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trained. Admittedly, we did not know enough about the courses and schedules to develop
precise numbers. But, plainly, a substantial number of people were passing through those
facilities. And, the IC made efforts to estimate those numbers.
This information should have led to an obvious analytical issue. Where were the graduates
going? Neither the Taliban nor the Kashmiri militants were taking substantial casualties,
so that the replacement of their losses would not absorb numerous recruits. Nor were
the Taliban or Kashmiri militant forces expanding markedly. If so, then the camps’ graduates
were going elsewhere. Why? In retrospect, an obvious question, but, at the time, it went
unasked. Or, if asked, it went unaddressed. Either way, it was a failure of vision.
The destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas in the spring of 2001 is an even clearer example,
albeit in hindsight, of our failure of vision. Despite enormous international pressure,
including efforts made by a number of major Islamic nations, to emphasize that these
massive rock carvings were a global treasure, the Taliban regime destroyed them in a
world-class act of cultural vandalism. At the time, we judged that it was yet another ignorant
act of the Taliban, reflecting simply their primitive hostility to anything outside their
narrow worldview. In a word, the vandalism seemed to serve no purpose. What we did not
stop to consider is that the destruction actually served a very clear purpose for Bin Laden.
Since arriving in Afghanistan from Sudan, Bin Laden used his close ties to Mullah
Omar, the Taliban ruler, to gradually develop a state within a state. Al Qaeda personnel
not only enjoyed free rein within Afghanistan, they gradually moved to assert increasing
control over security and general Taliban policy. We now know that other Taliban leaders
were becoming increasingly wary of the influence of Bin Laden’s ambition. They also
were becoming worried by their regime’s growing international isolation.
These leaders were by no means agreed on the destruction of the Buddhas, a decision
that seems to have been Omar’s alone. For Omar, the destruction appears to have
been driven by his skewed vision of Islam. Other Taliban leaders worried that the
destruction would further weaken their ties to such key supporters as Saudi Arabia and
Pakistan, both of whom opposed the act, and other Muslim states. The destruction produced
exactly that result.
The originator and energizer of the destruction was Bin Laden. While his religious
convictions played a role, the true purpose of the destruction was indeed to further isolate
the Taliban regime internationally. Such isolation was helpful, if not essential, to his gaining
de facto control of the Taliban state.
Our failure of vision settled on assuming that this destruction was an act of spectacular
ignorant vandalism. No one in the IC stopped to ponder whether there were other motives,
that is, another, more rational logic for this act. Had we done so, we might have had a
much better sense of Bin Laden’s ambition and his strategic skill.
As we are all now well aware of Al Qaeda’s actions and our efforts to destroy it, I will
conclude my remarks here with a few final observations.
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