learning with professionals - Higgins Counterterrorism Research ...

Opportunity-based warning is vulnerable to unanticipated consequences. This is true
even when the system works properly. The Reagan Administration, engaged in what it
saw as an ideological war with the Soviet Union, launched a campaign of anti-Soviet
rhetoric in March 1983. Instituted at a time when the Soviets were fighting in Afghanistan
and expanding their influence in Central America, the campaign was designed to
demonstrate increased American commitment to democracy around the world. An
already paranoid Soviet leadership misread President Reagan’s denunciations, his support
for development of the Strategic Defense Initiative, and his drive to deploy
medium range ballistic missiles in Europe. Given their preconceptions, they read the
events as indicators of an impending preemptive nuclear strike by the U.S.
When NATO forces in Europe commenced a scheduled command post exercise (codenamed
Able Archer) to practice nuclear release procedures in November 1983, the Soviet
intelligence services and military prepared for war. 123 When the President learned how
close the two countries had come to an unintended nuclear exchange he was shocked and
immediately became more conciliatory in his approach toward the Soviets. A few days
after the end of the exercise he wrote in his diary, I feel the Soviets are...so paranoid about
being attacked that without in any way being soft on them, we ought to tell them no one
here has any intention of doing anything like that.” 124 A campaign of rhetoric designed to
send a message had broadcast the wrong one at a bad time, and nearly led to an unintended
nuclear war.
Despite the potential problems associated with opportunity-based warning, it is a concept
whose time has come. Threat-based warning must remain the highest priority of the
Intelligence Community, but it must not be the only form of warning which leaders
receive. The strategic warning community needs to reevaluate the scope of its mission and
expand its charter to include opportunity-based warning. While there are many challenges
associated with such an effort, there are many compelling benefits as well. It is time to
start methodically advancing our national interests rather than merely defending them.
123 Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc, 1995),
471-477.
124 Andrew, 476.
85