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Online Papers - Brian Weatherson

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Morality, Fiction and Possibility 39<br />

Fixing a Hole<br />

DQ and his buddy SP leave DQ’s apartment at midday Tuesday, leaving a<br />

well-arranged lounge suite and home theatre unit, featuring DQ’s prized<br />

oval television. They travel back in time to Monday, where DQ has<br />

some rather strange and unexpected adventures. He intended to correct<br />

something that happened yesterday, that had gone all wrong the first<br />

time around, and by the time the buddies reunite and leave for Tuesday<br />

(by sleeping and waking up in the future) he’s sure it’s all been sorted.<br />

When DQ and his buddy SP get back to his apartment midday Tuesday,<br />

it looks for all the world like there’s nothing there except an ordinary<br />

knife and fork.<br />

Now this situation would not strike us, were we to see it, as one where there is a<br />

lounge suite and home theatre unit in DQ’s apartment midday Tuesday, for it looks as<br />

if there’s an ordinary knife and fork there. But still, the author gets to say that what’s<br />

in DQ’s apartment as the story opens includes an oval television. And this despite<br />

the fact that the two concepts, TELEVISION and OVAL, are grokking. Perhaps<br />

some epicycles could be added to Yablo’s theory to solve this problem, but for now<br />

the solution is incomplete.<br />

6 Virtue<br />

The content cases may remind us of one of Fodor’s most famous lines about meaning.<br />

I suppose that sooner or later the physicists will complete the catalogue<br />

they’ve been compiling of the ultimate and irreducible properties of<br />

things. When they do, the likes of spin, charm, and charge will perhaps<br />

appear on the list. But aboutness surely won’t; intentionality doesn’t go<br />

that deep . . . If the semantic and the intentional are real properties of<br />

things, it must be in virtue of their identity with (or maybe their supervenience<br />

on?) properties that are themselves neither intentional nor<br />

semantic. If aboutness is real, it must really be something else. (Fodor,<br />

1987, 97)<br />

If meaning doesn’t go that deep, but there are meaning facts, then those facts must<br />

hold in virtue of more fundamental facts. “Molino de viento” means windmill in<br />

Spanish in virtue of a pattern of usage of those words by Spanish speakers, for instance.<br />

It seems that many of the stories above involve facts that hold, if they hold at all,<br />

in virtue of other facts. Had Fodor other interests than intentionality, he may have<br />

written instead that beauty doesn’t go that deep, and neither does television. If an<br />

event is to be beautiful, this is a fact that must obtain in virtue of other facts about<br />

it, perhaps its integrity, wholeness, symmetry and radiance as Aquinas says (Joyce,<br />

1944/1963, 212), and that event being a monster truck death match of doom probably

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