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overseer, to stay a part of the process, “to have a seat at the table,” congressional committees must have jurisdiction over an executive branch agency or program. As may be seen in this case, jurisdictional concerns were paramount largely because Members sincerely wanted to play a part in guiding NIMA’s evolution over time. THE CREATION OF NIMA: CONGRESS’S ROLE AS OVERSEER Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee... we can no longer afford redundant capabilities in several different agencies… I will move immediately to consolidate the management of all imagery collection, analysis, and distribution. In my judgment both effectiveness and economy can be improved by managing imagery in a manner similar to the National Security Agency’s organization for signals intelligence. 369 —Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Candidate John Deutch WHY NIMA? The consolidation of imagery promised by John Deutch during his testimony to the SSCI, in his confirmation hearings for the position of Director of Central Intelligence, was a direct reference to the concept of a National Imagery and Mapping Agency. Deutch agreed with those who wanted to assemble all or part of as many as eight agencies or programs into a single, focused imagery agency. The pieces to be assembled would include: Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), Central Intelligence Agency’s National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), Central Imagery Office (CIO), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Imagery Processing, . Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO), Defense Intelligence Agency’s Photographic Interpretation Section (DIA/PGX), Defense Dissemination Program Office (DDPO) and Central Intelligence Agency’s imagery-related elements/programs. According to Leo Hazlewood, then CIA Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Deutch’s announcement “came as a complete surprise to the bureaucracy at Langley’’ (CIA headquarters). 370 Senior leadership there thought the NIMA idea had died in the early 1990s, due to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Colin Powell’s opposition. Deutch brought the idea back to life in April 1995. 369 U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Confirmation Hearings of John Deutch, 94th Congress, 1st sess., 26 April 1995, 1, 8 and 9. 370 Leo Hazlewood, Deputy Director, NIMA Implementation Team, interview by the author, 6 October 2000 220
The idea for such an agency seems to have been first put into writing as a conclusion in the Burnett Panel Report. 371 The panel, established in 1992 by DCI Gates, was charged with examining the structure guiding the Intelligence Community’s imagery assets and one of its recommendations was to integrate imagery and mapping. 372 Reorganization of the entire defense establishment was a popular idea in the early 1990s, following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. 373 At about the same time, reorganization of the Intelligence Community was popular in the aftermath of DESERT STORM. Leo Hazlewood attributes the attractiveness of a NIMA concept to three particular problems encountered during that operation: jurisdictional disputes over the dissemination of imagery, competing tasking authorities, and confusion over who owned NPIC (CIA or DIA). 374 The Burnett Panel sought solutions to these problems and many others. Its recommendation for an agency like NIMA was based on a conceptual seed planted by Keith Hall, the person Leo Hazlewood calls the “intellectual father’’ of the NIMA concept. As Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security at the time the Panel was deliberating, Hall sold his idea to several panel members. In fact, the FY 1992 Intelligence Authorization Bill recommended establishing a National Imagery Agency (NIA) in line with the Burnett Panel recommendation. The timing was not right, however, in either the executive or legislative branches, for reasons discussed later in this article. It would take another four years and the notoriety of problems associated with the Central Imagery Office (CIO) to “make NIMA happen.’’ NIMA was created near the end of the l04th Congress-a Congress in which there were numerous proposals to reorganize the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). An intensive review undertaken by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. (HPSCI) culminated in a lengthy document titled IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century and legislation called the Intelligence Community Act (H.R. 3237), reported to the floor of the House on 13 June 1996. Also in 1996, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) was engaged in its own hearings, building upon an extensive set of interviews carried out in the early 1990s. The Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, known as the Aspin-Brown Commission, was also winding up a year-long investigation along these same lines. The Aspin-Brown Commission presented its report to the SSCI in formal testimony on 6 March 1996; 375 the SSCI Chairman 371 The Burnett Panel was made up of active or retired senior military officers according to Greg Jay, Contractor with Booz, Allen and Hamilton, in “Creating the National Imagery and Mapping Agency: A Studies Roundtable,” in Studies in Intelligence 42, no. 1 (1998): 42. According to Hazlewood, DCI Gates handpicked its members. It was one of 15-17 task forces created by Gates when he first became DCI. Hazlewood interview. 372 According to Leo Hazlewood in “Creating the National Imagery and Mapping Agency: A Studies Roundtable,” in Studies in Intelligence 42, no. 1 (1998): 42. Article cited hereafter as “Creation of NIMA.” 373 The “peace dividend” was widely viewed as an opportunity to cut defense spending and increase spending on domestic issues such as education. Thus, a variety of terms such as downsizing, restructuring, streamlining, consolidation of assets, and so on, came to be associated with budget cutting. These ideas fit nicely with Vice President Gore’s Reinventing Government initiatives. Many reorganization studies, undertaken in the name of greater efficiency, also had budget cutting goals as a high priority. 374 Hazlewood interview. 375 Harold Brown, Warren Rudman, and Les Aspin, Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence (Washington, DC: GPO, 6 March 1996). The report is widely known as “Aspin-Brown.” 221
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Joint Military Intelligence College
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The Joint Military Intelligence Col
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The History of Intelligence The San
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THE WORK OF INTELLIGENCE
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carefully considered positions on t
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ies out a significant part of Sherm
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To illustrate the fulfillment of Ke
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have I taken any example out of con
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Effective only for producers on a f
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“. . . the month of February . .
