learning with professionals - Higgins Counterterrorism Research ...
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At this point, a NIMA Director-Designate was appointed to lead an Implementation<br />
Team drawn from the intelligence and mapping communities. On 28 November 1995,<br />
RADM Joseph (“Jack’’) Dantone, Jr., USN, was announced as the Director-Designate.<br />
His three deputies were Dr. Annette Krygiel from CIO, Leo Hazlewood from CIA and W.<br />
Douglas Smith from DMA. Sharon Basso moved over from CIO to take charge of Communications<br />
and Congressional Liaison and was responsible for developing a “legislative<br />
strategy’’ to push NIMA through Congress quickly. The team had a package ready for<br />
Congress by 15 April 1996. 437 Leo Hazlewood was told by staffers on the Intelligence<br />
Committees, “If it ain’t here by 15 April, it ain’t.’’ 438<br />
THE LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY<br />
Thus, by the time the Implementation Team was assembled, it had about four months<br />
to craft a package acceptable to both the executive branch and Congress. The pressure<br />
from Deutch was constant. He ordered them to be on the Hill in December to determine<br />
the interests and concerns of relevant committees, members and staffers. Sharon Basso<br />
was the team’s “eyes and ears’’ on the Hill. She remembers the extraordinary support the<br />
team received from CIA’s Congressional Affairs Office. 439 Team members arranged meetings<br />
<strong>with</strong> anyone who would agree to hear them out. According to Hazlewood, members<br />
rarely had the time and most considered it “a staffer issue.’’ He found House Republican<br />
Members the hardest group to schedule time <strong>with</strong> and remembers rescheduling an<br />
appointment four times <strong>with</strong> one Congressman before finally giving up. 440 It was an election<br />
year, and setting up a new agency was not high on their list of priorities. 441<br />
Leo Hazlewood remembers that the team had to worry about thirteen different committees<br />
— Intelligence, Armed Services, Appropriations, Foreign Relations, Judiciary<br />
(on Freedom of Information matters), Government Operations (on personnel authorities)<br />
(six each in the House and Senate) — plus the Joint Committee on Printing (for a<br />
GPO exemption, since in-house capability was needed for printing classified information).<br />
Most of its time, however, was spent <strong>with</strong> the Intelligence Committee staffers.<br />
Questions usually focused on committee jurisdictional concerns (protecting DCI or<br />
Secretary of Defense interests), how to balance national and combat commander support,<br />
the nature of NIMA’s leadership structure, cost and programmatics (NFIP or<br />
JMIP), personnel concerns such as the DMA union membership issue, and constituent<br />
interests. He recalled being asked, “Are you going to take jobs out of my district?’’ This<br />
became a big concern of Minority Leader Dick Gephardt (DMA in St Louis, MO) and<br />
Senator Arlen Specter (DMA in Philadelphia, PA). 442<br />
437 “Creation of NIMA,” 45. See Appendix G for a copy of a briefing summarizing NIMA’s purpose, Implementation<br />
Team members, and team schedule, working groups, and other background material. See Appendix H<br />
for a diagram of the NIMA decision process. See Appendices J and K for what agencies or programs were<br />
included in or excluded from the NIMA concept.<br />
438 SASC Professional Staffer interview. See Appendix F for a copy of the MOA.<br />
439 Hazlewood interview.<br />
440 Basso interview.<br />
441 Hazlewood interview.<br />
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