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learning with professionals - Higgins Counterterrorism Research ...

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cannot be expected to become an expert quickly, the thirst for knowledge, analytic skills<br />

and logical procedures of the dedicated analyst, can, over time, assisting in developing the<br />

required expertise. Furthermore, a good North Korean missile analyst may be able to<br />

make some useful statements about missiles in the Middle East — having dealt <strong>with</strong> the<br />

same missiles in North Korea. But the level of capability is sharply reduced when the analyst<br />

is working outside the area of his or her specialized knowledge. The North Korean<br />

missile analyst, for example, may be limited in assessing the doctrine and method of<br />

employing those missiles in the Middle East or in understanding the geopolitical environment<br />

in which Middle Eastern decisionmaking takes place.<br />

Information: The Raw Material of Analysis<br />

Intelligence analysts have a wide array of classified and unclassified information<br />

sources available. Unfortunately, the mediocre analyst is often trapped in the so-called<br />

“inbox syndrome.”<br />

That is, the only information considered is that which is delivered to the analyst’s desk,<br />

or today, to the analyst’s computer. That is not enough; active information searching is critical.<br />

Thus, first, the analyst needs to have a full array of information sources available. Poor<br />

analysis, in an organization <strong>with</strong> meager information sources, is not the fault of the analyst,<br />

but the fault of the manager who has failed to provide the information resources needed.<br />

Assuming the information systems are available, the experienced analyst will not only<br />

know how to use them, but will be a facile user, able to quickly ferret out information.<br />

Systems that should be available include, at a minimum, Intelink, specialized data systems,<br />

and the Internet. In addition, the analyst needs to be intimately familiar <strong>with</strong> the<br />

intelligence organization’s library.<br />

Information comes in a variety of qualities. Thus, the skilled analyst is a shrewd evaluator<br />

of information. According to an old axiom, a reliable source does not always yield<br />

reliable information, while a marginally reliable source sometimes provides accurate<br />

information. A correct evaluation of the accuracy of information requires a mental database<br />

against which the new information is compared, and multiple sources to verify it.<br />

Unfortunately, the inexperienced analyst is more likely to accept all information as accurate,<br />

sometimes <strong>with</strong> tragic consequences.<br />

The use of multiple sources to ensure accuracy is critical to useful and actionable analysis.<br />

Verification through the use of information from more than one intelligence source is<br />

at the heart of all-source analysis. Increasingly, the competent analyst will ensure that<br />

unclassified sources are added to the mix. Or, perhaps, it might be better to say that the<br />

competent analyst will ensure that classified sources will be effectively integrated <strong>with</strong> his<br />

or her overall unclassified database of knowledge about the subject under consideration.<br />

Intelligence analysis is more difficult than academic analysis because the target of intelligence<br />

interest frequently is taking active measures to hide the information, or to deceive the<br />

analyst. Thus, multiple sources are a must. At times, however, the analyst may be forced to<br />

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