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and persuasive arguments you construct from the evidence at hand. These are the core
activities of intelligence analysis — the “science of analysis,” if you will — discovery,
proof, and choice.
As we all know, failures of intelligence analysis are often widely advertised while
successes are not made public, and often cannot be. The truth is that analysts are routinely
asked to perform tasks for which they have received little if any tutoring. Conventional
courses in logic, probability, and statistics do not prepare a person for the task
of drawing conclusions based on masses of evidence whose items suggest many, often
complex and interrelated, lines of arguments on hypotheses of interest. The evidence of
interest to intelligence analysts usually concerns events that are unique, singular, or
one-of-a-kind and are thus not replicable or repeatable. This means that there are rarely
any useful or relevant statistical records available to draw upon in making inferences
about the capabilities and intentions of potential or real adversaries. We had no existing
statistical records regarding the intentions of foreigners who showed up in our civilian
flying schools wishing only to learn how to steer multiengine aircraft and not how to
perform takeoffs or landings. Lacking existing statistical records to draw upon, we must
generate new information by inquiry, the asking of questions. Skill in asking productive
questions is as vitally necessary in intelligence analysis as it is in any other situation in
which discovery and investigation are necessary. Effective intelligence analysis rests
upon mixtures of both imaginative and critical reasoning. Intelligence analysts whose
work has been exemplary have almost certainly acquired their skill through years of
experience and, perhaps, through often-painful trial and error experiences. Given the
need for accurate and timely intelligence analyses, whose urgency is evident in light of
current events, we cannot afford to have intelligence analysis learned just on the basis
of many trial and error experiences.
But where are the skills of marshaling evidence, analyzing evidence, and the construction
of persuasive arguments in support of intelligence estimates taught? Do we
assume that such analysis is something that can be done instinctively? Or do we think
that collecting and cataloging evidence is more specialized than analyzing evidence? I
start from the premise that such assumptions are false. Basic skills in marshaling and
analyzing evidence are important and teachable skills that are largely neglected in our
intelligence analysis education.
Just as you cannot do very much carpentry with your bare hands, there is not
much thinking you can do with your bare brain.
Bo Dahlbom and Lars-Erik Janlert
As cited by Dennitt in “Kinds of Minds,” 1996
Fortunately, there are methods for marshaling masses of evidence and for constructing
complex arguments that are very useful and that may at least reduce the number of
trial and error experiences that so often accompany learning the business of accurate
and timely intelligence analyses. Some of these methods have been in existence for
decades, but have not been given the attention they deserve. The exception is in the field
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