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able, for the most part, to both the executive branch and other committees such as Armed
Services. 407
The HPSCI elected to break new ground, not having previous testimony to rely on, and
took a different path under Chairman Larry Combest, resulting in the lengthy IC21: Intelligence
Community in the 21st Century, published by the HPSCI in April 1996. Chairman
Combest hired Mark Lowenthal, a man with many years of experience within academia
and the executive branch and noted for his numerous publications on the IC, specifically
because he could conduct the broad type of inquiry Combest wanted to see. Lowenthal
and Combest agreed on a manner of approach. 408 The report summarized its approach by
saying, “Everything is on the table. There are no sacred cows in terms of organizations,
missions or functions. 409 The changes proposed in IC-21 were revolutionary, far reaching,
I and largely unacceptable to both the executive branch and other committees such as
Armed Services (at least at first, for reasons mainly due to turf). 410
A major theme in IC-21 was the elimination of “stovepipes,’’ 411 within the IC. The
House Intelligence committee suggested more “synergy’’ and “corporateness’’ as a way
to break down barriers created by too many stovepipes and warned that “the current trend
within the IC seems to be one that would reinforce the stovepipe approach, further compounding
problems for little or no perceived gain. 412 Thus, the HPSCI’s response to the
executive branch proposal for an NIA was “Why do you want another stovepipe? 413 (In
fact, the SSCI thought that the HPSCI’s reorganization of the IC would create new and
different stovepipes by inserting another layer of authority over all the organizations.) 414
Leo Hazlewood remembers responding that NIMA would be a “porous stovepipe’’
designed to improve access to imagery-derived information. 415
The HPSCI was also opposed to NIMA because it thought that “tactical support would
win, strategic support would lose. 416 As Mark Lowenthal recalls, “We thought that NIMA
would ‘suck up’ imagery to the military with nothing left over for State, etc. It would be
407 The SSCI was more invested in Aspin-Brown recommendations than the HPSCI, because Aspin-Brown
had come largely at the initiative of Senator Warner and was thus more a Senate creation than a House one.”
Lowenthal interview.
408 Lowenthal interview.
409 Lowenthal interview.
410 For example, IC-21 recommended increased budgetary authority for the DCI; the creation of an independent
Clandestine Service made up of the Defense HUMINT Service and CIA’s DO; and regrouping of IC agencies
so that management of all technical collection assets would be consolidated together, all acquisition assets
consolidated, and so on.
411 Stovepipes refer to any narrow hierarchy of assets. For example collection stovepipes are defined in IC-
21 as “types of collection that are managed so as to be largely distinct from one another” resulting in too much
competition for resources and too little central control of overall collection needs. IC-21, 22.
412 IC-21, 22.
413 Hazlewood, “Creation of NIMA,” 41.
414 55 SSCI Professional Staffer interview.
415 Hazlewood interview.
416 Lowenthal interview. Lowenthal was defining “strategic” as support to the national policymakers, particularly
the White House and State Department, and “tactical” support as that to military commanders. Lowenthal had
worked at State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) prior to his position on the HPSCI.
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