Online Papers - Brian Weatherson

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Prankster’s Ethics 691 that when society needs a pie-thrower, he will step up with the plate, and do so directly because he wants to throw pies at innocent bystanders. Letting C stand for the circumstances described above, where it would be good for there to be more wrongdoing, Jack’s position can be summarised by saying that he desires that in C he desires that he throws pies at innocents. Does this all mean Jack values his throwing pies at innocents in C? Not necessarily. Does it mean that if we were all like Jack, and we are subjectivists about what is right, it would be right to throw pies at innocents in C? Definitely not. David Lewis (1989b) equates what we value with what we desire to desire. 4 And he equates what is valuable with what we value. The text is not transparent, but it seems Lewis wants valuable to subsume both what we call the ‘right’ and the ‘good’. And this he cannot have. Assume that everyone in Jack’s community desires to (de se) desire that (s)he throw pies at innocents in C. That does not make it right that pies are thrown at innocents. We take no stand here on whether the flaw is in the equation of personal value with second-order desire, or in the reduction of both rightness and goodness to personal value, but there is a problem for Lewis’s dispositional theory of value. 5 This point generalises to cause difficulties for several dispositional theories of value. For example, Michael Smith (1994) holds that right actions are what our perfectly rational selves would advise us to do. This assumes that when the good and the right come apart, our perfectly rational selves would choose the right over the good. And it’s far from clear that Smith has the resources to argue for this assumption. Smith’s argument that our perfectly rational selves will advise us to do what is right relies on his earlier argument that anyone who does not do what she judges to be right is practically irrational, unlike presumably our perfectly rational selves. And the main argument for that principle is that it is the best explanation of why actually good people are motivated to do what they judge to be right, even when they change their judgements about what is right. But now we should be able to see that there’s an alternative explanation available. Actually good people might be motivated to do what they judge to be good rather than right. We have seen no reason to believe that the right and the good actually come radically apart, so this is just as good an explanation of the behaviour actual moral agents as Smith’s explanation. So for all Smith has argued, one might judge ϕing to be right, also judge it not to be good, hence be not motivated to ϕ, and not be practically irrational. Indeed, our perfectly rational 4 More precisely, with what we desire to desire in circumstances of appropriate imaginative acquaintance. We can suppose that Jack, and everyone else under discussion in this paragraph, is suitably imaginatively acquainted with the salient situations. Jack knows full well what it is like to get a pie in the face. 5Someone might think it obvious that Lewisian value can’t be used in an analysis of both rightness and goodness, since it is one concept and we are analysing two concepts. But Lewisian value bifurcates in a way that one might think it is suitable for analysing both rightness and goodness. Since there are both de dicto and de se desires, one can easily draw out both de dicto and de se values. And it is prima facie plausible that the de dicto values correspond to what is good, and the de se values to what is right. Indeed, given a weak version of consequentialism where these two can be guaranteed to not directly conflict, this correspondence may well hold. But we think the pie-thrower threatens even those consequentialists. The net philosophical conclusion is that the pie-thrower is a problem for Lewis’s meta-ethics, but only because (a) she is a problem for Lewis’s consequentialism, and, surprisingly, (b) Lewis’s meta-ethics depends on his consequentialism being at least roughly right.
Prankster’s Ethics 692 self might be just like this. 6 Hence we cannot rely on our perfectly rational self to be a barometer of what is right, as opposed to what is good. 6 We have glossed over a technical point here that is irrelevant to the current discussion. What matters is not whether our perfectly rational selves are motivated to ϕ, it matters whether they desire that we ϕ, and hence whether they are motivated to advise us to ϕ. Keeping this point clear matters for all sorts of purposes, but not we think the present one.