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paper — preferably a disintereste
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sentences — like a supercomma or
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Completeness The flip side of the c
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about the subject — that your pap
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gence. But the use of intelligence
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international conference highlighte
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PART I INTELLIGENCE PROCESS [I]ntel
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intelligence products may be descri
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Human Source Intelligence (HUMINT)
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Table 2. Illustrative Definitions o
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As with the “Five Ws,” this mod
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Types of Intelligence Requirements
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Table 6. Intelligence Values Source
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■ Thirdly, the skilled analyst mu
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ely on only one source, because no
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needed, but it is up to the individ
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GETTING INTELLIGENCE RIGHT: THE POW
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ner, process improvement initiative
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FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF INTELLIGE
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product is shaped, analysts and man
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from an inductive reasoning process
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Information assimilation, the fitti
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Man is not rational, merely capable
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Documentation also helps minimize b
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Politicization. The Principle of Ob
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Classic errors in format include th
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Pitfalls that Limit Relevance Proce
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To the dismay of their customers, m
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motion picture analogy, time serves
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is extensible, universally open to
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Figure 5. Relating Process to Princ
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OPENING WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY: THE
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today’s strategic warning network
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with their perceptions of basic dem
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eliminate a threat or exploit an op
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Opportunity-based warning is vulner
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Except for varying opinions among p
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The style of traditional Western ed
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Figure 10. The NPIC Update. Source:
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ut that “the drawing teacher has
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Only the best tools can support a c
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Figure 13. Harmon’s Version of a
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After explaining the lesson behind
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Figure 17. Pattern. Source: Kennedy
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First Lieutenant Matthew S. Weingas
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amount, 203 but psychologists have
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When gifted seers depart the Colleg
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SPY FICTION, SPY REALITY 211 Jon A.
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Examples of this practice are fairl
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gence officer. W. E. B. Griffins mu
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you feel the appeal of the Resistan
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Short, fat and of a quiet dispositi
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assassinate Castro; the list includ
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A number of interviews touched on a
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and persuasive arguments you constr
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and necessary in any discovery-rela
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… it is rather more difficult for
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I will, however, note one crucial p
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drawn from Western history that soc
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trained. Admittedly, we did not kno
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HOMELAND SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE:
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Finally, we must ask how all this c
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turbulent aftermath produced a lot
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occurs is in the eyes of the behold
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gence, it was evident that the cult
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national intelligence estimates, re
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The military is in a support role o
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Committee on Governmental Affairs i
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LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND POLITICAL/MILIT
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cause and to their computer and lib
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(1) Make membership of the House an
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which the nation was founded, such
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THE SAN CRISTOBAL TRAPEZOID By A. D
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Page 207 and 208: Thursday, 7 April In his 0700 hours
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Page 249 and 250: High Commissioner for Refugees (UNH
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Page 255 and 256: likely to occur (Boutros-Ghali a: 4
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hegemonic power fighting various gr
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the U.S. government have personal a
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attack in a Tokyo subway and contin
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Religion has effectively filled a v
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who would contend that the current
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The relevance of this discussion is
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classified and is subject to strict
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The RAC and its decentralized Insti
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Although researchers at Asilomar we
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The published report was the subjec
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■ Fourth, university faculties ha
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esearch community a free pass, maki
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In response to the recommendations
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“SALSA FOR CYBER SONICS,” EDUCA
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“OSINT?” the cyber sonic asks.
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As we meet today, the College’s a
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INTELLIGENCE: AN ECONOMIC GOOD Mark
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less, Congress “artificially” l
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■ Synergistic Value. Synergy mean
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Granted, because of the subjectivit
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impact the calculation of time, in
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so that an optimal strategy can be
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cally areas which lack significant,
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notably heroin and marijuana, to Am
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ment model every administration has
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IT ISN’T THE ACQUISITION, BUT THE
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Just as military analysts seek enem
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ing Intelligence by Principles of Q
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■ Colonel Thomas W. Shreeve, Unit
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More information can be found at ht
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