem odd to have the impossible world closer than some possible worlds, but there<br />

are two reasons for doing this. First, in the impossible world everything known to<br />

any conversational participant is true. Secondly, putting the impossible world at this<br />

position accounts for some examples. This is a variant on a well known case; see for<br />

example Gibbard (1981) and Barker (1997).<br />

Jack and Jill are trying to find out how their local representative Kim, a Democrat<br />

from Texas, voted on a resolution at a particular committee meeting. So far, they<br />

have not even found out whether Kim was at the meeting. Jack finds out that all<br />

Democrats at the meeting voted against the resolution; Jill finds out that all Texans<br />

at the meeting voted for it. When they return to compare notes, Jack can truly say If<br />

Kim was at the meeting, she voted against the resolution, and Jill can truly say If Kim<br />

was at the meeting, she voted for the resolution. If i is further from the actual world<br />

than some possible world where Kim attended the meeting, these statements cannot<br />

both be true.<br />

It may be thought the distance function needs to be more fine-grained to account<br />

for the following phenomena 2 . It seems possible that in each of the following pairs,<br />

the first sentence is true and the second false.<br />

(19) (a) If Anne goes to the party, so will Billy.<br />

2 Lewis (1973b) makes this objection to a similar proposal for subjunctives; the objection has just as<br />

much force here as it does in the original case.

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