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<strong>with</strong> their perceptions of basic democratic principles. This will require a clear definition<br />

of opportunity-based warning which specifies both procedural methods and objectives. It<br />

will also require a clarification of associated terminology to neutralize potentially<br />

“loaded” words or phrases. Having laid this foundation it will then be necessary to<br />

address specific concerns which arise when the government moves to take advantage of<br />

opportunity-based warning.<br />

The Doolittle Report, submitted to President Eisenhower in 1954, demonstrated an<br />

acute appreciation of how important public perception is to proactive intelligence operations.<br />

Promoting expanded covert operations against the Soviet Union at the height of the<br />

Cold War, the committee observed:<br />

It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy [the U.S.S.R.] whose<br />

avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever<br />

cost. There are norules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human<br />

conduct do not apply. If the U.S. is to survive, long-standing American concepts<br />

of “fair play’’ must be reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage<br />

and counter-espionage services. We must learn to subvert, sabotage and<br />

destroy our enemies by more clear, more sophisticated and more effective<br />

methods than those used against us. It may become necessary that the American<br />

people be made acquainted <strong>with</strong>, understand and support this fundamentally<br />

repugnant philosophy. 118<br />

Even in a time when the threat was clearly defined there was an innate hesitation to<br />

engage in active measures against a dedicated opponent. In a nation where the convention<br />

of “never start a fight, but always finish one” has been a precept handed down over generations,<br />

the public has difficulty reconciling its ethics <strong>with</strong> the secrecy and duplicity of<br />

intelligence work. In a world less threatening, and yet more unstable, it is even more vital<br />

to address the American concept of “fair play” when justifying the need for proactive<br />

intelligence measures.<br />

The definitions of threat-based warning proposed by Mary McCarthy and John<br />

McCreary (and used earlier in this paper), provide a solid framework for the definition of<br />

opportunity-based warning: Opportunity-based warning is the process of communicating<br />

judgments about opportunities which may advance U.S. security or policy interests to<br />

decisionmakers. Such communications must be received and understood in order for<br />

leaders to take action that can encourage, enhance, or focus the opportunity for the greatest<br />

strategic advantage. This definition states the methods and objectives associated <strong>with</strong><br />

opportunity-based warning, highlighting both the similarities and the differences between<br />

the two warning types.<br />

Inflammatory language was purposefully excluded from the definition. However, its<br />

proactive tone may elicit impressions — embodied in words like predatory, opportunistic,<br />

118 Loch K. Johnson, Secret Agencies: U.S. Intelligence in a Hostile World (New Haven, CT: Yale University<br />

Press, 1996), 138.<br />

81

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