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Strategic warning is an intelligence function in both the U.S. military and the UNHCR.
Each organization conducts warning activities intended to enable proactive responses to
impending refugee crises. However, there are significant differences in the concept of
warning and the warning systems found in the U.S. military and the UNHCR. These differences
arise from the divergent purposes of each organization. The military exists to
fight wars, while the UNHCR is a refugee protection and assistance organization. This
section compares the warning systems in the UNHCR and the U.S. military. After first
considering the different concepts of warning in each organization, I conclude that the
UNHCR’s strategic warning is more effective than belated warnings of refugee flows in
the U.S. military.
WARNING IS PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF AN EVENT
There is no universally recognized concept of what constitutes warning of an impending
crisis or disaster, but a common definition might be: Warning is knowledge of a future
event early enough to allow action to influence events. Within a military context, several
respected scholars share a fundamental assumption that the goal of warning is to prevent
surprise (Betts: 5; Kam: 22). Within the UN, however, early warning is linked to concepts
as diverse as “early notification, urgent action, the good offices of the Secretary-General,
crisis control and preventive diplomacy” (Ramcharan: 7-8). In both the U.S. Government
and the UN, however, the concepts of warning are inextricably linked to a desire to act to
preempt or mitigate a crisis (McCarthy: 5; Dmitrichev: 264).
Warning in the U.S. Military
During most recent refugee operations, the U.S. military has had little warning prior to
commencement of its relief efforts. 491 Certainly, the amount of warnings issued to policymakers
and the reluctance of the U.S. to act preventively has varied in each instance, but
Rwanda represents the worst possible warning failure on the part of the military. The
senior military intelligence officer responsible for warning of the crisis admitted his attention
was focused on other areas when the crisis erupted (Hayden: 18-19). Furthermore,
the commander of the U.S. relief effort noted the difficulty his intelligence staff had
“because there was no ‘enemy’ on which to focus, but rather a “situation’” (USEUCOM
a: 5). Thus, the military often experiences problems in applying wartime warning techniques
to peacetime warning situations.
491 For instance, the U.S. European Command mounted Operation PROVIDE COMFORT-the 1991 mission
to assist the Kurds in northern Iraq-less than 24 hours after notification! See U.S. European Command (USEU-
COM), Operation PROVIDE COMFORT After-Action Report, 1-4. More recently, in Operation SAFE
HAVEN, the commander of the JTF had about 96 hours notice until he was expected to receive and care for
10,000 Haitians. Ultimately, political considerations delayed the JTF’s activation and changed the mission from
assisting Haitians to Cubans, but there was very little initial warning. James L. Wilson, BG, USA, former commander,
JTF SAFE HAVEN, interview by author, 3 April 1996.
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