atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 5 ı May
Detective Application Security Controls
for Nuclear Safety
Deeksha Gupta, Karl Waedt and Yuan Gao
The current Draft Nuclear IEC 63096 New Work Item Proposal (NWIP), a new downstream standard of IEC
62645, distinguishes between preventive, detective and corrective security controls. The focus of this paper is on
resilient detective cybersecurity controls that are needed especially for high security degrees in the context of Advanced
Persistent Threats (APTs). The Stuxnet malware demonstrates that sophisticated attacks on physical processes
can make use of both, the manipulation of output signals that control the automation equipment in parallel with
manipulations of the graphical process feedback information displayed to users. In the international IAEA coordinated
research proposal CRP J02008 several project partners investigate (as one of the objectives) the development of
detective security controls that do not rely on the process control software itself. Thus, a manipulation of the process
control software could still be detected by the detective security controls implemented by diverse means.
Implementing detective security controls at this conceptual
level requires knowledge about selected analog and binary
variables corresponding to the current state of physical
processes. This knowledge (expressed as modeled specifications
of expected safe transitions and value ranges) is
needed in order to detect potential manipulations. In
the case of Stuxnet this corresponds to detecting the
high frequency speed variations of centrifuges (with the
aim of physically destroying them) without regard to
the ( manipulated, maliciously reassuring) information
displayed to operators.
This paper will address the selection of process
variables, the different points at which these process
variables can be acquired, the equipment used for the
acquisition (e.g. additional networking equipment or
enhanced embedded software), the aggregation of the
variables, the detective logic and the reporting towards a
Security Information and Event Management System
( SIEM). The paper will also explain how existing nuclear
safety impact analyses can be leveraged by replacing the
typical safety events (e.g. due to ageing or random failures)
by graded targeted security attack events.
The semi-formal description of the detective security
controls will make use of the Application Security Control
(ASC) concepts as introduced by ISO/IEC 27034-x.
This approach is fully in line with Nuclear IEC 62859
that provides requirements on coordinating safety
and cybersecurity. The recommendations on separating
selected detective security controls from the process
control software can be achieved by avoiding an increased
complexity and the possibility of retroactions of security
measures on safety related functionality.
to physical property, computer system, information or
other assets.
The detective application security controls provide
alternative or enhanced protection means as part of a
security defense-in-depth concept. Accordingly, for a new
NPP they may serve as security enhancements while for an
existing NPP they may serve as an effective and cost-saving
alternative, in cases where the legacy process control
software cannot be easily revised to include cybersecurity
specific functionality.
In principle the term “Cybersecurity Control” or just
“Security Control” denotes one or a set of Cyber Security
countermeasures. Security Controls are applied during all
lifecycle phases of the I&C-product or project [4]. In an
( initially) non safety related context several Security
Controls are similar to measures that are by default implemented
in safety systems. These include, e.g., the degree
of requirements traceability (e.g., to avoid the intro duction
of requirements on debugging functionality that may later
be misused for manipulations) and requirements on
testing. However, the Security Level [2, 3] of a subsystem
may be increased due to results of a risk assessment [5].
This may mandate the implementation of individual
security controls that have to be met only for higher safety
classes [4].
IEC 62645 [8] is the top level nuclear cybersecurity
standard. It defines security controls for the nuclear
285
ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY
Introduction
Cybersecurity is considered as a major element of physical
protection plans for nuclear facilities and it should be
implemented from the initial phase of nuclear facility
design [1]. In nuclear power plants (NPPs), I&C systems
have evolved during the last decades from non-digital
equipment and standalone environments to digital
technologies and interconnected systems. Such an
evolution exposes them to risks related to cyberattacks.
The cyberattack can later affect the safety of the NPP.
Cyberattack or digital attack is the attempt by digital
means to destroy, expose, alter, disable, steal or gain
unauthorized access to or make unauthorized use of an
asset [2]. To minimize these risks security controls
provides the countermeasures to avoid, detect, counteract
| | Fig. 1.
Example Plant Operation related to Security Control for a Detective System [6, 7].
Environment and Safety
Detective Application Security Controls for Nuclear Safety ı Deeksha Gupta, Karl Waedt and Yuan Gao
Change language