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Online Papers Brian Weatherson Janu
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CONTENTS ii IV Vagueness 410 22 Man
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What Good are Counterexamples? The
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What Good are Counterexamples? 4 Ge
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What Good are Counterexamples? 6 it
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What Good are Counterexamples? 8 to
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What Good are Counterexamples? 10 f
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What Good are Counterexamples? 12 (
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What Good are Counterexamples? 14
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What Good are Counterexamples? 16 c
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What Good are Counterexamples? 18 T
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What Good are Counterexamples? 20 g
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What Good are Counterexamples? 22 p
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Morality, Fiction and Possibility 2
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David Lewis 52 1 Lewis’s Life and
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David Lewis 54 that, and it is comm
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David Lewis 56 co-ordination proble
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David Lewis 58 3.2 Analysis The bas
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David Lewis 60 getting us closer to
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David Lewis 62 the number of new te
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David Lewis 64 So, at least in the
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David Lewis 66 of a belief is a pro
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David Lewis 68 5 Humean Supervenien
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David Lewis 70 Instead of ranking c
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David Lewis 72 5.2 Causation In “
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David Lewis 74 parked cars influenc
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David Lewis 76 to there being at le
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David Lewis 78 In the first chapter
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David Lewis 80 6.3 Paradise on the
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David Lewis 82 problem, what he dub
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David Lewis 84 no classes? Can you
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David Lewis 86 Lewis doubted severa
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David Lewis 88 7.5 Ethics Lewis is
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Part II Epistemology
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Can We Do Without Pragmatic Encroac
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Knowledge, Bets and Interests 1 Kno
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Knowledge, Bets and Interests 118 S
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Knowledge, Bets and Interests 120 d
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Knowledge, Bets and Interests 122 M
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Knowledge, Bets and Interests 124 i
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Knowledge, Bets and Interests 126 T
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Knowledge, Bets and Interests 128
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Knowledge, Bets and Interests 130 q
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Knowledge, Bets and Interests 132 p
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Knowledge, Bets and Interests 134 1
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Knowledge, Bets and Interests 136 w
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Knowledge, Bets and Interests 138 S
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Knowledge, Bets and Interests 140 P
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Defending Interest-Relative Invaria
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Deontology and Descartes’ Demon 1
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Luminous Margins 182 But Tolerance
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Luminous Margins 184 was reliable,
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Luminous Margins 186 he actually ha
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Luminous Margins 188 whether he fee
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Scepticism, Rationalism and Externa
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Disagreements, Philosophical and Ot
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Do Judgments Screen Evidence? 1 Scr
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Do Judgments Screen Evidence? 222 1
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Do Judgments Screen Evidence? 224 o
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Do Judgments Screen Evidence? 226 A
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Do Judgments Screen Evidence? 228 J
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Do Judgments Screen Evidence? 230 N
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Do Judgments Screen Evidence? 232 o
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Do Judgments Screen Evidence? 234 .
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Do Judgments Screen Evidence? 236 O
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Do Judgments Screen Evidence? 238 p
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Easy Knowledge and Other Epistemic
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Induction and Supposition 258 Note
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Induction and Supposition 260 this
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Induction and Supposition 262 one s
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Part III Language
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Epistemic Modals in Context 266 1 A
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Epistemic Modals in Context 268 (11
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Epistemic Modals in Context 270 pro
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Epistemic Modals in Context 272 not
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Epistemic Modals in Context 274 in
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Epistemic Modals in Context 276 But
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Epistemic Modals in Context 278 Mor
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Epistemic Modals in Context 280 Sin
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Epistemic Modals in Context 282 his
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Epistemic Modals in Context 284 Fir
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Epistemic Modals in Context 286 eve
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Epistemic Modals in Context 288 The
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Epistemic Modals in Context 290 jus
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Epistemic Modals in Context 292 we
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Epistemic Modals in Context 294 cer
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Epistemic Modals in Context 296 App
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Epistemic Modals in Context 298 So
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Attitudes and Relativism Data about
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Attitudes and Relativism 302 less c
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Attitudes and Relativism 304 contex
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Attitudes and Relativism 306 take a
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Attitudes and Relativism 308 proble
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Attitudes and Relativism 310 6. In
