Law of Wills, 2016A

days. These provisions constitute a disposition of property that is different from the statutory
requirement of survival for only 120 hours after the testator dies. Thus, the statute does not apply to
those provisions. Id. However, paragraph 2.02 in each will provides for certain bequests if both
Vencie and Melba “die in a common disaster or under circumstances making it impossible to
determine which of [them] died first.” This language indicates that their intent was to avoid the
bequest going to one of them if they died simultaneously or almost simultaneously. This is also the
intent of the statute, which prevents property from passing into the estate of a second person who is
already deceased only to be distributed immediately from that estate. See Glover v. Davis, 366 S.W.2d
227, 231 (Tex.1963).The Beards articulated their intent to provide for a disposition of some of their
property that was different from provisions of the statute but worded paragraph 2.02 in a manner
that is consistent with the Simultaneous Death Act. They could have used the same language in
paragraph 2.02 as they did in the other paragraphs if they wanted the same result. The trial court did
not err in its construction of the wills. We overrule Stephens’s second issue.
DISPOSITION
The trial court properly concluded that the Beards died in a common disaster and the Simultaneous
Death Act applies to paragraph 2.02 of each will.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment in each case.
3.3.4 Brain Death vs. Hearth Death
It is difficult to determine survival without a clear meaning of death. As the next case
indicates, the law often grapples with the concept of legal death.
In re Haymer, 450 N.E.2d 940 (Ill. App. 3d 1983)
RIZZI, Justice:
On October 28, 1982, Loyola University of Chicago, which owns and operates Foster G. McGaw
Hospital in Cook County, Illinois, sought a declaratory judgment that its patient, 7-month-old Alex
B. Haymer, was legally dead, thereby permitting the hospital to remove Alex B. Haymer from a
mechanical ventilation system. The child’s parents opposed the removal of the mechanical device, as
did the child’s guardian ad litem. Following an expedited hearing, the trial court entered an order on
November 4, 1982, which provided that the legal death of Alex B. Haymer occurred on October 23,
1982, the date when doctors determined that the child had suffered the total and irreversible
cessation of all functions of the entire brain. The order also authorized Foster G. McGaw Hospital,
Loyola University Medical Center, to discontinue the mechanical ventilation system connected to the
body of Alex B. Haymer. The trial court stayed the force and effect of its order for seven days to
give the parties an opportunity to have appellate review of the order before the mechanical
ventilation system was removed. The State of Illinois was permitted to intervene on the ground that
it had an interest in the investigation and prosecution of any deaths which may have been caused by
any criminal action in Cook County. The State objected to the stay on the basis that the
circumstances surrounding the alleged legal death of Alex B. Haymer were suspicious, and that the
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