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PREFACE xiii Sources: How Do We Know What We Know? One of the single most important concerns of any leader— military, business, or civilian—is intelligence. Not the IQ kind (I’ve known some good leaders who are not so bright), but the kind that yields information. What gossip and rumors do we listen to? Why? Whose report is to be believed? When do we trust the reports of Wall Street analysts? Does a particular board informant have an agenda unknown to us? Where did the consultant get her information, and why should we believe her? Do we trust this industry analyst? Is our intelligence about the competition accurate? Is our internal strategic-planning analysis of strengths accurate, or is it overstated for political reasons? Similarly, are our weaknesses understated? You can see (and you know from experience) that knowledge is power. Power, though, derives from accurate intelligence, accurate information, and accurate knowledge. The questions are: How do you know what information is accurate, and what do you believe? In a parallel vein, how do historians know what they know about Alexander the Great, and why should you believe them? If you can’t believe the sources, then are you learning bogus lessons? What knowledge do we believe? Why? When? Sources: Accounting Irregularities In historical writing, we compare the various sources of data and make informed judgments, just like any decision maker in any organization.
xiv PREFACE All of the classical sources exaggerate the losses of Alexander’s opponents. Why? Well, each author has a perspective to air. Plutarch, for example, seemed to make his heroes bigger than life (unnecessary in Alexander’s case), so he usually reported the higher numbers asserted. Others seem to opt for more accuracy, though the second great battle, at Issus, shows the disparities. Arrian, generally considered the most accurate and reliable historian, reported 100,000 Persians and 10,000 cavalry killed at this battle. This number must be greatly inflated. Alexander lost perhaps 1,000 troops, and even a ten-to-one casualty ratio is unheard of, except at Zama, Agincourt, and a few other battles. Surely, Issus did not qualify as such a lopsided battle. Exaggeration has many friends, and few enemies. CEOs take credit for successes, real or not, and inflated numbers make the victory seem all that much more magnificent. The smaller the loss, the less troubling it is to the board of directors, so exaggeration works for leaders in both directions, if properly managed. So what we look for in strategic planning, accounting auditing, and history are independent audits. The victor writes history, which is hardly independent. Successful CEOs are generally believed. When they fail, their opponent’s version becomes truth. Truth is seldom absolute in battle. Even with modern battlefield intelligence, leaders often remain unclear about events. Histories written by those who saw only a portion of the field, and who necessarily rely on the similarly biased observations of others, necessarily provide inaccurate data. Sometimes modern historians can compare all the reports and do a fair job of sorting out the inconsistencies and prejudices.
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Page 6 and 7: CONTENTS Foreword .................
Page 8 and 9: CONTENTS vii 33: Ablutions, Celebra
Page 10 and 11: FOREWORD Alexander the Great as a l
Page 12 and 13: PREFACE Leadership cannot be taught
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Page 20 and 21: ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xix Dickerson, Andy
Page 23 and 24: RÉSUMÉ Alexander the Great SIGNIF
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100 THE WISDOM OF ALEXANDER THE GRE
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The heart of the Persian Empire—m
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156 APPENDIX 326 Battle at River Hy
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158 BIBLIOGRAPHY Fildes, Alan, and
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164 INDEX Alexander the Great (cont
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166 INDEX integration of cultures,
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168 INDEX Sogdiana, Rock of, 65 Sov
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