Online Papers - Brian Weatherson

BIBLIOGRAPHY 743
—. 1999. Understanding Truth. New York: Oxford University Press.
—. 2002. Beyond Rigidity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—. 2003. Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Sorensen, Roy. 2000. “Direct Reference and Vague Identity.” Philosophical Topics
28:175–94.
—. 2001. Vagueness and Contradiction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sosa, Ernest. 1991. Knowledge in Perspective. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
—. 1997. “Reflective Knowledge in the Best Circles.” Journal of Philosophy 94:410–
430.
—. 1998. “Minimal Intuition.” In DePaul and Ramsey (1998), 257–269.
—. 1999. “How to Defeat Opposition to Moore.” Philosophical Perspectives 13:137–49.
Stalnaker, Robert. 1973. “Presuppositions.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 2.
—. 1975. “Indicative Conditionals.” Philosophia 5:269–286.
—. 1984. Inquiry. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
—. 1998. “Belief revision in games: forward and backward induction.” Mathematical
Social Sciences 36:31 – 56. ISSN 0165-4896, doi:DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00007-
9.
—. 1999. “Extensive and strategic forms: Games and models for games.” Research in
Economics 53:293 – 319. ISSN 1090-9443, doi:DOI: 10.1006/reec.1999.0200.
—. 2008a. Our Knowledge of the Internal World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—. 2008b. Our Knowledge of the Internal World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1968. “A Theory of Conditionals.” In Nicholas Rescher (ed.),
Studies in Logical Theory, 98–112. Oxford: Blackwell.
—. 1976. “Possible Worlds.” Noûs 10:65–75.
—. 1978. “Assertion.” Syntax and Semantics 9:315–332.
—. 1981. “A Defence of Conditional Excluded Middle.” In William Harper,
Robert C. Stalnaker, and Glenn Pearce (eds.), Ifs, 87–104. Dordrecht: Reidel.
—. 1996. “Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games.” Economics
and Philosophy 12:133–163, doi:10.1017/S0266267100004132.