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Attitudes and Relativism 312 it mea
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Attitudes and Relativism 314 to the
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Conditionals and Indexical Relativi
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Indicatives and Subjunctives This p
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Indicatives and Subjunctives 342 (6
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Indicatives and Subjunctives 344 Th
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Indicatives and Subjunctives 346 3
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Indicatives and Subjunctives 348 (b
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Indicatives and Subjunctives 350 cl
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Indicatives and Subjunctives 352 4
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Assertion, Knowledge and Action Ish
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Assertion, Knowledge and Action 356
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No Royal Road to Relativism 374 are
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No Royal Road to Relativism 376 thi
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No Royal Road to Relativism 378 Haw
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No Royal Road to Relativism 380 the
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Epistemic Modals and Epistemic Moda
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Questioning Contextualism 398 be pr
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Questioning Contextualism 400 (2) D
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Questioning Contextualism 402 Lestr
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Questioning Contextualism 404 And i
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Questioning Contextualism 406 the p
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Questioning Contextualism 408 argum
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Part IV Vagueness
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Many Many Problems 412 we precisify
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Many Many Problems 414 If this is h
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Many Many Problems 416 influence ov
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Many Many Problems 418 our talk and
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Many Many Problems 420 Kilimanjaro(
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Many Many Problems 422 Non-Arbitrar
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Many Many Problems 424 two. 11 In t
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Many Many Problems 426 hard questio
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Vagueness as Indeterminacy Abstract
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Vagueness as Indeterminacy 430 But
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Vagueness as Indeterminacy 432 (f)
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Vagueness as Indeterminacy 434 can
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Vagueness as Indeterminacy 436 seem
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Vagueness as Indeterminacy 438 view
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Vagueness as Indeterminacy 440 Most
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True, Truer, Truest What the world
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True, Truer, Truest 444 But it has
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True, Truer, Truest 446 B2 Some cla
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True, Truer, Truest 448 [∀x: Fx]
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True, Truer, Truest 450 • All the
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True, Truer, Truest 452 (∨ In-lef
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True, Truer, Truest 454 Now (5) is
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True, Truer, Truest 456 True and Tr
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Vagueness and Pragmatics If Louis i
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Vagueness and Pragmatics 460 Option
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Vagueness and Pragmatics 464 in mak
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Vagueness and Pragmatics 466 (10) Y
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Vagueness and Pragmatics 468 premis
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Vagueness and Pragmatics 470 have b
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Vagueness and Pragmatics 472 be exp
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Vagueness and Pragmatics 474 senten
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Vagueness and Pragmatics 476 5 Cons
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Vagueness and Pragmatics 478 As BH
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Vagueness and Pragmatics 480 truth
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Vagueness and Pragmatics 482 (32) a
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Vagueness and Pragmatics 484 links
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From Classical to Intuitionistic Pr
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The Bayesian and the Dogmatist Ther
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Keynes, Uncertainty and Interest Ra
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Stalnaker on Sleeping Beauty The Sl
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Stalnaker on Sleeping Beauty 548 is
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Stalnaker on Sleeping Beauty 550 Wh
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Stalnaker on Sleeping Beauty 552 Wi
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Stalnaker on Sleeping Beauty 554 ju
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Stalnaker on Sleeping Beauty 556 Th
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Dogmatism and Intuitionistic Probab
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Intrinsic Properties and Combinator
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The Asymmetric Magnets Problem Ther
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Chopping Up Gunk John Hawthorne, Br
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Chopping Up Gunk 600 (3) Occupation
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Chopping Up Gunk 602 Further, in th
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Chopping Up Gunk 604 y and z in S,
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Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties
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In Defense of a Kripkean Dogma Jona
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Defending Causal Decision Theory In
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Defending Causal Decision Theory 63
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Page 717 and 718: BIBLIOGRAPHY 714 Barker, Stephen. 1
Page 719 and 720: BIBLIOGRAPHY 716 Campbell, John. 20
Page 721 and 722: BIBLIOGRAPHY 718 DePaul, Michael an
Page 723 and 724: BIBLIOGRAPHY 720 Ellis, Brian. 1991
Page 725 and 726: BIBLIOGRAPHY 722 Geach, P. T. 1969.
Page 727 and 728: BIBLIOGRAPHY 724 Harman, Gilbert. 1
Page 729 and 730: BIBLIOGRAPHY 726 —. 1991. “Deci
Page 731 and 732: BIBLIOGRAPHY 728 —. 1971-1989. Th
Page 733 and 734: BIBLIOGRAPHY 730 —. 1971b. “Cou
Page 735 and 736: BIBLIOGRAPHY 732 —. 1986a. “Eve
Page 737 and 738: BIBLIOGRAPHY 734 —. 2003. “Thin
Page 739 and 740: BIBLIOGRAPHY 736 McCawley, James. 1
Page 741 and 742: BIBLIOGRAPHY 738 —. 1997. “Keyn
Page 743 and 744: BIBLIOGRAPHY 740 Romdenh-Romluc, Ko
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 742 Shoemaker, Sydney.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 744 Stanley, Jason. 20
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 746 Warfield, Ted and
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 748 Wolfe, Tom. 2000.
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